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ADDENDUM

v

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the above-entitled Court
by Section 78-2a-3)2)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the Judgment of the Fifth District Court, in
and for Washington County, State of Utah, the Honorable James L. Shumate,
presiding, and sitting with a jury, wherein the Defendant was convicted of
Murder, a first-degree felony.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
(PRESERVATION OF APPEAL ON THE RECORD)
ISSUE I
Did the trial court commit clear error by not instructing the jury as to the
definition of duels, mutual combat, or consensual altercations? The appropriate
standard of review for a trial court's response to a question of law is correction
of error. State v. James, 819 P. 2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991) (discussing the standard
of review for interpretation of statutory law).
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ISSUE II
Does Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. Section 76-5-104 state that
a duel, mutual combat, or consensual altercation, involving the use of a
dangerous weapon, is not a defense, in and of itself, to a charge of criminal
homicide; and, if not, i. e. it is a defense, does it deny a person his right to self
defense when coupled with jury Instruction # 13. c?
Did the trial court err in giving Instruction 13.c, because it was
unnecessary, confusing, and misleading?
Did the Trial Court Judge commit clear error by allowing a jury verdict to
be entered prior to a juror submitted question being answered?
Standard of review is found in State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19 (Utah
App. 01/25/2001) ^6 ... Because [Defendant] did not object on the record to the
jury instructions at trial, he can only obtain relief by demonstrating plain error.
See State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51,^6, 4 P. 3d 778. Plain error requires a showing
that "'(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for [defendant]"' Id. at f7 (quoting State
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993)).

ISSUEIII
Richard Andrew Frausto has been denied his rights under the Fifth, Sixth,
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article 1
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Section 12, of the Utah Constitution, and Rule 11 (d) (1) (g) and (h), of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, to Due Process of Law, because of mistakes,
delays, and inaction, by the Court System charged by those same constitutional
elements, with the processing of his case on direct appeal. Standard of Review:
Plain error is a question of law, which we review for correctness State v. Ostler,
2000 UT App 28,1J6, 996 P.2d 1065.

SUMMARY OF FACTS
A.

On July 28, 1992, the police were called in response to a report of

shots being fired at a residence in a trailer park in Ivins, Utah. Sergeant Pete
Kuhlman testified that, upon arriving at the scene, he discovered the body of
Larry Gilstrap inside of a pick-up truck. Upon checking vital signs, Sergeant
Kuhlman confirmed that Mr. Gilstrap was dead.
B.

The police alleged that, in the early morning hours, after a night of

drinking, Mr. Frausto got into an argument with Mr. Gilstrap. The police also
alleged that, during the course of this argument, Mr. Gilstrap was shot three
times by Mr. Frausto.
C.

Mr. Frausto testified that he shot Mr. Gilstrap twice, only after Mr.

Gilstrap fell on him and after Gilstrap received a gunshot wound to the throat
from someone else. Mr. Frausto also testified that he and Johnny Gourley put
Mr. Gilstrap into Mr. Gilstrap' s truck.
D.

The Defendant was charged with criminal homicide, and was

convicted after a jury trial. While the jury was deliberating, a note was passed,
Page 3 of 49
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from the jury, to the judge. The question was not answered before the jury came
back with their verdict. The trial judge sentenced the Defendant to one term of
imprisonment of not less than six years to life.

FACTS OF THE CASE
On July 27, 1992, Richard Andrew Frausto was feeling under attack.
About five months before, he had moved his family, from California, to
Ivins, Utah, to give his children a saner environment in which to live, and
himself, a cleaner environment in which to rehabilitate him into a drug free
lifestyle. [R. 1162,11.2-13]
His efforts to "dry out," to date, had yielded mixed results; by his own
words, an on again, off again, sort of lifestyle, with alcohol and Valium to
reduce the pain and stress of withdrawal. [R. 1172,11. 2-19]
Other problems had followed him from California. That day, his wife and
children had reported spotting a former California associate, Terry Buck, an exfriend, with two strangers, all standing in front of the family home, in Ivins. [R.
1175,11. 15-25, R. 1176,11. 1-21] A week or two before, Frausto had heard from
his "friend", Johnny Gourley, that someone had been sent from California to
"take care of him." [R. 1173,11. 17-25, R. 1174,11. 1-9]

Page 4 of 49
ScartH <Dent dtWHiteCey, <PC

BRIEF OF APPELLANT FRAUSTO, R. A., CASE#20000520-CA

On July 27, Frausto and his friend, Ray Perez, from California, were
working together, building a front porch on Frausto's home, in Ivins. They
drank all through the day, through the heat, as they worked. [R. 1163,11. 1-25,
R. 1164,11. 1-9]
Later, as the evening progressed, they went over to the residence of their
neighbors, Johnny Gourley and Debbie Hem. They found those two present,
along with Grant Arend, another neighbor. [R. 1164,11. 10-25]
The group shared a few rounds of beer. A conversation transpired, during
which Frausto informed Johnny Gourley that he did not trust Gourley, because
Gourley worked for LeighAnn Reber. [R. 1168,11. 6-8]
LeighAnn Reber was a source of frustration and anger for Frausto.
LeighAnn had been the girlfriend of Frausto's friend, Tony Ambrose, who was
now in jail in California. Since Tony's incarceration, LeighAnn had taken up
with Larry Gilstrap, who had left his wife and moved in with LeighAnn.
Frausto felt some kind of obligation, born out of a sense of loyalty to Tony
Ambrose, to try to rectify the situation; but he did not know exactly how to go
about that. He just knew he would want Tony, or someone, to do the same for
him, were the tables reversed. [R. 1176,11. 22-25, R. 1177,11. 1-25, R. 1178,11.
1-5,R. 1182,11. 13-25,R. 1183,11. 1-19]
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Gourley took offense with Frausto's remarks about distrust. They went
outside and went to blows. [R. 1168,11. 8-10] They were clutched together,
locked up, and rolling around on the ground, when Donald Turnbow showed up
and broke up the fight. [R. 1168,11. 15-18] The two brawlers agreed they
would resume throwing blows when Frausto was sober. [R. 1168,11. 19-25, R.
1169,11. 1-8]
Later, Frausto, Turnbow, and Perez went over to nearby David Ice's
house, in search of more beer. [R. 1165,11. 10-22] From there, Frausto and
Turnbow continued on over to another friend's, known only as "Ted", and
stayed through a couple of more rounds. Then, Frausto and Turnbow returned
to Frausto's home, where Perez had preceded them. [R. 1166,11. 2-20]
Still later, Frausto and Turnbow returned to Johnny Gourley's and Debbie
Hem's house to ask Debbie if she had any more beer. While there, Frausto
reminded Gourley that they would take care of it later, would "throw blows"
later, when Frausto was not drunk.
Gourley responded with, "All right."
This visit was brief, as Gourley and Hem did not have any more beer. [R.
1167,11. 14-25,R. 1169,11. 11-25,R. 1170,11. 1-3,R. 1169,11.2-8]
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Frausto and Turnbow returned to Frausto's residence. It was after
midnight. Perez was there, and Frausto's wife and daughter-in-law were still out
in the living room. [R. 1170,11. 5-25]
Frausto drank "quite a bit" of tequila. [R. 1171,11. 19-25]
At this point, it would be appropriate to note that Frausto's accounts, of
the following events of July 28, 1992, are varied and conflicted. Some of these
deviations he blames on the fact that he was "wasted." Other discrepancies,
encountered upon cross-examination, he allows to the fact that certain
statements and representations that he had made to authorities were not taken
under oath, and that said authorities had lied to him. He also asserts that it took
two days, after his arrest, for his head to clear and for an accurate recall of
events to emerge from his memory. He cannot recall many statements he made
to authorities prior to his testimony at trial.
At some point during the early morning, subsequent to the consumption
of the tequila, Frausto took a gun from a drawer and told Tumbow and Perez
that he was going to shoot himself [R. 1179,11. 9-22] He fired the gun into his
living room wall to demonstrate that it was loaded. [R. 1172,11. 20-25, R. 1173,
11. 1-3]
His fatigue from his fight with drugs was weighing heavily on him,
causing him concern, as was his recently acquired knowledge that someone from
Page 7 of 49
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California was on their way to "take care of him." [R. 1173, 11. 11-12, R. 1174,
11. 1-22] Then, there was the aforementioned sighting of Terry- Buck, and two
strangers, in front of the house, on the 27th of July. [R. 1177, 11. 1-25, R. 1178,
11. 1-3]
The others heard Frausto say that he wanted to talk to Larry Gilstrap.
[R. 1179, 11. 24-25, R. 1180, 1-8] Frausto had other issues with Gilstrap,
besides Gilstrap having left his wife to live with LeighAnn. Frausto had assured
Reta Gilstrap that he would try to talk to Larry about returning home. He had
learned, about a week before, that Gilstrap, known to carry a gun everywhere he
went, had tried to pull his gun on Donald Turnbow. [R. 1178,11. 1-20] l
Shortly, Johnny Gourley arrived at Frausto's residence. Frausto met him
at the front door, .357 in hand. [R. 1180,11. 9-24]
When Gourley asked if the gun was loaded, Frausto answered that it was
and fired it into the air to demonstrate. Leaving Gourley on the front porch,
Frausto returned to his living room and sat down. [R. 1181, 11. 2-11]
1

At trial, John Gourley says that he knew Gilstrap was known to carry a
gun. [R. 856,11. 10-11]
Gourley says he saw Frausto fire his gun into the air on the night in
question. [R. 859,11.4-10]
Gourley says that, witnessing from the porch, he saw Frausto shoot
Gilstrap while holding the gun in his left hand. In contradictory testimony, he
has stated that he, witnessing from a different location, saw Frausto shoot
Gilstrap using his right hand. [R. 925,11. 3-25, R. 926,11. 1-23]
Page 8 of 49
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Minutes later, Gourley again appeared at the door to announce that Larry
Gilstrap had arrived. Frausto put the gun in his pants, pulled his T-shirt down
over it, and walked out front to meet Gilstrap, who had pulled up in his truck.
[R. 1181,11. 10-25]

3

According to Frausto, Johnny Gourley followed him off the porch and out
the front yard gate toward Gilstrap's truck. [R. 1184,11. 17-25] 4
When Frausto got within about five or six feet of the truck, Gilstrap was
already out of the truck and to the middle, or the end part, of the truck bed.
They exchanged words to the following effect.
Frausto asked Gilstrap, why was he having an affair with Frausto's
friend's (Tony Ambrose) old lady, and why he didn't go back to his wife.
Gilstrap answered, that was none of Frausto's business.
According to Frausto, Gilstrap then drew his gun on Frausto.

Gourley says Frausto had a gun in his hand when he went out front to
meet Gilstrap, then reverses his statement. [R. 921,11. 2-25, R. 922,11. 1-2]
Gourley says that, witnessing from the porch, he saw Frausto shoot
Gilstrap while holding the gun in his left hand. In contradictory testimony, he
has stated that he, witnessing from a different location, saw Frausto shoot
Gilstrap using his right hand. [R. 925,11. 3-25, R. 926,11. 1-23]
Page 9 of 49
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Frausto hit Gilstrap and a scuffle ensued, leading to a fight that brought
them both, entangled, to the ground. [R. 1182,11. 1-25, R. 1183,11. 1-25, R.
1184,11. 1-14, R. 1185,11.4-8]
According to Frausto, he heard gunshots at that point, but was uncertain
as to the source. Gilstrap seemed to fall on Frausto. Frausto rolled away from
him, pulled his own gun, and started shooting with the .357, firing twice into
Gilstrap. [R. 1185, 11. 8-25, R. 1186,11. 1-3]
Frausto then arose and asked Johnny Gourley to help him get Gilstrap into
the truck, so he could get him to the hospital. At that point, Gilstrap was still
breathing.

Frausto looked through the truck for Gilstrap's keys. [R. 1186, 4 -

25, R. 1187,11. 1-5]
The two men had difficulty getting Gilstrap into the truck. Frausto went
into the house to enlist the help of his son. When he and his son returned,
Johnny Gourley was gone. [R. 1187,11. 6-25]
After getting Gilstrap into the truck, Frausto and his son went, on foot, to
Reta Gilstrap's house, to inform her that Gilstrap had pulled a gun on Frausto
and that Frausto had shot him. Frausto states his other purpose was to change

5

When Gourley discovered Gilstrap was still breathing, he says he called out for
someone to get an ambulance, then told Frausto to ".. .just let him die." He says
that he only feigned helping Frausto get Gilstrap into the truck, a task at which
they were unsuccessful. [F 870,11. 4-25, R. 871,11. 1-25, R. 872,11. 1-25]
Page 10 of 49
Scarth <Dento£M/hiteCey, <BQ

BRIEF OF APPELLANT FRAUSTO, R.. A., cASE # 20000520-cA

his bloodied pants, not wanting to appear at the hospital that way. [R. 1188,11.
1-25]
Reta provided Gilstrap with a pair of pants. He changed in the back room
and put the soiled clothing under a mattress. [R. 1190, 11. 7-17]
At this point, on direct examination, Frausto reveals that he had a second
gun in his pocket, a .22, which he cannot recall whether having pulled out that
evening.
His son detected police presence outside, at Frausto's residence. Frausto
hid the .22 under Reta's porch; the .357, he hid in a trashcan. Frausto and son
started back toward home. [R. 1190,11. 18-25,R. 1191,R. 1192,11. 1-20]
The pair were confronted by police and told to drop to the ground.
Frausto refused, at first, until they ceased pointing a gun at his son. Then
Frausto lay on the ground as his son knelt before them. Frausto denied any
knowledge of the shooting and he and his son were released.
Frausto proceeded past his house, as the police were there, and went down
to Tammy Howard's house, about a block down the street. [R. 1193,11. 10-25,
R. 1194,11. 1-25, R. 1195,11. 1-10]

Witness, LaReta Gilstrap, states that, when Frausto and his son visited her, just
after the shooting, he told her that she would be next, if she talked to police. [R.
425,11.1-3]
Page 11 of 49
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He obtained a cigarette from Tammy Howard and remained in her living
room, for about fifteen minutes, until someone came knocking at the door.
Frausto moved to a back room. [R. 1195, 2-25, R. 1196,11. 1-15]
He was called out of the back room by a police officer. Frausto complied,
unarmed, and without incident, after the third call.
Frausto denies having given any statement at the time of his arrest. He
says the officer told him to say nothing. Upon seeing that the police had Donald
Turnbow in one of their cars, he asked why, as Turnbow "... did not do it." [R.
1196,11. 16-25, R. 1197,11. 1-25, R. 1198,11. 1-15]
At trial, Frausto's memory of that night, and his earlier statements to
police, is sketchy. His complete memory, he says, returned to him only after a
couple of days sleep in jail. [R. 1201, 21-25, R. 1202,11. 1-9] Thereafter, he
never had a doubt in his mind as to what happened.
Frausto believes there were other people around as the incident took
place, but is not certain exactly who was present. His concern about someone
on their way from California, "to take care of him", contributed to his state of
mmd during the altercation. [R. 1204,11. 11-25, R. 1205,11. 1-5, R. 1201,11. 5 25, R. 01202,11. 1-9]
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Frausto believes it is all right to lie to police, when not under oath. He
also believes that it is self-defense to carry a gun to meet someone else who is
also known to be carrying a gun. [R. 1242,11. 4-25, R. 1243, 11. 1-24]
Frausto says, he had heard that Gilstrap routinely carried a gun on his
person. [R. 1249,11. 20-25, R. 1250,11. 1-24]
Frausto says, he had heard that Gilstrap had pulled, or tried to pull, his
gun on one of Frausto's friends. [R. 1177,1. 25, R. 1178, 11. 1-4]
In Frausto's first statements to authorities, he denies ever having shot his
gun on the morning in question; upon cross-examination, he admits that he lied
about that, and that he did fire his weapon. [R. 1225,11. 19-25, R. 1226,11. 1-15]
He also admits that, in his first story to authorities, Gilstrap only tried to
point his weapon at Frausto's chest, without firing, before Frausto shot him. [R.
1236,11. 22-25, R. 1237,11. 1-13]
State's witness, John Gourley, also exhibited discrepancies, between
testimony he gave at trial, and earlier statements made to authorities. Along
with other points worthy of citation, some of these incidents, where conflicts in
his testimony occurred, are cited below.
At trial, Gourley cannot remember if Frausto declared Gilstrap dead, alter
the shooting, contrary to Gourley's earlier statements. [R. 869,11. 7-25, R. 867,
11.1-16]
.
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Gourley also states that he and Frausto "made up," during Frausto's
second visit to his residence, earlier that evening. He says, Frausto "needed a
hug," and Gourley gave it to him. Gourley also says that he had a borrowed gun
and had it with him at the time, unbeknownst to Frausto, and that they both
agreed on a rematch for the brawl, at some unknown point in the future, when
Frausto would be sober. [R. 849,11. 2-9]
Gourley says, he warned Gilstrap not to bring a gun when he went to
Frausto's house. At that meeting with Gilstrap, his conflicted testimony creates
confusion as to what his original motivation was for that visit: was it to tell
Gilstrap that he no longer need Gilstrap's "backup", because he and Frausto had
made up; or, was it to summon Gilstrap to Frausto's residence, as Frausto had
requested? [R. 856, 11. 5-25, R.857,11. 1-16]
Gourley had great difficulty deciding, through his different testimonies,
how many shots were fired. R. 900,11. 11-22, R. 901,11. 13-25, R. 902 through
R. 912, R. 913,11. 1-7]
Donald Turnbow, another witness to the shooting, did not see much, as he
was hiding under the front porch of the Frausto residence. He does, however,
report hearing just three shots fired at the time of the shooting. [R. 767,11. 1025, R. 768 through R. 773, R. 774,11. 1-19]
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Gourley states that Frausto, during a phone conversation with Gourley,
while Frausto was in jail, asked Gourley to change his story. He also states that
he never saw Gilstrap pull his gun. [R. 881 through R. 884, R. 885,11. 1-19]

STATE OF THE CASE

1.

On July 27, 1992, Richard Andrew Frausto was charged with the

murder of Larry Gilstrap. He was subsequently tried before a jury, and found
guilty, December 18, 1992. At his request he proceeded with sentencing on that
date and received an enhanced jail sentence. [R. 1338,11. 16-20] On December
23, 1992, at a hearing, the Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment were signed
and placed in the court file, with the admonition to the Defendant / Appellant,
"Mr. Frausto, your appeal time starts now." [R. 1346 11. 7-14]
2.

January 25, 1993, the filing of the Notice of Appeal was

acknowledged, with a filing date of January 26, 1993, as was the Notice of
Transfer to the Utah Court of Appeals for Disposition, with a filing date of
January 28, 1993.
3.

On February 10, 1993, J. McArthur Wright filed notice of

withdrawal as counsel and Michael Miller entered an appearance as new
counsel.
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4.

Following that date, the record reflects five entries pertaining to

receipt of the reporter's Hearing Transcripts for December 15-18, and 23, 1993;
all of which occurred on March 8, 1993. That ends the original, three page
Index of Record on Appeal.
We cite the following items, 5 through 13, in great detail due to the fact
the documents they represent are missing from the record and effect the
completeness of Defendant's / Appellant's appeal. These records were
generated during and partially the direct result of Court of Appeals ORDER in
Case No. 930357-CA, and is a remand to the Fifth Judicial District Court for
consideration of appellant's pro se request for appointment of counsel and for
proceedings pursuant to Rule 11 (f) or (g), Utah R. App. P. (see addendum)
These records were the subject of a Motion to Augment the record filed
on May 29, 2001, which was subsequently denied by the Utah Court of Appeals.
5.

A SUPPLEMENTAL RECORD, designated as page 4 of the

INDEX, dated March 6th' 1995, and with a starting date of 6/3/93, and that
starting document was a letter from the Supreme Court, "re: Court of Appeals
Court", and is assigned the index number [R. 1348]. (see addendum)
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6.

Number [R. 1349] concerns the case number, and is dated 6/16/93,

Number [R. 1350], dated 10/8/93, an extension to file brief; both letters are from
the Court of Appeals.
7.

No further action is recorded in this file until May 3, 1994, which is

seven months later, and that is a Notice of Hearing 5/25/94, and is designated as
index numbers [R. 1351-1352].
8.

May 19, 1994, a transportation order designated [R. 1344 and

9.

The next two entries are on May 25, 1994, and are an "Ex Parte

1345].

Motion to Continue", designated index number [R. 1356], and an Order of
Continuance, dated June 1, 1994, numbered [R. 1357].
10.

June 6, 1994, there is another Transportation Order, indexed [R.

1358], followed by three "Minute Entry - Notice," indexed as [R. 1359, 1360,
and 1361], and dated June 6, 1994, June 8, 1994, and July 13, 1984.
11.

There are no more entries until three months later; one which is

dated October 14, 1994, and is an "Order Supplementing Record", indexed as
numbers [R. 1362, 1363, and 1364].
12.

Following that index, and not numbered as part of the index, is a

Mailing Certificate, signed by Tauna Hammer, Deputy Court Clerk, and bearing
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a Washington County Seal, certifying that "supplemental pleadings in the file...
was sent to the Court of Appeals on 6 March 1995".(see addendum)
13.

The paginated index is silent from October 14, 1994, until another

Supplemental Index, covering the dates September 14, 1995, through October
19, 2000, and bearing a Washington County Seal, signed by a Deputy Court
Clerk, and dated October 27, 2000.
14.

A letter from Defendant / Appellant, Richard Frausto, dated Nov.

20, 1995, [R. 1367], addressed to Judge James L. Shumate, was received by the
Fifth District Court on Nov. 28, 1995, requesting replacement of his attorney,
Floyd Holmes.
15.

This was followed by another letter, dated Dec. 29, 1995, and

received by the Court on Jan 12, 1996, [R. 1368], requesting the results, if any,
of his previous letter. This second request was entered into the Court Record on
Jan. 12, 1996, combined with a Memorandum Decision, by Judge Shumate, of
like date, stating that the Court did not have jurisdiction. A copy thereof was
mailed to Defendant / Appellant.
16.

On Jan. 2, 1996, Defendant / Appellant sent a letter to the Utah

Court of Appeals, which they received on Jan 25, 1996, [R. 1373], and attached
same to an Order Suspending the Briefing Schedule, pending determination as to
legal representation and remand to the Fifth District Court, for an "expedited"
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hearing, to enquire into Defendant's counsel's alleged conflict of interest and, if
appropriate, to appoint replacement counsel, or to accept Defendant's waiver of
counsel. That document was [R. 1371, 1372].
17.

By Feb. 26, 1996, the Fifth District Court had held a hearing and

subsequently replaced counsel for the Defendant with Thomas Blakely; records,
reflecting same, were forwarded to the Utah Court of Appeals. [R. 1397]
18.

Next is an Order of Dismissal, by the Court of Appeals, filed June

28, 1996, [R. 1399, 1400], followed by a remittitur, dated Aug. 12, 1996.
19.

Dec. 30, 1996, Defendant / Appellant sent a letter, [R. 1405],

received on Jan 14, 1997, by the Fifth District Court, requesting a copy of his
commitment order, and stating that he had given his copy to his attorney, Tom
Blakely, for duplication, and had not received them back, nor heard from
Blakely in a long time.
20.

Following that, in a letter dated, Thursday, April 10, 1997, [R.

1406, 1407], and received by the Court, April 17, 1997, Defendant / Appellant
acknowledges receipt of the Court Docket and the Sentencing and Commitment
Statement, requested in [R. 1405], the previous letter. In his letter, he takes
exception to the wording of the commitment report. Ultimately, his exception
was proved correct. Please note that this document bears, penciled in on the top,
"File, No Action. 15 Apr 97", and signed by what appears to be Judge
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Shumate's initials. This is a properly filed document with the Court, who has
jurisdiction, since the remittitur of Aug. 12, 1996.
21.

On Aug. 26, 1997, and received Sept. 2, 1997, by the Fifth District

Court, a letter, with a Certified Motion of twenty-five pages, was sent by
Defendant / Appellant, along with ten pages of attachments. The Motion has a
yellow, gummed note attached, instructing, "Just file it then. No further Action
Needed." Again, this was signed with what appears to be the initials of Judge
Shumate. [R. 1408-1452] This is a properly filed, certified Motion, with the
Court, who has jurisdiction, since the remittitur of Aug. 12, 1996.
22.

Oct. 5, 1997, Defendant / Appellant wrote a letter to the Fifth

District Court requesting information regarding a Motion to Dismiss Count 2,
and specifically requesting a copy of the Court Order be forwarded to him; and
again, the notation on the face of the letter reads, written in, "File, No Action 13
Oct 97", over, what appears to be, Judge Shumate's initials. [R. 1453-1454]
23.

Oct. 17, 1997, received by the Fifth District Court on 20 Oct. 1997,

Defendant filed a petition for an Court Order Granting Re-sentencing. [R. 1458]
At that point, the record of the Fifth District Court falls silent until 1999.
24.

At this juncture, we refer to the opinion of Frausto v State of Utah,

966 P.2d 849, 352 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 09/25/1998) to determine what
occurred during this period of time. In the opinion on that case, under the
heading of Background, we find:
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On February 22, 1996, a fourth attorney was appointed
to handle Frausto's appeal. After some time had
passed, with no communication from that attorney,
Frausto requested a copy of his case from the Utah
Court of Appeals *fnl and discovered that on June 28,
1996, the court had executed an order dismissing his
appeal for failure to file an appellant's brief
The court granted a reinstatement of the appeal,
provided an appellant's brief was filed within ten days
of the order; however, no brief was filed.
On September 2, 1997, Frausto filed a "Motion
to Withdraw Court Appointed Counsel", and on
September 10, 1997, he filed a pro se petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, claiming ineffective assistance
of counsel both at trial and on appeal. The district
court dismissed the petition pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-35a-107, the one-year statute of limitations
provision for post-conviction relief. Specifically, the
court found that the limitations period began to run on
June 28, 1996, the date on which the court of appeals
dismissed his appeal, and that Frausto filed his petition
on September 10, 1997, more than one year later.
Therefore, the court ruled, "[By] the express terms of
the statute, this fact precludes Mr. Frausto from
seeking relief in a habeas petition." (emphasis added)
25.

During the time between the three-page letter, which is entered in

the index at 10-20-97 as [R. 1455-1458], and is captioned as a "Petition for
Court Order Granting Re-Sentencing", and the next entry, at 8-17-99, which is
a Minute Entry regarding an evidentiary hearing, ordering the re-sentencing of
Page 21 of 49
Scartft <Dent ^"Wftiteley, <PC

BRIEF OF APPELLANT FRAUSTO, R.. A , CASE # 20000520-CA

defendant nun pro tunc, and stating that "Appeal time to run when judgment,
sentence, commitment nun pro tunc is signed."
26.

This judgment was finally signed on May 8, 2000, and is on the

record index as "Judgment, Restitution Judgment, Sentence (Second Amended
Nunc Pro Tunc) and Commitment". [R. 1482-1486]
27.

The Notice of Appeal was filed with the Fifth District Court on

June 5, 2000, and received by the Utah Supreme Court on June 15, 2000, and
was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals Oct. 3, 2000. [R. 1488-1489]
28.

A letter from the Court of Appeals, dated October 16, 2000, and

entered into the Court record on Oct. 19, 2000, addressed to Odean Bowler, then
Appellate Counsel of Record, advised him that the file had been transferred to
that Court and the ten (10) day period for the transcript request. [R. 1493]
29.

A second Supplemental Index, in this case, starts with an Order,

from the Utah Court of Appeals, for a temporary remand on a motion to
withdraw and replace counsel. This Order is dated, by the Court, Oct. 26, 2000,
and stamped, Received by the Fifth District Court, on Dec. 12, 2000. [R. 1494]
The motion was scheduled for a hearing in January and resulted in appointment
of present counsel.
30.

Current counsel attempted to get a remand to complete the record

and tried three requests of the Utah Court of Appeals for the two docketing
statements, filed by the appellate attorneys following both sentencing orders.
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31.

Trial Counsel, J. Mac Arthur Wright raised questions concerning the

effect that the jury question regarding 13.c may have had on the jury at the
sentencing of the Defendant.
Mr. WRIGHT: [R. 1336,11. 19-25, 1337,11. 1-11] ... I think that
there is substantial evidence in this case that suggests that there was a selfdefense. While apparently the jury has neglected that, I'm concerned about
some of the questions that the jury expressed to us. Questions that we were
unable to respond to before the — before the jury came back. See addendum)
THE COURT: [R.1340,11. 22-25, R. 1341, 1-8]
... for the purposes of the record — in response to what has been marked as
Court's Exhibit No. 2, and Instruction No. 13-c, the Court has marked an inquiry
from the jury as Court's Exhibit No. 2. That will go in the file.
The Court also, at the agreement of counsel, prepared what was going to
be given as a supplemental instruction prior to the time that the jury came back
with a verdict and before we could answer the question in Exhibit No. 2 —
Court's Exhibit No. 2. Those will be placed in the file.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ISSUE I
The wording of portion of Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended,
Section 76-5-104, is confusing, and the Court's use of same in Instruction
#13.c, confused the jury. The Court erred in delivering that instruction without
instructing the jury as to the definition of duels, mutual combat, or consensual
altercations.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ISSUE II
The Trial court failed to answer a juror's note regarding an instruction prior to
accepting a verdict, thereby impairing the integrity of the verdict. The jury
asked a question of the Court while the jury was in deliberation. A note was
prepared by the court but not delivered to the jury. This failure to respond to the
juror's confusion allowed the juror to remain confused about the right of selfdefense and about whose duty it was to prove self-defense, and whether or not,
under Instruction 13.c self-defense was legal, all to the detriment of the
Defendant / Appellant and this represented clear error.
Defendant / Appellant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel by
his counsel's failure to object to the inclusion of Instruction #13.c, in its
proposed form; his failure to argue for supplemental instructions being
submitted to the jury, based on the juror's confusion, as expressed in the subject
note; his failure to argue for supplemental instructions that would include
definitions pertaining to duels, mutual combat, or consensual altercations
involving dangerous weapons; and his failing to motion for a mistrial.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ISSUE III
Frausto was convicted of murder in December 1992, sentenced to five
years, to life, plus one year for firearms enhancement. He has had six attorneys,
prior to his present counsel; all chosen because they were contract employees, in
the Fifth Judicial District, of the Public Defenders Office. Few ever filed a
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request for Enlargement of Time, and not one filed a brief on his direct appeal.
Frausto's valiant attempts to communicate, and to advocate his appeal,
when he felt his rights jeopardized, were rejected by the Utah Court of Appeals,
[R. 1436] and ignored by the Fifth District Court. [R. 1406, 1409) (see
addendum)
At the filing of this brief, Frausto's effort toward due process remains
frustrated due to the vacancies in the record. Efforts to supplement the record
have been thwarted. The inability to find a record, or their replacement, from
the findings of the Miller remand, makes arguing the due process claim,
regarding the 13c jury instructions, speculative. Unable to find a record of
September 10, 1997, Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed in the Fifth District Court, or
any record of the hearing and findings by the Fifth District Court, referred to in
Frausto v State, Id., leaves a void as to what, if any, post conviction motions
may have been made, denied, or refused consideration, per State vRawlings,
829 P. 2d 150, (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
When resentencing takes place to allow a first right of
appeal, as set forth in Johnson, this should not rule out
the procedural possibility that post-conviction motions
may be appropriately heard in the sentencing court.
The court will then have an opportunity to rectify
mistakes, if it is persuaded such occurred, at the trial
level. Disposition of those matters can then be raised
by direct appeal, avoiding later collateral attacks. This
promotes judicial economy and is consistent with Utah
law which favors raising issues on direct appeal rather
than through post-conviction proceedings. Porter v.
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Cook, 747P.2d 1031, 1032 (Utah 1987); Codiana v.
Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Utah 1983).
See Harrisv. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 1994)
We may add to this list the requirement that the
State afford the defendant a timely appeal, for an
appeal that is inordinately delayed is as much a
"meaningless ritual," Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358, as an
appeal that is adjudicated without the benefit of
effective counsel or a transcript of the trial court
proceedings. See Burkett I, 826 F.2d at 1221-22;
UnitedthStates ex rel. Smith v. Twomey, 486 F.2d 736,
739 (7 Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 416 U.S. 994, 40 L.
Ed. 2d 773, 94 S. Ct. 2408 (1974); cf Coppedge v.
United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449, 8 L. Eel 2d 21, 82 S.
Ct. 917(1962)... .

ARGUMENT ISSUE I
Had the trial court included the definitions of, or what constituted, duels,
mutual combat, or consensual altercations, as referred to in Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended, Section 76-5-104 Consensual altercation, as cited
above, the Court could have eliminated jury confusion. This was made evident
by the juror's note to the judge. That note, regarding Instruction #13.c, cited
below, and designated as Court's Exhibit #2, reads as follows:
Instruction #13.c Does the statement "it is no defense "to"
the prosecution mean no help for the prosecution.
Though the Court did prepare a note, to the jury, in response, Court's
Exhibit #1, the jury returned before receiving the reply and was allowed to enter
its verdict before its confusion was addressed. If the Court had insisted on
addressing the issue, before allowing the verdict, the jury might have returned to
further deliberation, to the benefit of the Defendant.
In People State New York v. Jamar Smith, 1996, NY., 637 N.Y.S.2d 279,
168 Misc. 2d 33, the matter of jury notes is dealt with as follows.
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How a court responds to jury notes for information is
governed by statute and case law. New York's statute
clearly vests the trial court with discretion in the
manner in which jury requests for information are
answered: "Upon such a request, the court must direct
that the jury be returned to the courtroom, and after
notice to both the people and counsel for the
defendant, and in the presence of the defendant, must
give such requested information as the court deems
proper." (CPL 310.30.)
In Utah, this same method is used in addition to sending back a written
response to the jury. In this instance the record does not reflect the j ury being
returned to the court room for the answer to the question.
The juror's motivation for the question is speculative; if, for instance, that
it was not the juror's desire to avoid assisting the prosecution, and, based upon
his confusion and, under the mistaken assumption that involvement in a duel did
constitute self defense, would have urged his fellow jurymen toward
entertaining a finding that both shooter, and victim, were actually involved in a
consensual altercation; one including an agreement, or understanding, that
deadly weapons would be used. Or, conversely, with the same motivation at
heart, that the same juror might have argued, with fellow jurymen, that no such
agreement had been reached, thereby allowing for an inadvertent use of said
weapons, and therefore, possibly finding reason to endorse a self defense
position.
The elements of an unspoken, or uncertain, agreement could
certainly be construed to be present, on the part of both parties, by virtue of the
fact that each held good reason to suspect the other's possession of firearms on
his person ; Frausto, by his knowledge that the victim routinely carried a gun;
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the victim, by his having heard Frausto firing his weapon earlier, along with the
rest of the neighborhood. [R. 1249,11. 20-25, R.1250, 11. 1-24]
By a layman's interpretation of a duel, based on a dose of Westerns, and a
host of other historical traditions, it would not be implausible for a juror to
conclude that a determination of self defense was achievable in this case.
However, such a possibility was greatly diminished because of the
limitations and the ambiguity imposed by the given instruction, #13.c, as given,
and the Court's failure to address the jury's ensuing confusion.
One could wonder, is 76-5-104 unconstitutional, when considering what
the juror might have been thinking, because it could deprive one of the
protection of self-defense, under all circumstances, in which one might carry a
gun, and use it? What is the juror thinking? Is it, in fact, true that, by statute, if
you have a gun, and use it, you are guilty of murder? Or, if you bring a gun to
what becomes a fight, and wind up using it, to defend yourself, you are guilty of
murder? Based on the choice of words in the jury note, this is the nature of the
confusion likely posed by Instruction #13.c and left without clarification by the
Trial Court. See State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, (UT App 1993)
.. .the general rule is that an accurate instruction upon
the basic elements of an offense is essential,'" failure
to provide such an instruction is reversible error that
can never be considered harmless. State v. Jones, 823
P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Roberts,
711 P.2d 235, 239 (Utah 1985)).
In State of Utah v. Nick Kozik, 1984 UT 151, 688 P. 2d 459, reversible
error, versus harmless error, are considered in the effect of mishandling jury
notes, as follows:
The jury' s note to the judge involved a point of law,
which was resolved in the present of defendant and
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both counsel, and which duly was recorded by the trial
court. In any event, irrespective of the authority
designated in the Rule, the decision in Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, (1967), is dispositive. That
decision articulates the "harmless error' rule. In our
own recent decision in State v. Urias, Utah, 609 P. 2d
1326 (1980), we referred to Chapman and held as
follows:
We do not upset the verdict of a jury merely
because some error or irregularity may have occurred,
but will do so only if is it something substantial and
prejudicial in the sense that there is a reasonable
likelihood that in its absence there would have been a
different result.
In the instant trial, the only debate in that jury room, and in our jury's
mind, was murder or self-defense. No other, lesser option than murder was
considered. Did the confusion of the jury include the belief that the burden of
proof of self defense fell upon the Defendant? See State v. Garcia, 2001 UT
App 19 (Utah App. 01/25/2001)
lf6 Garcia asserts the jury was not adequately
instructed about the burden of proof of self-defense.
Because Garcia did not object on the record to the jury
instructions at trial, he can only obtain relief by
demonstrating plain error. See State v. Parker, 2000
UT 51, ^6, 4 P.3d 778. Plain error requires a showing
that " (i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have
been obvious to the trial court; and (hi) the error is
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for [Garcia]"'
Id. at V (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208
(Utah 1993)). To show obviousness of the error,
Garcia must show that the law was clear at the time of
trial. See State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997) (stating "error is not plain where there was
no settled appellate law to guide the trial court").
Again at State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19 (Utah App. 01/25/2001)
TJ20 The law in Utah requires a trial court to
adequately instruct the jury about the burden of proof
for self-defense when the defendant presents the
quantum of evidence necessary to assert self-defense.
See State v Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1985);
State v Knoll, 712 P. 2d 211, 214—15 (Utah 1980).
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Here the trial court erred by failing to do so. The error
was obvious because the law was clear at the time of
trial. Finally, the error was harmful because we cannot
say that the jury did not mistakenly consider the
burden of proof of self-defense to be on the defendant;
thus, absent this error, there was a reasonable
possibility of a more favorable outcome for Garcia.
In view of the vacillation of the eye-witness's testimony, one can see how
the consideration of a self defense argument might have been a more serious
undertaking had the jury been reminded, by the answer to the juror's question,
that the burden of proof for self defense did not rest upon the Defendant. Failure
to so instruct represented clear error. See State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, (UT
Appl993)
After the jury in this case had been sequestered
for deliberation, it requested clarification of the words
"supply or furnish" as used in the trial court's
instruction pertaining to the offense of supplying
alcohol to minors. *in7 The trial court appropriately
considered the common meaning of the words in
evaluating what response would assist the jury. *fn8
This consideration was proper because Utah's statutes
generally direct that "words and phrases are to be
construed according to the context and the approved
usage of the language." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11
78-35a-107 (1986). However, where the jury requests
the definition of a "term critical to the meaning of a
criminal statute," that requested definition becomes a
"point of law." State v. Couch, 635 P. 2d 89, 94 (Utah
1981). The appropriate standard of review for a trial
court's response to a question of law is correction of
error. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991)
(discussing the standard of review for interpretation of
statutory law). Further, because "'the general rule is
that an accurate instruction upon the basic elements of
an offense is essential,'" failure to provide such an
instruction is reversible error that can never be
considered harmless. State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059,
1061 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Roberts, 711 P. 2d
235, 239 (Utah 1985)).
"And again in Souza, supra
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Both defendant and the State correctly cite
Couch as providing the controlling law in situations
where the jury asks the trial court to define words used
injury instructions that normally are not considered to
have unique legal meaning. According to the Couch
decision, although the court usually need not volunteer
the definitions of terms of common usage injury
instructions, where the jury requests the'instruction,
the trial court should provide it. Couch, 635 P. 2d at
94-95. The Couch court reasoned that the rule
requiring the trial court to define terms of art should
apply equally to "non-technical words of common
usage" if the jury signifies that it does not understand
the meaning of a word that it must apply to arrive at a
verdict. Id. at 95. Refusal to provide a definition was
reversible error in Couch, because "jurors cannot be
considered properly instructed on a criminal statute if
they are demonstrably confused about the meaning of
the words used in it." Id. at 94.

ARGUMENT ISSUE II
Does Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, Section 76-5-104, state
that a duel, mutual combat, or consensual altercation, involving the use of a
dangerous weapon, is not a defense, in and of itself, to a charge of criminal
homicide?
As in the instant case, since the altercation did not transpire under
conditions where both parties were necessarily in agreement to the use of deadly
force, or weapons thereof, should not the implications of this telling difference
have been addressed by the Court, and was not failure to do so injurious to the
jury's application of law and the cause of justice?
The Court's instruction to the jury, instruction #13.c, is the direct cause
the juror's confusion, as it is the ambiguous wording thereof that was brought to
the Court's attention in the note, cited above as Court's exhibit #2.
The question arises; did the Court err, first in delivering the instruction,
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then in failing to deliver its remedy, another instruction, to clarify the juror's
question, before the jury reached its verdict?
That question went unanswered, prior to the jury delivering its verdict,
allowing whatever confusion to prevail, thus jeopardizing the integrity of the
verdict, to the detriment of the Defendant.
This constituted clear error. See State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, (UT App
1993) two paragraphs quoted in Argument Issue I.
Trial Counsel for the Defendant was ineffective because:
a. he failed to object to Instruction #13.c in its proposed form; and,
b. he failed to request supplemental instructions properly instructing the
jury, as to the definition of a duel, mutual combat, or consensual altercation
involving a dangerous weapon.
c. failing to request a mistrial or motion for a verdict not withstanding
The defendant was denied effective assistance of Counsel. See State v.
Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, (UT App 1993) two paragraphs quoted in Argument
Issue I.

Argument Issue No. Ill
We quote extensively from HARRIS V CHAMPION here after and, have
used paragraph numbers from VersusLaw. In the interest of judicial economy a
hardcopy of the entire case is included in the addendum bearing those same
paragraph numbers to ensure clarity. See addendum
InHarris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538 (10 th Cir. 01/26/1994) the
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit defined Appellate Delay
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[86]

B.Substantive Claim That Appellate Delay

[87]

Violates Right To Due Process

[88]

1. Elements of the claim

[89]

The Due Process Clause provides that "No person shall . . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
U.S. Const, amend. V. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment provides
"nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." Id. amend. XIV, 1.

[90]

The right to a speedy trial, which is guaranteed an accused by the Sixth
Amendment, is a fundamental right imposed on the states by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Barker v. Wmgo, 407
U.S. at 515. Although the Constitution does not require the State to
afford a criminal defendant a direct appeal to challenge alleged trial
court errors, see McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687, 38 L. Ed.
867, 14 S. Ct. 913 (1894), the Supreme Court has held that

[91]

if a State has created appellate courts as "an integral part of the . . .
system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant,"
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. at 18, the procedures used in deciding
appeals must comport with the demands of the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Constitution.

[92]

Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821, 105 S. Ct. 830
(1985)(alteration in original).

[93]

To ensure the defendant's right to a "meaningful appeal," Douglas v.
California, 372 U. S. at 358, the Court has held that when the State
affords a criminal defendant an appeal by right, the Fourteenth
Amendment requires, among other things, that counsel be appointed to
represent an indigent defendant, id. at 356-58, that the representation
oi counsel be effective, Evitts, 469 U.S. at 396, and that either an
indigent defendant be provided a free transcript or some equivalent
method of reporting the trial proceedings be employed, Draper v.
Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 495, 9 L. Ed. 2d 899, 83 S. Ct. 774 (1963);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. at 19-20.

[94]

We may add to this list the requirement that the State afford the
defendant a timely appeal, for an appeal that is inordinately delayed is
as much a "meaningless ritual," Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358, as an appeal
that is adjudicated without the benefit of effective counsel or a
transcript of the trial court proceedings. See Burkett I, 826 F.2d at
1221-22; United States ex rel. Smith v. Twomey, 486 F.2d 736, 739
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(7m Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 416 U.S. 994, 40 L. Ed. 2d 773, 94 S. Ct.
2408 (1974); cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438. 449, 8 L.
Ed. 2d 21, 82 S. Ct. 917 (1962) ("No general respect for, nor
adherence to, the law as a whole can well be expected without judicial
recognition of the paramount need for prompt, eminently fair and
sober criminal law procedures. . . . Delay in the final judgment of
conviction, including its appellate review, unquestionably erodes the
efficacy of law enforcement."); Mathews v. Eldndge, 424 U.S. 319,
333, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976)("The fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard cat a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."').
[95]

When determining whether a criminal defendant has been deprived of
his or her right to timely process at the trial level, the Supreme Court
has established a balancing test to be applied on an ad hoc basis.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. Four factors should be assessed and balanced:
"(1) length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's
assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant." Id. (numbers
added). The fourth factor "should be assessed in the light of the
interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to
protect." Id. at 532. The "Court has identified three such interests: (I)
to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety
and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the
defense will be impaired." Id.

[96]

Although Barker addressed only a defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to a speedy trial, the balancing test the Court enunciated provides an
appropriate framework for evaluating whether a defendant's due
process right to a timely direct criminal appeal has been violated. See
Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d at 303 ("The factors of Barker are
preferred [over] the standard announced in United States v. Lovasco,
431 U.S. 783, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752, 97 S. Ct 2044 . . . (1977)[concerning
pre-indictment delay], since the reasons for constraining appellate
delay are analogous to the motives underpinning the Sixth Amendment
right to a speedy trial.")(footnote omitted); DeLancy v. Caldwell, 741
F.2d 1246, 1248 (1(T Cir. 1984)("We agree with the Fifth Circuit that
the right to avoid unreasonable delay in the appellate process is similar
to the right to a speedy trial."); Burkett II, 951 F.2d at 1445-46
(holding that delay in adjudicating an appeal, which infringes on due
process rights, is effectively no different than delay in imposing a
sentence, which infringes on Sixth Amendment speedy trial right).

[97]

We can apply the first three factors of the Barker test to claims of
appellate delay without modification. We must modify the fourth
factor of prejudice to the defendant, however, to reflect the interests
sought to be protected by an appeal "unencumbered by excessive
delay." Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 R2d at 303 n.8.

[98]

The Fifth Circuit has identified the following interests that should be
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considered when assessing prejudice arising from appellate delay: "(1)
prevention of oppressive incarceration pending appeal; (2)
minimization of anxiety and concern of those convicted awaiting the
outcome of their appeals; and (3) limitation of the possibility that a
convicted person's grounds for appeal, and his or her defenses in case
of reversal and retrial, might be impaired." Id. In DeLancy, 741 F.2d
at 1248, we adopted the Fifth Circuit's modification of the Barker
prejudice factor for purposes of appellate delay. We also heeded the
Supreme Court's admonition that the four factors of the balancing test
are related and should be considered together with such other
circumstances as may be relevant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533; DeLancy,
741F.2datl248.
[99]

Nevertheless, as we discuss below, we view the first factor
length
of delay
as a threshold that a petitioner must meet before the court
need consider the other factors. Furthermore, we agree with the Ninth
Circuit that, ordinarily, a petitioner must make some showing on the
fourth factor
prejudice
to establish a due process violation.
United States v. Tucker, 8 F.3d 673, 676 (9 th Cir. 1993)(en banc).

[100]

Therefore, in determining whether delay in adjudicating a petitioner's
direct criminal appeal violated the petitioner's due process rights, we
must balance the following factors:

[101]

a. the length of the delay;

[102]

b. the reason for the delay and whether that reason is justified;

[103]

c. whether the petitioner asserted his right to a timely appeal; and

[104]

d. whether the delay prejudiced the petitioner by

[105]

i. causing the petitioner to suffer oppressive incarceration pending
appeal; or

[106]

ii. causing the petitioner to suffer constitutionally cognizable anxiety
and concern awaiting the outcome of his or her appeal; or

[107]

iii. impairing the petitioner's grounds for appeal or his or her defenses
in the event of a reversal and retrial.

[108]

we will address each of these factors in turn.

[109]

a. THE LENGTH OF THE DELAY
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At all times since the Defendant's / Appellant's sentencing on
September 23, 1992, he has been represented by State appointed
counsel.
In excess of nine (9) years have passed since he was told, by The
Honorable James L. Shumate, Judge of the Fifth District Court in
Washington County, that "your appeal time starts now".
Quoting Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 01/26/1994)
[110]

"Only passage of an inordinate amount of time triggers
due process concerns." Hill v. Reynolds, 942 F.2d 1494 at
1497 00th Cir. 08/23/1991)

Harris v. Champion, Id,
[115] .. .delay substantially beyond two years, at least in a case that
does not warrant a lengthier appellate process, will reduce the
burden of proof on the other three factors necessary to establish a
due process violation. See Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2693 (holding
that the more protracted the delay, the more prejudice may be
presumed from the delay).

[110]

The first factor in the balancing test is the length of the appellate delay.
"Only passage of an inordinate amount of time triggers due process
concerns." Hill v. Reynolds, 942 F.2d at 1497 (emphasis added).
Therefore, if a petitioner cannot establish at least some degree of
inordinate delay, the court need not inquire into the other lactors. Cf.
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Doggett v. United States, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2690-91
(1992)(holdmg that because no speedy trial violation occurs if the
government prosecutes a defendant "with customary promptness," "to
trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval
between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing
ordinary from 'presumptively prejudicial' delay").
[Ill]

We cannot set an inflexible length of time that will constitute
inordinate delay in every case. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 521 ("We
cannot definitely say how long is too long in a system where Justice is
supposed to be swift but deliberate."); Coe v. THurman, 922 F.2d at
531 ("There is no talismanic number of years or months, after which
due process is automatically violated."). Nonetheless, it seems
appropriate to Judge appellate delay by the same two-year
presumptive standard that we used earlier to excuse exhaustion. See
supra (slip op.) at pp. 30-31. Therefore, a two-year delay in finally
adjudicating a direct criminal appeal ordinarily will give rise to a
presumption of inordinate delay that will satisfy this first factor in the
balancing test.

[112]

Creating a presumption that a two-year delay in adjudicating an appeal
is inordinate comports with the district court's ruling that "a two-year
period, from the notice of appeal or order permitting same, be
established as the time period for resolution of a direct criminal appeal
in Oklahoma beyond which any delay will be presumed to be
unconstitutional, . . . absent a showing of good and sufficient^ cause or
special circumstances." R., Doc. 255 at 8 (footnote omitted).
Respondents do not challenge the district court's two-year
presumptive period. Although petitioners argue for a snorter period,
the only basis for their argument is that in 1991, the Tenth Circuit's
median time for deciding direct criminal appeals was 11.7 months. See
Appellant's Principal Br. (No.93-5123) at 57; Appellant's Principal
Br. (No. 93-5209) at 18-19. We are not sufficiently persuaded by this
single statistic to conclude that the district court erred in establishing a
two-year presumptive period. See United States v. Pratt, 645 F.2d at
91 (declining to hold nine-month appellate delay unconstitutional in
absence of exacerbating factors); United States ex rel. Harris v. Reed,
608 F. Supp. 1369, 1376 (N.D. 111. 1985)(holdmg that a seven-andone-half-month delay in adjudicating a motion for post-conviction
relief was not so egregious as to violate petitioner's due process
rights); Doescher v. Estelle, 454 F. Supp. 943, 952 (N.D. Tex.
1978)(determining as a matter of law that a one-year delay in
processing petitioner's appeal was not unjustified), appeal dismissed,
597F.2d 281 (5 th Cir. 1979)(table).

[113]

The district court concluded that two year^io adjudicate an appeal in
Oklahoma is both customary and feasible.
Furthermore, a two-year
delay is within the time frame that other courts have found to raise due
process concerns. For example, in United States ex rel. Hankins, 582
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F. Supp. At 184-85, the court held that the pendency of an appeal for
two years with no decision by the state appellate court, coupled with a
nine-month delay by the trial court in ruling on post-trial motions,
gave rise to a prima facie due process violation. See also Dozie v.
Cady, 430 F.2d at 638 (holding that seventeen-month delay in filing
opening brief warrantee! inquiry into possible due process violation);
Burkett II, 951 F.2d at 1445-46 (holding that eighteen-month delay
between sentencing and decision on appeal gave rise to due process
violation); United States v. Antoine, 906 F.2d 1379, 1382-83 (9 th
Cir.)(holding that three-year delay in adjudicating federal appeal was
"substantial" and remanding for further findings regarding prejudice),
cert, denied, 498 U.S. 963, 112 L. Ed. 2d 407, 111 S. Ct. 398 (1990);
Snyder v. Kelly, 769 F. Supp. 108, 111 (W.D.N. Y. 1991 )(holding that
three years is "an excessive amount of time to await the resolution of
an appeal"), aff d 972 F.2d 1328 (2d Cir. 1992)(table); cf Jones v.
Grouse, 360 F.2d at 158 (holding that delay of more than eighteen
months in processing appeal of collateral attack warranted inquiry into
possible due process violation)."" 1 "
[114]

The passage of two years creates only a presumption of inordinate
delay on appeal. The particular circumstances of a case may warrant a
finding that the passage of less than two years constitutes inordinate
delay or that the passage of more than two years does not. For
example, althougn the length of the sentence cannot be a controlling
factor in light of the time requirements inherent in processing an
appeal, a case in which a very short sentence was imposed may
warrant more expedited treatment. See Wheeler v. Kelly, 639 F. Supp.
1374, 1379 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)(holding that "the length of the sentence is
a factor in determining whether post-conviction delay is excessive"),
affd, 811 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1987). On the other hand, a particularly
complex case may warrant a more lengthy appellate process. Cf.
Geames v. Henderson, 725 F. Supp. 681, 685 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)(holding
that delay of three-and-one-hall years was excessive because issues
on appeal were "no more complex than in most criminal appeals").

[115]

Because it is a balancing test that we employ, however, delay
substantially beyond two years, at least in a case that does not warrant
a lengthier appellate process, will reduce the burden of proof on the
other three factors necessary to establish a due process violation. See
Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2693 (holding that the more protracted the
delay, the more prejudice may be presumed from the delay).

[116]

b. THE REASON FOR THE DELAY
Harris v. Champion, Id.,
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[115] ...delay substantially beyond two years, at least in a case that
does not warrant a lengthier appellate process, will reduce the burden
of proof on the other three factors necessary to establish a due process
violation. See Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2693 (holding that the more
protracted the delay, the more prejudice may be presumed from the
delay).
[117] ... In Harris I, we laid to rest any argument that delays by the
Public Defender in filing briefs could be attributed to petitioners on the
ground that the Public Defender requested the continuances on
petitioners' behalf 938 F.2d at 1065. The record indicated that "the
delay in preparing petitioner's brief on appeal [was] caused by the
inability of [the Public Defender] to address petitioner's case in a
timely fashion." Id. Because this delay was "forced upon an unwilling
petitioner by reason of his indigency," we held it should not be
attributed to the petitioner. Id.

[117]

The second part of the balancing test is the reason for the delay. In
Harris I, we laid to rest any argument that delays by the Public
Defender in filing briefs could be attributed to petitioners on the
ground that the Public Defender requested the continuances on
petitioners' behalf 938 F.2d at 1065. The record indicated that "the
delay in preparing petitioner's brief on appeal [was] caused by the
inability of [the Public Defender] to address petitioner's case in a
timely fashion." Id. Because this delay was "forced upon an unwilling
petitioner by reason of his indigency," we held it should not be
attributed to the petitioner. Id. The parties do not dispute that the
delays in adjudicating petitioners' direct criminal appeals are
attributable to the State of Oklahoma and not to petitioners.""1" See R.,
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Doc. 29 at 9 (Attorney General); Addendum to Br. Of OIDS Defs. At
17 (Public Defender); R., Doc. 27, Ex. 3L Attachment 1 (Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals'); see also Hankins v. Fulcomer, 941 F.2d at
252 (holding that court had. numerous opportunities to rule on pending
matters and its delay in doing so was not attributable to petitioner);
Wojtczak v. Fulcomer, 800 F.2d at 356 (holding that delay in
adjudicating motion for post-conviction relief was not attributable to
petitioner, but to "disinterest on the part of court appointed counsel
and to a failure on the part of the court to require them to provide
minimally effective representation").
[119]

c. PETITIONER'S ASSERTION OF HIS OR HER RIGHT TO A
TIMELY APPEAL

[120]

... The Supreme Court rejected in Barker *4the rule that a
defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial forever
waives his right." 407 U.S. at 528. Instead, the Court held
that whether and how strongly a defendant asserts his or
her right to a speedy trial should be balanced with the
other factors. Id. at 528-29.

At all times, throughout the past nine (9) years Defendant /
Appellant, Richard Andrew Frausto, has pursued his appeal. This
began with his request for immediate sentencing following the jurors
verdict.
The first evidence is a letter from J. Mac Arthur Wright [R. 1434]
(see addendum) advising contract attorneys, Freestone and
Angerhoffer, engaged by Defendant / Appellant, [R. 1434] that the
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notice of appeal, and the request for transcript, had been filed.
Secondary evidence resides in a letter to Defendant / Appellant,
over the signature of Janice Hill, Deputy Clerk of the Utah Court of
Appeals, dated February 1, 1994. He had personally corresponded
with the Court and was advised in part:
The Court will only consider documents on your behalf if
they are filed by your attorney. ... You must
communicate through him regarding your appeal.
Defendant / Appellant pursued the replacement of his first
appointed appellate attorney, Michael Miller, for Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel and he was replaced by Mr. Floyd Holmes, who
filed his notice of entry on June 22, 1994.
November 28, 1995, Defendant / Appellant filed a letter with the
Fifth District Court requesting the dismissal of attorney, Holmes, due
to his ineffective assistance on his appeal. By February 6, 1996, this
resulted in a remand by the Court of Appeals to the Fifth District
Court, and the replacement of Holmes with Thomas Blakeley, which
officially occurred February 22, 1996.
At this point we refer to: Frausto v State of Utah, 966 P. 2d 849,
352 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 09/25/1998) that reflects more of his
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efforts.
... After some time had passed, with no communication
from that attorney, Frausto requested a copy of his case
from the Utah Court of Appeals *fnl and discovered that
on June 28, 1996, the court had executed an order
dismissing his appeal for failure to file an Appellant's
Brief ...
... On September 2, 1997, Frausto filed a "Motion to
Withdraw Court Appointed Counsel^, and on September
10, 1997, he filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel both, at
trial, and on appeal.
We ... remand for further proceedings... .

Thus, due to the efforts of the Defendant I Appellant a judgment
was finally signed on May 8, 2000, and is on the record as "Judgment,
Restitution Judgment, Sentence (Second Amended Nunc Pro Tunc)
and Commitment". [R. 1482-1486]
The Notice of Appeal was filed with the Fifth District Court on
June 5, 2000, and received by the Utah Supreme Court on June 15,
2000, and the case was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals on
October 3, 2000. [R. 1488-1489]
A second Supplemental Index, in this case, starts with an Order,
from the Utah Court of Appeals, for a Temporary Remand on a
Motion to Withdraw and Replace Counsel. This Order is dated, by the
Court, Oct. 26, 2000, and stamped, "Received by the Fifth District
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Court, on Dec. 12, 2000." [R. 1494] The Motion was scheduled for a
hearing in January and resulted in appointment of present counsel who
has filed this brief
[120]

The third factor we must balance in determining whether a due process
violation has occurred is the petitioner's assertion of his or her right to
a timely appeal. The Supreme Court rejected in Barker "the rule that a
defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial forever waives his right."
407 U.S. at 528. Instead, the Court held that whether and how strongly
a defendant asserts his or her right to a speedy trial should be balanced
with the other factors. Id. at 528-29.

[121]

We will not require petitioners to have made an affirmative assertion
of their right to a timely appeal in state court for this factor to weigh in
their favor. Under the circumstances, the filing of these federal habeas
petitions constitutes a sufficient assertion of petitioners' respective
rights to a timely appeal. See Snyder, 769 F. Supp. At 111.

[122]

Unlike a criminal defendant who stands accused and may not wish to
have any trial, much less a speedy one, e.g., Barker, 407 U.S. at 535, a
criminal defendant who has already been convicted usually wants a
speedy appeal and has little or no incentive to delay the outcome.
Cody v. Henderson, 936 F.2d at 719; cf Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at
520 ("The prisoner's principal interest, of course, is in obtaining
speedy federal relief on his claims."). Therefore, we presume every
petitioner desired a timely appeal.

[123]

Furthermore, petitioners were hampered by the fact that they had to
speak through their counsel in the state court appellate process and, in
most instances, it was that very counsel who was responsible for the
delay. Under these circumstances, we cannot fairly expect petitioners
to have raised the issue of delay in state court. See Gaines
v. Manson,
194 Conn. 510, 481 A.2d 1084, 1093 (Conn. 1984)(4The petitioners
have been handicapped in asserting rights through their counsel when
it is the counsel itself that has been the source oi the challenged
delays.").

[124]

Moreover, because the Public Defender had a policy of briefing cases
on a "first m, first out" basis and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals was unwilling to expedite the briefing of one Public
Defender's case over another, see Manous v. State, 797 P.2d at 100506, even if petitioners had complained vigorously about delays in
prosecuting their appeals, those complaints probably would have been
unavailing. See Gaines, 481 A. 2d at 1093. Therefore, absent evidence
that a petitioner affirmatively sought or caused delay in the
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adjudication of his or her appeal, this third factor should weigh in
favor of finding a due process violation.

[125]

d. PREJUDICE TO THE PETITIONER AS A RESULT OF
DELAY
d. Hi. whether the delay prejudiced the petitioner by
impairing the petitioner's grounds for appeal or his or her
defenses in the event of a reversal and retrial.
One need only consider the trial transcript to see the impairment
to justice that elapsed time can create. That transcript is replete with
examples of inconsistency, throughout the testimony of numerous
individuals, and especially that of eyewitness, Johnny Gourley. Many
contradictions in witnesses testimony are reflected in the footnotes
recited in the FACTS OF THE CASE of this brief
For that small neighborhood in Ivins, Utah, the evening in
question, and for some, the day preceding it, started early with copious
imbibing of intoxicants by most, if not all, concerned. Whether it was
the amount of alcohol consumed, and whatever may have
accompanied same, or the amount of time between initial statements to
authorities and later trial testimony, or a mixture of all of the above,
the ensuing common was one of confusion, uncertain recollection.
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outright denial, or a combination of all three.
In considering a retrial, one would have to factor in the damage
to the collective memory by the dominating element often years. It
would be too much to expect the cause of justice to prevail.
[129]
[130]

Barker, 407U.S. at 532.
Impairment of one's grounds for defense in the event of a retrial is
"the most difficult form of. . . prejudice to prove because time's
erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony 'can rarely be
shown.'" DoggetU 112 S. Ct. at 2692-93 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S.
at 532). The Supreme Court has recognized that "excessive delay
presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that
neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify," id. at 2693,
and the likelihood of injury "increases with the length of the
delay," id. To support such a finding of prejudice, unjustified delay
"unaccompanied by particularized trial prejudice must have lasted
longer than [unjustified delay] demonstrably causing such
prejudice." Id. at 2694.

[126]

The fourth factor we must consider when determining whether a
petitioner's due process rights have been violated is whether the
petitioner has suffered any prejudice due to delay in adjudicating his or
her appeal. As we stated earlier, prejudice may result from any of the
following: (i) oppressive incarceration pending appeal; or (ii)
constitutionally cognizable anxiety awaiting resolution of the appeal;
or (iii) impairment of a defendant's grounds for appeal or a
defendant's defenses in the event of a retrial. DeLancy, 741 F.2d at
1248; Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d at 303 n.8.
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[127]

We have not previously had occasion to discuss the meaning of
prejudice in tne context of appellate delay. We take this opportunity to
do so, beginning with the last and most serious form of prejudice:
impairment of the grounds for appeal or the grounds for defense in the
event of a retrial. *m 15

[128]

The most serious [form of prejudice] is the last, because the inability
of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the
entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the
prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are
unable to recall accurately events of the distant past.

[129]

See above.

[130]

See above.

[131]

That delay has impaired a petitioner's ability to mount a defense on
retrial is irrelevant, however, if a petitioner has no credible grounds for
reversal and retrial. See Tucker, 8 F.3d at 676. Therefore, in addition
to establishing that excessive delay has impaired his or her defense on
retrial, a petitioner also must assert a colorable state or federal claim
that would warrant reversal of his or her conviction. *fn 16 See id. But
see Harris v. Kuhlman, 601 F. Supp. 987, 994 (E.D.N. Y.
1985)(finding that seven-year delay might impair petitioner's defense
if he were retried, even though review of petitioner's claims suggested
"very little chance of reversal"). Thus, if a petitioner's conviction has
been affirmed by the time the petiticpner's claims are heard in the
federal habeas proceeding, the petitioner will not be able to show
prejudice on retrial because the state appellate court has finally
decided there will be no retrial.

[132]

Likewise, because the only prejudice with which we are concerned is
that which arises from excessive delay, for a petitioner to make a
particularized showing of prejudice, the prejudicial event, such as the
death of a key witness, must have occurred, or have been exacerbated,
during the period of delay that is found to be excessive. Therefore, in
most cases, particularized prejudice that occurs during the first two
years that an appeal is pending will not support a due process violation
because the prejudice would have occurred even in the absence of any
excessive delay in adjudicating the appeal.

[133]

We turn then to the second type of prejudice: constitutionally
cognizable anxiety awaiting resolution of the appeal. Once again, we
are concerned only with anxiety arising out of excessive delay.
Therefore, that a petitioner is anxious about the outcome of the appeal
from the day the notice of appeal is filed is of no consequence; the
anxiety must relate to the period of time that the appeal was
excessively delayed.
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[134]

The courts appear split on the showing of anxiety that a petitioner must
make. The Ninth Circuit, for example, requires a showing of
"particular anxiety" distinguishable from that "of any other prisoner
awaiting the outcome of an appeal." Antoine, 906 F.2d at 1383; see
also Tucker, 8 F.3d at 676; Coe, 922 F.2d at 532. In Burkett II, the
Third Circuit concluded that the petitioner had established prejudice in
art because he was able "to detail anxiety related to the processing of
is case post-conviction." 951 F.2d at 1447. The Second Circuit, on
the other hand, has affirmed findings of prejudice based solely on the
district court's assumption that the delay of four or more years worried
the petitioner, who awaited hopefully the outcome of the appeal.
Yourdon v. Kelly, 969 F.2d 1042 (2d Cir. 1992)(table), aff g, 769 F.
Supp. 112, 115 (W.D.N. Y. 1991); Snyder v. Kelly, 972 F.2d 1328 (2d
Cir. 1992)(table), aff g 769 F. Supp. 108, 111 (W.D.N.Y. 1991). We
think the better approach is to require the petitioner to make some
particularized and substantial showing of anxiety and concern, absent a
delay so excessive as to trigger the Doggett presumption of prejudice.

E

CONCLUSION
The issues regarding the jury note or notes inquiring about a jury
instruction that referred to self-defense, and the confusion of the jury
regarding the law as it pertained to self-defense, could have defeated
the defendant's argument of self-defense. Confidence in the verdict is
undermined by the lack of a full record on the issue.
Not one page of the indexed items, [R. 1346 through 1364], covering
critical dates and information pertaining to the Defendant's / Appellant's
Appeal, are currently in the paginated recorded. Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure Rule 11 (d) Papers on appeal. (1) Criminal cases. All of the papers
in a criminal case shall be included by the clerk of the trial court as part of the
record on appeal. (See addendum)
March 16, 1994, Michael L. Miller, then attorney for Defendant /
Appellant, filed a "Motion to Supplement Record" regarding a missing /
Page 47 of 49
Scarth <Dent ^WfitteCey, <?C

BRIEF OF APPELLANT FRAUSTO, R.. A., CASE # 20000520-CA

unreported record of a conversation between Trial Counsel Defense Counsel,
and the Court relating to jury instruction 13.c. [R. 1442-1444] April 24, 1994,
The Utah Court of Appeals issued an ORDER temporarily remanding the
case to the Fifth District Court for consideration of a Request for a New
Attorney by the Defendant / Appellant and for proceedings under rule 11
pertaining to Attorney Miller's Request to Supplement the Record. [R. 1437]
(see addendum pg. A )
According to the Docket record of the Fifth District Court, consisting of 6
pages, [R. 1446-1451] (see addendum) the above dates are the period in which
the appointment of new counsel and proceedings, regarding Rule 11, occurred or
should have occurred.
Page 3 and 4 [R. 1448) [R. 1449] of the Docket reflect the transactions,
for the time period covered by page 4, of the Supplemental Index.
According to that Docket, on 7-13-94, a hearing was held with neither the
Attorney for the Defendant or the Defendant present. The State was represented
by Brent W. Langston, with the stated results:
"Mr. Langston informs the Court that a stipulation has
been reached between counsel as to Motion to
Supplement the Record; Court instructs Mr. Langston
to submit written stipulation which has been signed by
counsel and defendant."
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That undoubtedly is the stipulation that Attorney Miller was seeking, but
it is not in the file or listed on the Supplemental Index.
Defendant feels the missing information has required him to proceed
without a complete record contrary to Due Process as guaranteed by, the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the U. S. Constitution, and, Article I, Section 7,
of the Utah Constitution. Defendant prays this court will reverse this judgment
and in view of the elapsed time and the probable lack of witnesses with
sufficient recollection of the events to retry the case, release defendant and grant
such other relief as the court deems proper.
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of November 2001.

»Stood*. Jfo Mtik
~j

Brenda S "whiteley L7016J

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF
were mailed, first class postage prepaid, this 19th day of November, 2001, to:
Mark Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General
Laura Dupaix, Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South - 6* Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee, M / / %
Brenda S. Whiteley [7016]
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Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 01/26/1994)
[1 ]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH
CIRCUIT

[2]

Nos. 93-5123, 93-5209

[3]

1994.C 10.41422 <http://www.versuslaw.com>; 15 F.3d 1538

[4]

Filed: January 26, 1994; As Corrected February 2, 1994.

[5]

ANTHONY JEROME HARRIS, GARY MIDDAUGH, THEODORE
FORD, DOYLE KING, RANDY MEYER, TERRY CRISP,
MICHAEL FARMER, JOHN HONEYCUTT, COY HILL, TROY
BROWN, DEEMS ROWELL, GORDON BUNTON, ADAM
WRIGHT, ROBERT MANOUS, KIMBALL FOREMAN, JOE
HEADRICK, TERRY STEWARD, ARTHUR BLACKMON,
JAMES SMITH, STEPHEN ROSS, JOHNNY SMITH, LARRY
BROWN, WALTER ROBINSON, ROGER WILLIAMS,
KENNETH OWENS, MARSHALL GEE, KELLY CRAIG,
GILBERT PAYNE, DANNY GREEN, CALVIN ESLICK, PAUL
ROGERS, MICHAEL SMITH, NATHANIEL JACKSON, JOHNNY
ROMO, JEFFERY LEA, JOHNNY DAVIS, CHESTER WATKINS,
RICKY WYATT, ARON COX, NERO TECUMSEH, JOSEPH
OSBORNE, JOSEPH DICESARE, WILLIAM KNITTEL, JAMES
MCCLAIN, EDDIE COATS, WALTER BOWERS, HUEY HALL,
RONNIE MOORE, SHANE BOGGS, WILLIE TAYLOR,
CLARENCE BRAMLETT, BRUCE HILL, LARRY IVES,
DONALD MYLES, KEVIN COLE, LARRY CRAWLEY,
EDWARD TEICHMAN, KEITH LARKINS, LEONARD
GOUDEAU, JOEL VANSCOY, ROBERT RICHARDS, MICHAEL
BROADNAX, RUFUS MCGEE, KYLE CHEADLE, STEVE SEITZ,
TIMOTHY WHIPKEY, ADRIAN COLLINS, WILLIAM SEVERE,
ROBERT BRIXEY, KEVIN PARKER, LLOYD HARJO,
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KENNETH BURRELL, LOUIS WASHINGTON, DAVID COPPLE,
FRED COOK, ROBERT SCHNEIDER, JOEL ALLEN, BOYCE
VANDENBURG, JERRY STILES, TONY ABNEY, JACKIE L.
ADAIR, ROBERT ANDERSON, ASCENSION ARMENDARIZ,
LARRY BAILEY, CHARLES BARNETT, ROGELIO BEGE, J.C.
BERRY, LAVERN BERRYHILL, PERRY BIFFLE, JACKIE
BLANTON, DOUGLAS BREEDEN, GREGORY BRIANS,
ARTHUR BROWN, BOBBY BRUCE, DEREK BURGER, LARRY
BUTCHER, JOHN BYRD, JAMES CAGLE, CLIFFORD
CAMPBELL, DOUGLAS CAPPS, GERALD CARROLL,
TORIANO CHANDLER, JOE CHASE, CLYDE CHUCULATE,
JOSEPH CLOUD, JOHNNY COLE, PAM COLLEY, RONALD D.
COPPER, DENNIS CORNELL, CYNDI CORNELL, GERMALNE
CRAWFORD, RICKIE CRISP, JAMES CROW, GERALD
DANIELS, BRIAN DANIELS, RICHARD DEMES, RONNIE DIAL,
ALFONSO DURAN, LARRY EDWARDS, ANDREW EPHRIAM,
JAMES L. EVANS, J.W. FATHERREE, LANCE FOSTER,
DONNIE JOE FRYE, DENNIS GAINES, LOUIS GIBSON,
RONNIE GILMORE, JAMES GODBEY, FOREST GOLBEK,
JERRY GRAHAM, LANTZE GREEN, BRYAN GRIFFIN, JAMES
HAMILTON, DAVID P. HAMMER, LAUREN HANKINS, EUAL
HARDT, MICHAEL HAYES, RANDY HENDERSON, ELDON
HENDERSON, ANDREA HESTER, ARCHIE HILL, DEWAYNE
HOLLAND, HAROLD HOLMAN, THOMAS HONEYCUTT,
MICHAEL HOUSTON, C. HUFFSTUTLER, KEITH HUNT,
DORRIS JACKSON, NAPOLEON JAMES, WILLIE JEMISON,
ALLEN JONES, ALLEN KAULAITY, JEFFERY KING, ROBERT
KLUVER, FRED KNISLEY, MILLARD KNOX, CLARENCE
LANDRETH, BERNARD LAWSON, ODIS LAWSON, JR.,
QUNION LEIGH, FRANK LOGAN, LAURA LONG, JOSEPH
LYDA, BRIAN MAFFEE, MCKINLEY MAHAN, PATRICK
MARTIN, ELIJAH MARTIN, LEOBARDO MARTINEZ, BARRY
MCCLURE, GLENN MCGUDRE, PATRICK MEADOWS, .JUAN
MERCADO, WALTER MILLER, JACKIE MILLER, LARRY
MILLS, GARY MINARD, WILLIAM MOORE, ABDULLAH
MUHAMMAD, DARPHUS MURRAY, STEVEN NESS, GEORGE
NICHOLS, MICHAEL NORMAN, JAMES NORTHCROSS,
RICHARD OLSEN, CARMEN PATTON, DIXIE PEBWORTH,
ROGER PETERMAN, RICK PETRICK, GREGORY POE,
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WILLIAM P. POTTS, MICHAEL PRATER, JAMES PRICE,
STEVEN PYLES, NILLSON RAMIREZ, CHRISTOPHER
RANSOM, HAZEN RAY, TERRY REEVES, KENNETH
REYNOLDS, TERRANCE RICHARDS, EDDIE RICHIE,
MICHAEL RIGGS, T.J. ROBY, ARTHUR RODRIGUEZ, VICTOR
ROSE, KENNETH L. RUSSELL, DAVID RUSSELL, DAVID
SADLER, SAMUEL SANNER, WILLIAM SHERBURN, MONTY
SHOCKEY, MARY SHOFFNER, WAYNE SHULL, DONALD
SIBIT, CANOVA SINGLETON, JOHN SMITH, DANNY SMITH,
TERRY SMITH, MICHAEL S. SMITH, ANTHONY STEELE,
RICHARD STONE, THOMAS STROTHER, JAMIE STRUBLE, H.
STUMBLINGBEAR, SHERMAN SURFACE, STACEY SUTTON,
STEPHEN THOMAS, DAVID THOMAS, JON TIBET, JOHNNY
TILLEY, ROSCOE TILLEY, LYMAN TOMLIN, FLOYD R.
TURNER, CHERYL WAGNER, LARRY WALKER, MICHAEL
WALLING, WALTER WALTERS, WARREN WARD, LESLIE
WARLEDO, JOHNNY WASHINGTON, ORLAND WASSON,
JOSEPH WATKINS, THOMAS WEAVER, ANDREW WEST,
JACK WHITLOCK, ROBERT WHITTIER, BILLY D. WILKINS,
TYRONE WILLIAMS, MARTY WILLIAMS, JACK WILLIAMS,
THURMAN WILSON, DONALD WILSON, WILLIE WILSON,
RANDY WOOD, KEVIN WOOD SR., ROBERT WOODS, BILLIE
WOOLSEY, CHARLES WOOTEN, GALEN WOOTEN,
SHARLENE WORKMAN, COY YOCHAM, FLOYD ZEIGLER,
FLOYD HARRIS, ROOSEVELT MCCOY, GREGORY
MUNDINE, DONALD O'SHIELDS, GERALD THOMPSON,
TERRY P. CROW, BRIAN LEROY JORDAN, TERRY LYNN
RHINE, LERON ROBINSON, CAROL ANN PIERCE, RICHARD
LEE JOHNSON, ROBERT M. ESTRADA, DAVID RICHARD,
PETITIONERS-PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,
v.
RON CHAMPION, STEVE HARGETT, STEPHEN KAISER,
BOBBY BOONE, DAN REYNOLDS, JOY HADWIGER, R.
MICHAEL CODY, EDWARD EVANS, R. JACK COWLEY,
NEVILLE MASSIE, H.N. SCOTT, SUE FRANK, DENISE SPEARS,
EARL ALLEN, JIM SORRELS, WARDENS, AND ALL OTHER
WARDENS OF CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES OF THE STATE
OF OKLAHOMA HAVING CUSTODY OF ANY OF THE
PLAINTIFFS; THE OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF
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CORRECTIONS; GARY MAYNARD, THE DIRECTOR OF THE
OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; THE
OKLAHOMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS; THE JUDGES
OF THE OKLAHOMA COURT OF CRIMINAL .APPEALS, TOWIT, HONORABLE JAMES F. LANE, HONORABLE GARY L.
LUMPKIN, HONORABLE TOM BRETT, HONORABLE ED H.
PARKS, AND HONORABLE CHARLES A. JOHNSON; THE
STATE OF OKLAHOMA; THE OKLAHOMA. INDIGENT
DEFENSE SYSTEM; HENRY A. (HANK) MEYER, III,
CHAntMAN, RICHARD REEH, DOUG PARR, RICHARD
JAMES, AND BECKY PFEFFERBAUM, M.D., INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS MEMBERS OF THE OKLAHOMA INDIGENT
DEFENSE SYSTEM BOARD; PATTI PALMER, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE OKLAHOMA
INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM; AND, E. ALVIN SCHAY,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS APPELLATE INDIGENT DEFENDER,
I.E., CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER OF THE
OKLAHOMA APPELLATE INDIGENT DEFENDER DIVISION,
RESPONDENTS-DEFEND ANTS-APPELLEES.
[6]

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA. D.C. No. 90-C-44S-B.

[7]

David Booth of R. Thomas Seymour, Attorneys, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for
Petitioners-Plaintiffs-Appellants.

[8]

Diane L. Slayton, Assistant Attorney General (Susan B. Loving, Attorney
General of Oklahoma, with her on the brief), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,
for Warden Respondents-Defendants-Appellees.

[9]

J. Warren Jackman (William A. Caldwell, with him on the brief), of Pray,
Walker, Jackman, Williamson & Marlar, Tulsa, Oklahoma (and Gary
Peterson, with him on the brief, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma), for
Oklahoma Indigent Defense System Respondents-Defendants-Appellees.

[10]

John M. Imel (John E. Rooney, Jr., with him on the brief), of Moyers,
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Martin, Santee, Imel & Tetrick, Tulsa, Oklahoma (and Gail L. Wettstein,
with him on the brief, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma), for Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals Respondents-Defendants-Appellees.
[11 ]

Before Logan, Brorby, and Ebel, Circuit Judges

[12]

Ebel

[13]

EBEL, Circuit Judge

[14]

These consolidated habeas appeals, which come to us after our remand in
Hams v. Champion, 938 F.2d 1062 (10th Cir. 1991) (Hams I), require us
to revisit the problem of appellate delay in the Oklahoma criminal Justice
system. In Harris I, we ruled that the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma should have excused an Oklahoma
prisoner's failure to exhaust his state remedies before seeking federal
habeas relief in light of extensive delay by the state public defender in
filing an opening brief in the prisoner's direct criminal appeal. 938 F.2d
at 1065-66, 1071. We remanded the action to the district court and
directed it to investigate the possibility of systemic delay in the filing of
briefs by the Oklahoma Appellate Public Defender System (Public
Defender). — Id. at 1071. In a subsequent opinion, we expanded the
scope of inquiry on remand to include a consideration of the entire
criminal appellate process in Oklahoma insofar as it contributes to delay
in deciding direct criminal appeals of indigent defendants. Hill v.
Reynolds, 942 F.2d 1494, 1496-97 (10th Cir. 1991). We now consider
the results of the district court's rulings on remand.

[15]

In this opinion we are called upon to address several issues arising out of
the delay in processing petitioners' direct criminal appeals, including
whether petitioners must exhaust their state remedies before seeking
habeas relief in federal court and whether the delays in the state appellate
process have violated petitioners' rights to due process, equal protection,
or effective assistance of counsel. The record before us shows that many
of these petitioners, all of whom are indigent and were represented by the
Public Defender in their direct criminal appeals, had to wait three or
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more years before a brief was filed on their behalf in their respective
direct criminal appeals. Some petitioners also experienced delays
elsewhere in the appellate process.
[16]

The following is a brief synopsis of our opinion, which begins with the
issue of exhaustion. We conclude that there is a rebuttable presumption
that the State's process is not effective and, therefore, need not be
exhausted, if a direct criminal appeal has been pending for more than two
years without final action by the State. This two-year presumptive period
is not inflexible: the particular circumstances of a case may warrant
excusing exhaustion after a delay of less than two years as, for example,
when the length of the sentence is considered or when there is an obvious
and massive breakdown in the procedural development of the appeal;
alternatively, circumstances may warrant refusing to excuse exhaustion
even after a delay of more than two years.

[17]

Next, we consider whether appellate delays also gave rise to independent
due process violations. We apply the four-part balancing test of Barker v.
Wingo, 407U.S. 514, 530, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972), and
examine the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, whether the
petitioner asserted his or her right to a timely appeal, and whether the
petitioner experienced any prejudice as a result of excessive delay.

[18]

First, we agree with the district court's Conclusion that delay in finally
adjudicating a direct criminal appeal beyond two years is presumptively
excessive. Again, this two-year presumptive period is not inflexible;
delay of less than two years may be excessive in some cases and delay of
more than two years may not be excessive in other cases. Generally,
however, the longer delay in the appellate process extends beyond two
years, the less showing a petitioner must make on the other parts of the
balancing test, including prejudice resulting from the delay.

[19]

Second, we conclude that the reasons the State has offered for the delays
experienced by petitioners—underfunding and, possibly, mismanagement
of resources—are not constitutionally sufficient to justify excessive delay.
Third, we conclude that absent a showing that a petitioner affirmatively
sought or caused delay in adjudicating his or her appeal, a petitioner
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sufficiently asserted his or her right to a timely appeal by filing a federal
habeas petition seeking relief from appellate delay by the State.
[20]

Finally, we conclude that although prejudice may be presumed if
appellate delay is sufficiently excessive, ordinarily a petitioner must
make some particularized showing of prejudice to establish a due process
violation. Prejudice arising from excessive appellate delay may take any
of three forms: oppressive incarceration pending resolution of the appeal;
anxiety and concern pending resolution of the appeal, and impairment of
the grounds for appeal or the grounds for a retrial in the event the
petitioner's conviction is reversed. Because we are concerned only with
prejudice arising from excessive delay, the particularized showing must
relate to events that occurred during the period of delay that was
excessive.

[21]

The most significant form of prejudice, and often the most difficult to
prove, is prejudice to the grounds for appeal or to the grounds for defense
in the event of a retrial. As a precondition to establishing the latter, a
petitioner must assert a colorable state or federal claim that would
warrant a reversal and retrial. Likewise, as a precondition to establishing
either oppressive incarceration or anxiety and concern pending resolution
of the appeal, a petitioner generally must assert a colorable claim that
would warrant a reversal of his or her conviction or a reduction in
sentence that would entitle the petitioner to immediate release. Because
the district court has not yet conducted the individualized factual inquiry
necessary to apply the Barker balancing test to each petitioner, we
remand the due process claims to the district court for further
development.

[22]

Likewise, although we recognize that the Equal Protection Clause may be
implicated if indigent petitioners face substantial delays in adjudicating
their direct criminal appeals that petitioners who can afford to retain
counsel do not face, we cannot review petitioners' equal protection claims
on the factual record before us. Therefore, we must remand these claims
to the district court, as well.

[23]

Turning to petitioners' claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, we
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conclude that excessive delay in filing an appellate brief may violate a
petitioner's right to effective counsel. The violation ends, however, once
the brief is filed, and unless the delay affected the outcome of the appeal
itself, the past violation is not redressable through a habeas action.
Therefore, only when a brief has yet to be filed can a petitioner obtain
habeas relief for ineffective assistance of counsel resulting from
excessive delay in filing an appellate brief
[24]

Finally, we address two issues that do not relate to delay in the state
appellate process. The first concerns the refusal of Judge Brett, one of the
members of the district court panel that issued the rulings subject to
appeal, to recuse himself from the habeas claims despite his uncle's
presence on the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals until the uncle's
death in early 1993. We conclude that Judge Brett abused his discretion
in failing to recuse himself and that he should not participate in any
further proceedings relating to petitioners' claims. We further conclude,
nonetheless, that Judge Brett's failure to recuse himself was harmless
error under the particular circumstances presented here and, therefore, we
may review the merits of the district court's rulings. Lastly, we conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award
petitioners interim attorney fees on the ground that the fee request was
premature.

[25]

I. HISTORICAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

[26]

In 1981, following a two-year pilot project, Oklahoma instituted its first
statewide system of public defenders. Before that time, in all but Tulsa
and Oklahoma Counties, indigent criminal defendants were represented
solely by appointed members of the private bar. The Oklahoma Appellate
Public Defender System was given responsibility for appeals by all
indigent defendants except those in Tulsa and Oklahoma Counties, who
continued to be represented by county public defenders. Except for cases
involving conflicts of interest, the Public Defender had no authority to
refuse cases assigned to it by the courts.

[27]

Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Public Defender was assigned a steadily
increasing number of felony appeals. This increase in caseload was not
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met with a corresponding increase in funding and staffing, however, and
a backlog of unbnefed cases began to develop. With only five attorneys
briefing noncapital cases, the Public Defender fell further and further
behind. At the end of fiscal year (FY) 1986, the Public Defender had a
total of 367 unbnefed cases.* m By the end of FY 1989, that number had
risen to 705.
[28]

In an effort to maximize the use of its limited resources, the Public
Defender implemented a "first-in, first-out" policy, pursuant to which the
oldest cases were briefed first. The Public Defender also began seeking
lengthy extensions from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals on a
routine basis. The Public Defender would ask for an initial extension of
360 days to be followed, if necessary, by subsequent requests for
extensions of 180 days or less. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
ordinarily granted these extensions.—

[29]

Although the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals was distressed by the
Public Defender's inability to handle the number of cases assigned to it,
the court felt it had no power to remedy the situation directly. — In
response to a mandamus petition by an indigent criminal defendant who
sought an order directing the Public Defender to file appellate briefs in
his two cases with no further delays, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals regretfully commented:

[30]

It is obvious that the office is understaffed to handle the number of
appeals that are presently being handled by the office but due to the lack
of funding by the State, the office is apparently doing the best that they
can under the circumstances. We are powerless to cure this problem. It
can only be cured by the legislature through the use of its budgetary
powers. Petitioner is not entitled to have his appeal handled prior to
others who are in similar circumstances and have been delayed even
longer.

[31]

Manous v. State, 797 P. 2d 1005, 1005-06 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990). Enter
Anthony Jerome Harris.
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[32]

Harris was sentenced on September 29, 1988, and the Public Defender
was appointed to represent him on appeal. On April 16, 1990, in response
to his inquiry, the Public Defender sent Harris a letter stating: "'It will be
at least 3 years before we are able to file your brief with the court.'"
Harris I, 938 F.2d at 1064 (quoting Letter from Public Defender to Harris
of 4/16/90). Believing that he should not have to wait that long to obtain
a review of his conviction and sentence, Harris filed a habeas petition in
federal district court and argued that the anticipated delay in adjudicating
his direct criminal appeal should excuse his failure to exhaust his state
remedies.

[33]

By the time we issued our opinion in Harris I on June 17, 1991, almost
three years had passed since Harris' sentencing and the Public Defender
had yet to file a brief on his behalf We concluded that the briefing delay,
which was authorized by the numerous extensions granted by the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, was attributable to the State and
was not justified. Therefore, we excused Harris from exhausting his state
remedies before proceeding in federal court. We also noted that the delay
raised potential independent violations of Harris' constitutional rights,
namely the right to equal protection, the right to due process, and the
right to effective assistance of counsel.

[34]

We reversed the district court's dismissal of the habeas petition for failure
to exhaust and, in light of the problems encountered by Harris and other
Oklahoma habeas petitioners who had raised the issue of delay to this
court, we directed the district court on remand

[35]

to consider this petitioner's claims within the context of the systemic
operations of the [Public Defender]. Once the constitutional scope of the
problem is known, the district court should consider what relief is
appropriate for this petitioner as well as such systemic relief, if any, as
may be needed to prevent any ongoing constitutional violations that may
be occurring as a result of the inability of the [Public Defender] timely to
prepare appeals for [its] indigent clients.

[36]

Harris I, 938 F.2d at 1071 (footnote omitted). Further, we instructed the
district court (1) to consolidate, to the extent possible, any other habeas
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cases pending in the Northern District of Oklahoma that raised a
constitutional challenge to the delay by the Public Defender in filing
briefs in direct criminal appeals and to coordinate its review of those
petitions with the review of similar petitions by the courts in the Western
and Eastern Districts of Oklahoma; (2) to "conduct a full hearing, as
expeditiously as possible, into possible systemic delays of the [Public
Defender] in preparing and filing appellate briefs for [its] indigent
clients;" (3) to make "detailed findings of fact and Conclusions of law
and . . . enter orders specifically addressing and remedying any
constitutional violations that may be found;" and (4) "to appoint
experienced counsel to represent the petitioners" in the collective cases.
Id. at 1071, 1073.
[37]

Two months later, we considered an appeal by another state habeas
petitioner who was represented by the Public Defender in his direct
criminal appeal. The opening brief there was not filed until two years and
nine months after the notice of appeal. Hill, 942 F.2d at 1495. At the time
we issued our decision, Hill's appeal had been pending three years and
four months with no decision by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals. Hill contended that the delay in adjudicating his appeal excused
his failure to exhaust state remedies and violated his right to due process.

[38]

Based on our decision in Harris I, we reversed the district court's
dismissal of Hill's habeas petition for failure to exhaust. On remand, we
instructed the district court to consolidate Hill's habeas action with that of
Harris for hearing. We further instructed the district court to consider the
period both before and after the Public Defender filed its brief and to
determine "what part of the whole period of delay caused by the state
may have violated Hill's right to due process." Id. at 1496-97. We thereby
expanded the scope of inquiry on remand to excessive delay in the entire
Oklahoma criminal appellate system.

[39]

During this time, sweeping changes were taking place in Oklahoma's
public defender system. In June 1990, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
ruled that Oklahoma's system for appointing and compensating trial
counsel for indigent defendants was unconstitutional. State v. Lynch, 796
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P . 2 d l l 5 0 , 1159(Okla. 1990).
[40]

In its 1991 session, the Oklahoma legislature responded to the Lynch
decision by overhauling the entire indigent defense system, both at the
trial and appellate levels. The Oklahoma Indigent Defense Act, Okla.
Stat. tit. 22, 1355-68, which took effect on July 1, 1991, created the
Oklahoma Indigent Defense System, and assigned it the responsibility of
providing both trial and appellate counsel, as well as counsel on capital
post-conviction matters, for indigent defendants in all but Tulsa and
Oklahoma Counties. The legislature also authorized the Public Defender
to hire two more attorneys to handle noncapital felony appeals.

[41 ]

Pursuant to our remand order in Harris I, in July 1991, Judges in the three
federal districts in Oklahoma began identifying pending habeas cases that
raised the issue of delay by the Public Defender and transferring them for
hearing to the then-Chief Judge of the Northern District of Oklahoma,
who was designated to sit in all three judicial districts. In January 1992,
the district court appointed counsel to represent the petitioners in these
cases (the Harris group), which at that time numbered sixteen.

[42]

On February 28, 1992, the petitioners in the Harris group, which then
consisted of thirty habeas cases, presented the court with reams of
statistical and other data gathered from the Public Defender, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, and the Attorney General. This
evidence showed that for noncapital felony appeals filed in 1989, the
Public Defender filed only three percent of its briefs within six months of
the date they were due; fifty-six percent of its briefs were at least three
years late; and thirty-one percent of its briefs had yet to be filed by the
beginning of 1992. Almost all the Public Defender briefs due in
noncapital felony appeals filed in 1990 and 1991 had yet to be filed by
the beginning of 1992. During much of the operative period, therefore, an
indigent appellant could expect a delay of two to four years before his or
her appellate brief would be filed.

[43]

The Public Defender was not the only entity having problems managing
its caseload, however. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals also
had a steadily growing backlog of cases. --— Each year the court was
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struggling to dispose of the cases pending from the previous year and
was making virtually no progress on the new cases filed that year. At the
end of FY 1989, there were 1,148 undecided cases pending before the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals; a year later, there were 1,407
undecided cases pending.
Even the Attorney General was beginning to
slip. Data collected from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
showed that although the Attorney General filed almost all her briefs
within six months of the due date, starting in 1987, there was "a clear
trend of a decreasing number of briefs timely filed." R., Doc. 27, Ex.3(b)
at 12. It was clear from the evidence presented that the appellate criminal
Justice system in Oklahoma was in a crisis.
[44]

In the spring of 1992, the Oklahoma legislature began taking steps to
alleviate the crisis. It appropriated $400,000 for the Public Defender to
use to contract with private attorneys to handle noncapital felony appeals
on which the Public Defender had been appointed. As a result, the Public
Defender contracted out approximately 176 of its cases that spring. In the
fall, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals also took steps to speed up
the appellate process. The court adopted a summary opinion format to be
used in all cases that would not be published. By reducing the amount of
legal analysis and Discussion set forth in its unpublished opinions, the
court eliminated lengthy conferences concerning the precise wording of
the opinion, as well as the need for separate opinions when Judges
concurred in the outcome but not in the analysis.

[45]

Meanwhile, the petitioners in the Harris group, which by then had grown
to 108 habeas cases, increased their pressure on the State by filing a
supplemental and amended complaint that named as defendants the State
of Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals and its individual
members, the Public Defender and its board members and administrative
officers, as well as all the Oklahoma wardens, among others. The
complaint, filed in July 1992, asserted against all the named defendants
both habeas claims and claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983.*fez The
Harris petitioners also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction,
seeking to enjoin the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals from granting
any further extensions of time to the Public Defender, and a motion for
partial summary judgment, seeking the release of those petitioners who
had been, or reasonably could be expected to be, in custody for 11.7
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months or longer without receiving a final adjudication of their appeal. - [46]

The district court held a hearing on the pending motions on October 15,
1992, by which time the Harris group had grown to 193 habeas cases.
The court noted at the outset that all the parties appeared to agree that
delays in the Oklahoma criminal appellate system had risen to the level
of constitutional violations, and it informed the parties that it rejected the
Attorney General's position that only the Oklahoma legislature could
provide a remedy for those constitutional violations. The court said it,
too, could provide a remedy.

[47]

The Public Defender recommended that the court stay its hand because
the legislature had appropriated more money for the Public Defender to
contract out its cases, and the Public Defender intended to award
contracts in an additional 354-400 cases the next morning. The contracts
would require all opening briefs to be filed on or before April 30, 1993.
The Public Defender stated that once these cases were contracted out to
private counsel, the Public Defender could "maintain brief filings on a
current basis within the statutorily allotted periods." Tr. 10/15/92 at 37.
Counsel for the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals also suggested that
the court wait six months to see if the clog in the system would resolve
itself. When questioned about appropriate remedies, counsel argued that
while release of petitioners during the period of excessive appellate delay
might be an appropriate remedy, it would have to be considered on a
case-by-case basis. The Attorney General, in turn, also argued that the
propriety of any remedy depended on the individual circumstances of
each petitioner.

[48]

At the Conclusion of the hearing, the court noted that, although in the
usual situation it would approach petitioners' claims on an individual
basis, in light of the unusual circumstances presented, it proposed the
following possible remedy: to release any petitioner whose appeal had
not been fully briefed and submitted to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals for decision within fourteen months of the date of conviction.
Each petitioner would be released on his or her personal recognizance
until the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals issued its opinion; the
State could apply for special terms and conditions of release in individual
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cases. The court gave the parties until October 23 to comment on the
proposal and indicated it would issue a ruling shortly thereafter.
Unfortunately, no ruling ever appeared.
[49]

Beginning in January 1993, various Harris group petitioners, who were
anticipating release, began filing mandamus petitions with us seeking a
ruling by the district court. By the end of February, there were seven such
mandamus petitions pending, including one filed by counsel on behalf of
all the Harris group petitioners.

[50]

On February 18, 1993, on motion of the Chief Judge of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, approved by the
Chief Judges of the Western and Eastern Districts, the Chief Judge of this
court entered an order designating a three-Judge district court panel to
adjudicate common issues of law and fact in all the habeas cases alleging
delay in the adjudication of direct criminal appeals in Oklahoma. The
panel, which was composed of one Judge from each of the three federal
districts in Oklahoma, was formed in an effort to resolve uniformly and
expeditiously the common issues arising in the approximately 275 habeas
cases that by then made up the Harris group.

[51]

By order entered March 26, 1993 in the mandamus proceedings, we
directed the district court panel to show cause why it should not be
ordered, among other things, "to enter findings of fact and Conclusions of
law in the Harris cases insofar as those cases seek habeas relief because
of delays by the [Public Defender] in preparing and filing briefs in
petitioners' direct criminal appeals" no later than May 10, 1993; and "to
enter findings of fact and Conclusions of law in the Harris cases insofar
as those cases seek habeas relief because of delays by the [Attorney
General] or the [Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals]" no later than
September 10, 1993. Harris v. United States Dist. Ct., (slip op.) at 7-8
(10th Cir. 1993)(unpublished order). We also suggested that the district
court certify those rulings for immediate appeal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
54(b).

[52]

In its response to the show cause order, the district court indicated that it
had no objection to meeting the deadlines set forth in the show cause
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order. Therefore, on April 22, 1993, we entered a mandamus order
directing the district court to enter the findings and Conclusions
requested in our show cause order and we also instructed the court to
consider the issue of cumulative delay in its ruling due September 10.
[53]

On April 1, 1993, the Harris group petitioners filed a motion to disqualify
two of the three members of the district court panel. Both motions were
orally denied at a status conference on April 6, with the exception that
Judge Thomas R. Brett whose uncle was a member of the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals until his death three months earlier, agreed to
recuse on any claims for damages.

[54]

At an evidentiary hearing on April 9, the district court said it would grant
respondents' motion to sever from the Harris group twenty-six habeas
cases by petitioners who were not represented by the Public Defender in
their direct criminal appeals. The court also said that it would close the
Harris group as of that date and any subsequent habeas petitions raising
the issue of appellate delay would be considered on an individual basis.
As of April 9, 284 habeas petitions that raised the issue of appellate delay
in the Oklahoma criminal Justice system had been filed by criminal
defendants represented by the Public Defender.

[55]

On May 6, 1993, the district court entered its findings of fact and
Conclusions of law concerning delay by the Public Defender and
certified its ruling as final for purposes of appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b).
Based on the Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the
district court concluded that an appellate process that took up to sixteen
months from the filing of the notice of appeal through the filing of
appellate briefs "would satisfy constitutional concerns." R., Doc. 143 at
21-22. In light of this standard, the court concluded that "there has been
inordinate delay attributable to [the Public Defender] in the filing of most
of the appellant briefs herein. This delay has thus been systemic." Id. at
22. The court determined, however, that to decide whether the inordinate
delay by the Public Defender gave rise to any independent due process
violations, it would have to balance the factors set forth in Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. at 530, which would require the court to consider each
habeas petitioner's case individually. The court said it would defer this

Research Scarth. Dent & Whiteley PC

Page 16 of 59

individual inquiry until after it had entered all the rulings required by our
mandamus order of April 22. The court also deferred any rulings on the
equal protection and ineffective assistance of counsel issues until it
conducts the individual inquiries on due process.
[56]

The court further held that any habeas petitioner whose direct criminal
appeal had been either affirmed or reversed with prejudice to retrial was
not entitled to habeas relief as a result of delay in the appellate process.
Finally, the court held that in the future, habeas petitioners would have to
exhaust the issue of delay in the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
before raising it in federal court. Petitioners filed their notice of appeal
from the district court's order on May 28.

[57]

In August, the parties submitted documentary and testimonial evidence to
the court concerning delays by the Attorney General and the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals, as well as cumulative delays in the system.
Among other things, the court was advised that two pieces of legislation
went into effect on July 1 that would speed the appellate process.

[58]

The first act established an Emergency Appellate Division of the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals that can be activated whenever
more than 100 noncapital felony appeals are at issue and pending in the
Office of the Clerk of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Act of
June 3, 1993, ch. 292, sees. 2-6, 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws Serv. 1548,
1549-51 (West)(codified at Okla. Stat. tit. 20, 60.1.-.5). Each emergency
appellate panel consists of three trial Judges, two of whom must concur
in any decision. Okla. Stat. tit. 20, 60.3. Each panel must dispose of any
cases assigned to it or return the cases to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals for resolution within ninety days. Decisions of the panels are
final unless the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals grants a petition for
review. Id. at 60.1. Judge Johnson of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals testified that sixty-six cases had been assigned to emergency
appellate panels since the legislation went into effect, and three of the
cases had already been decided.

[59]

The second act cut in half the time allowed for perfecting appeals in
misdemeanor and felony cases (i.e., filing the record with transcripts); an
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appeal must be perfected in 90, rather than 180, days from the date the
judgment and sentence are pronounced. Act of June 7, 1993, ch. 298, sec.
5, 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws Serv. 1562, 1564 (West)(codified at Okla. Stat,
tit. 22, 1054). Because the briefing schedule does not begin to run until
the appeal has been perfected, reducing the time permitted for perfecting
the appeal effectively reduces delay on appeal by ninety days.
[60]

The district court entered its findings of fact and Conclusions of law
concerning delay by the Attorney General and the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals, as well as cumulative delay throughout the appellate
system, on September 8, 1993. The court found that pursuant to data
provided by the parties, "there are approximately 302 matters now
considered Harris cases as of August 13, 1993." R., Doc. 255 at 4. An
appellate brief had been filed on behalf of the appellant in at least 301 of
the cases and the Attorney General had filed a brief on behalf of the
appellee in all but three cases. The Attorney General's briefs were filed
within the statutory period in 130 cases and were filed more than sixty
days after the statutory period in only sixty-seven cases. The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals had issued opinions in eighty-five of the
cases, and 217 cases remained pending before the court. Of those, six
were not yet at issue, 125 were at issue and ready to be assigned to a
Judge, and eighty-six were at issue and had already been assigned to a
Judge.

[61 ]

The district court found no evidence of systemic delay in filing briefs by
the Attorney General and also determined that although delay by the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals may have been inordinate in
individual cases, it had not been systemic. The court further concluded
that there was no cumulative inordinate systemic delay at present. The
court held that a delay in adjudicating an appeal of more than two years
from the notice of appeal or order permitting an appeal out of time to
issuance of an opinion would be presumed to be unconstitutional "absent
a showing of good and sufficient cause or special circumstances." Id. at
8. The court again ruled that before a habeas petitioner could assert
unconstitutional delay in federal court, he or she first had to raise the
issue to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals and permit it to take
appropriate action.

(
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[62]

On September 28, petitioners filed their notice of appeal from the court's
September 9 order, which the court certified as final pursuant to Rule
54(b). The two appeals were consolidated by our order of October 14,
and we heard oral argument in the appeals on November 8, 1993.

[63]

On appeal, petitioners assert that the district court's findings and
Conclusions concerning their due process, equal protection, and
ineffective assistance of counsel claims are incomplete and, in certain
instances, erroneous. Petitioners also contend that Judge Brett, who was a
member of the three-Judge district court panel, should have recused
himself on the habeas claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 455. Finally,
petitioners maintain that the district court erred in not awarding interim
attorney fees against the State for work performed by counsel on behalf
of petitioners. We will discuss each of these issues below.

[64]

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL RELATING TO DELAY

[65]

A. Exhaustion of State Remedies

[66]

A threshold question that must be addressed in every habeas case is that
of exhaustion. Federal habeas relief is not available to a state prisoner
"unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available
State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such
process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner." 28 U.S.C.
2254(b).

[67]

The exhaustion doctrine, which was codified in 1948, began as "a
judicially crafted instrument which reflects a careful balance between
important interests of federalism and the need to preserve the writ of
habeas corpus as a 'swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal
restraint or confinement.'" Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410
U.S. 484, 490, 35 L. Ed. 2d 443, 93 S. Ct. 1123 (1973)(quotmg Secretary
of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien, [1923] A.C. 603, 609 (ELL.))Although the doctrine advances several interests, see Deters v. Collins,
985 F.2d 789, 794 (5th Cir. 1993), it "is principally designed to protect
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the state court's role in the enforcement of federal law and prevent
disruption of state judicial proceedings." Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,
518,71 L.Ed. 2d 379, 102 S. Ct. 1198(1982).
[68]

Because "it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a
federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an
opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation,"
federal courts apply the doctrine of comity, which "teaches that one court
should defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the
courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already
cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the
matter."

[69]

Id. (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204, 94 L. Ed. 761, 70 S. Ct.
587(1950)).

[70]

Exhaustion is, therefore, based on principles of comity; exhaustion is not
jurisdictional. Patterson v. Leeke, 556 F.2d 1168, 1170 (4th Cir.), cert,
denied, 434 U.S. 929, 54 L. Ed. 2d 289, 98 S. Ct. 414(1977). "Although
there is a strong presumption in favor of requiring the prisoner to pursue
his available state remedies, his failure to do so is not an absolute bar to
appellate consideration of his claims." Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129,
131, 95 L. Ed. 2d 119, 107S.Ct. 1671 (1987). The State may waive a
prisoner's failure to exhaust by failing to raise the defense in federal
district court. Id. at 135. Likewise, some cases may present special
circumstances that make it "appropriate for an appellate court to address
the merits of a habeas corpus petition notwithstanding the lack of
complete exhaustion." Id. at 131; Frisbiev. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 521,
96 L. Ed. 541, 72 S. Ct. 509 (1952). One such circumstance is when the
State's process is inadequate to protect a prisoner's rights. See 28 U.S.C.
2254(b); Darr, 339 U.S. at 210.

[71]

"Where state procedural snarls or obstacles preclude an effective state
remedy against unconstitutional convictions, federal courts have no other
choice but to grant relief in the collateral proceeding." Bartone v. United
States, 375 U.S. 52, 54, 11 L. Ed. 2d 11, 84 S. Ct. 21 (1963); see also
Hankins v. Fulcomer, 941 F.2d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 1991)("The principle of
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comity weighs less heavily [when] the state has had an ample opportunity
to pass upon the matter and has failed to sufficiently explain its . . .
delay."); United States ex rel. Hankins v. Wicker, 582 F. Supp. 180, 182
(W.D. Pa. 1984)("If an appropriate remedy does not exist or its
utilization is frustrated in the state system, . . . the deference accorded the
state judicial process must give way to the primary role of the federal
courts to redress constitutional deprivations."), aff d, 782 F.2d 1028 (3d
Cir.)(table), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 831, 93 L. Ed. 2d 64, 107 S. Ct. 118
(1986).
[72]

Thus, "inexcusable or inordinate delay by the state in processing claims
for relief may make the state process ineffective to protect the
petitioner's rights and excuse exhaustion. Wojtczak v. Fulcomer, 800
F.2d 353, 354 (3d Cir. 1986); accord Hill v. Reynolds, 942 F.2d at 1496
("The delay [petitioner] faced in having a direct appeal filed proves his
state remedies ineffective.").

[73]

In Way v. Crouse, 421 F.2d 145, 146-47 (10th Cir. 1970), we concluded
that it was proper for a habeas petitioner who had experienced an
eighteen-month delay in the adjudication of his direct criminal appeal to
"seek vindication of his asserted constitutional grievance" in the federal,
rather than the state, courts. Noting that "'the concept of federal-state
comity involves mutuality of responsibilities, and an unacted upon
responsibility can relieve one comity partner from continuous
deference,'" we vacated the order dismissing the habeas petition for
failure to exhaust. Id. at 147 (quoting Dixon v. Florida, 388 F.2d 424,
426 (5th Cir. 1968)).

[74]

Later, in Harris I, we set forth the standard that when "a habeas petitioner
makes colorable and sufficient allegations of an unconstitutional delay in
obtaining direct state appellate review of his criminal conviction, . . . the
federal district court should consider that claim on the merits without
requiring that he exhaust his direct state appeal first." 938 F.2d at 106869. Because exhaustion is a threshold issue, it often can be addressed on
the pleadings without the need for an evidentiary hearing. However, an
evidentiary hearing was deemed necessary in Harris I to investigate the
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reasons for delay in light of the allegations of systemic delay.
[75]

We turn now to the question: At what point does delay in the state
process become so inordinate that exhaustion should be excused? In
addressing this question, we must keep in mind that "it is the legal issues
that are to be exhausted, not the petitioner," Park v. Thompson, 356 F.
Supp. 783, 788 (D. Haw. 1973). We cannot, of course, announce a bright
line rule. As we noted in Way, 421 F.2d at 146-47, and Jones v. Grouse,
360 F.2d 157, 158 (10th Cir. 1966), it is necessary to know the facts and
circumstances surrounding the delay in order to determine whether the
State is providing the petitioner an effective appeal.

[76]

In Way, we concluded that an eighteen-month delay in docketing a direct
appeal before the state supreme court was enough to excuse exhaustion in
the absence of facts and circumstances justifying that delay. 421 F.2d at
146-47. Based on other facts and circumstances, courts have found other
periods of delay sufficient to conclude that the state process was
ineffective and exhaustion should be excused. See Simmons v. Reynolds,
898 F.2d 865, 870 (2d Cir. 1990)(suggestmg that "the doctrine of
exhaustion of state remedies does not require a prisoner to wait. . . three
or four years before enlisting federal aid to expedite an appeal"); Rheuark
v. Wade, 540 F.2d 1282, 1283 (5th Cir. 1976) (remanding for district
court to excuse exhaustion if fifteen-month delay m preparing transcript
could not be justified); Dozie v. Cady, 430 F.2d 637, 638 (7th Cir.
1970)(remanding for district court to excuse exhaustion if seventeenmonth delay in briefing direct criminal appeal could not be justified);
United States ex rel. Hankins, 582 F. Supp. at 182 (finding "the twenty
four month delay in the Disposition of [petitioner's] direct appeal, to
which is added the nine month period between his conviction and the
filing of a notice of appeal, sufficient to question the adequacy of the
state remedy" and to excuse exhaustion); cf. Smith v. Kansas, 356 F.2d
654, 657 (10th Cir. 1966)(remanding for district court "to take such steps
as it deems necessary to secure petitioner's right to a prompt hearing on
his claim of unconstitutional restraint" where more than one year passed
between filing of motion for post-conviction relief and entry of
appealable order), cert, denied, 389 U.S. 871, 19 L. Ed. 2d 151, 88 S. Ct.
154 (1967); Breazeale v. Bradley, 582 F.2d 5, 6 (5th Cir. 1978) (excusing
exhaustion because state habeas petition had been completely dormant
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for over one year and the State had offered "no reason for its torpor"); St.
Jules v. Beto, 462 F.2d 1365, 1366-67 (5th Cir. 1972)(remandmg for
district court to excuse exhaustion and address merits if seventeen-month
delay in state trial court ruling on motion for post-conviction relief could
not be justified); Jones, 360 F.2d at 158 (remanding for district court to
excuse exhaustion if eighteen-month delay in adjudicating appeal from
denial of post-conviction relief could not be justified); Dixon, 388 F.2d at
426 (remanding for district court to excuse exhaustion and address merits
if eighteen-month delay in state trial court ruling on post-sentencing
motion could not be justified); Seemiller v. Wynck, 663 F.2d 805, 80708 (8th Cir. 1981)(remanding for district court to excuse exhaustion and
address claims if state court had not ruled within sixty days on motion for
post-conviction relief that had been pending for two years); Wojtczak,
800 F.2d at 355-56 (excusing exhaustion because motion for postconviction relief had been pending for more than two and one-half
years); Moore v. Deputy Comm'rs of SCI-Huntingdon, 946 F.2d 236, 242
(3d Cir. 1991)(excusing exhaustion because petition for post-conviction
relief had been pending for three years), cert, denied, 117 L. Ed. 2d 647,
112S.Ct. 1509(1992).
[77]

Although we cannot establish a bright line, we think it would be helpful
to articulate a time period beyond which there is at least a presumption
that the state process has become ineffective because of delay. Based
upon the record before us, as well as our review of the case law in this
and other circuits, we conclude that delay in adjudicating a direct
criminal appeal beyond two years from the filing of the notice of appeal
gives rise to a presumption that the state appellate process is
ineffective.—

[78]

We recognize that cases may arise in which exhaustion should be
excused even though an appeal has been pending for less than two years.
Conversely, we also recognize that, in particular cases, the State may
show that a delay of more than two years is justified and, therefore, good
cause exists for not excusing exhaustion. Thus, we hold only that the
state appellate process should be presumed to be ineffective and,
therefore, exhaustion should presumptively be excused, when a
petitioner's direct criminal appeal has been pending for two years without
resolution absent a constitutionally sufficient justification by the State.
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SeeBurkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208, 1218 (3d Cir. 1987)(Burkett
I)("Where a petitioner has demonstrated inordinate delay, we have placed
the burden on respondents to demonstrate why further resort to the state
courts should be required.").
[79]

Although 2254 requires a habeas petitioner to exhaust his or her
underlying claims before coming to federal court, it does not require a
petitioner to exhaust the issue of exhaustion, itself. Because exhaustion
functions as a federal court gatekeeper, the federal, not the state, courts
decide when the state process has been exhausted or should be deemed
ineffective because of delay. Moreover, requiring a petitioner to raise the
issue of exhaustion first in state court would unnecessarily frustrate a
petitioner's right to a speedy adjudication of his or her claims. See Way,
421 F.2d at 146-47 (conditionally excusing petitioner from having to
raise issue of delay to "the very courts which are responsible, on the face
of the pleadings, for the very delay of which he complains"); Brooks v.
Jones, 875 F.2d 30, 31 (2d Cir. 1989)("When the petitioner can
substantiate his complaint that his right to appeal is being violated by
inattention and time-consuming procedures, to require one more
technical step would be to tolerate the frustration of the petitioner's due
process rights."); United States ex rel. Hankins, 582 F. Supp. at 182
("Where the state process is itself the basis for the claimed denial of due
process the issue has properly been presented [to the state judiciary].").
But see Schandelmeier v. Cunningham, 819 F.2d 52, 54-55 (3d Cir.
1986) (holding that because petitioner had not pursued procedures for
presenting his claims based on sentencing delay to the state court, he had
not exhausted his remedies and could not seek federal relief), cert,
denied, 480 U.S. 938, 94 L. Ed. 2d 774, 107 S. Ct. 1584(1987).

[80]

Once exhaustion is excused, a federal court has the power to review7 the
merits of a petitioner's habeas petition to the extent that it raises federal
issues. See, e.g., Jones, 360 F.2d at 158. In many (indeed, most)
instances, however, proceeding directly to the merits of a petitioner's
claims after excusing exhaustion may not be the preferred course of
action, or even an effective one.

[81]

If exhaustion is excused due to delay in adjudicating a petitioner's direct
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criminal appeal, the federal habeas review will in some regards, serve as
a surrogate for a direct state appeal. This raises several concerns. First,
because the petitioner would be entitled to appointed counsel on direct
appeal, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-58, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811, 83
S. Ct. 814 (1963), it may be appropriate to appoint counsel to represent
the petitioner on habeas review. Likewise, the federal court may need to
ensure that an indigent petitioner has a free copy of the trial transcript if it
is necessary to evaluate his or her habeas petition. See Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 19-20, 100 L. Ed. 891, 76 S. Ct. 585 (1956).
[82]

Furthermore, to the extent the petitioner's underlying claims of error are
state claims, the federal court cannot review them even if exhaustion is
excused, because federal habeas review is limited to alleged "violations
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C.
2254; see also Estelle v. McGuire, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385, 112 S. Ct. 475, 480
(1991)("It is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state
court determinations on state law questions. In conducting habeas review,
a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.").

[83]

Finally, federal courts should not be required as a routine matter to fulfill
the State's obligation to provide an "adequate and effective" direct
criminal appeal to its indigent criminal defendants, Griffin, 351 U.S. at
20. Requiring the federal courts to do so on a regular basis just because
the State does not fulfill its own constitutional obligations would
unnecessarily tax federal resources and inject the federal courts into the
State's process.

[84]

Thus, we consider an alternative. We start by noting that delay in
adjudicating a state prisoner's direct criminal appeal may do more than
simply excuse exhaustion. It also may give rise to an independent due
process claim. Harris I, 938 F.2d at 1068; accord United States v. Pratt,
645 F.2d 89, 91 (1st Cir.), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 881, 70 L. Ed. 2d 195,
102 S. Ct. 369 (1981); Cody v. Henderson, 936 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir.
1991); Burkett v. Fulcomer, 951 F. 2d 1431, 1446 (3d Cir. 1991), cert,
denied, 120 L. Ed. 2d 921, 112 S. Ct. 3055 (1992)(Burkett II); Rheuark
v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 302 (5th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 450 U.S. 931,
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6 7 L . E d . 2d 365, 101 S. Ct. 1392(1981); Coev. Thurman, 9 2 2 R 2 d 5 2 8 ,
530-31 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus, a habeas petition may be predicated on a
due process violation arising from the State's delay in adjudicating a
petitioner's direct criminal appeal even if the petitioner's allegations of
error at the trial level are based on state law and therefore, not proper for
federal habeas review.
[85]

Once appellate delay rises to the level of an independent due process
violation, a wide range of remedies is available with which the federal
district court can redress the constitutional violation. These remedies
often will be more effective in redressing state appellate delay than will
merely excusing exhaustion and considering the petitioner's underlying
claims on the merits. We turn, therefore, to the requirements for
establishing an independent due process claim based on the State's delay
in processing a direct criminal appeal.

[86]

B.Substantive Claim That Appellate Delay

[87]

Violates Right To Due Process

[88]

1.Elements of the claim

[89]

The Due Process Clause provides that "No person s h a l l . . . be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . . " U.S. Const,
amend. V. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment provides "nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law. "Id. amend. XIV, 1.

[90]

The right to a speedy trial, which is guaranteed an accused by the Sixth
Amendment, is a fundamental right imposed on the states by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. at 515. Although the Constitution does not require the State to
afford a criminal defendant a direct appeal to challenge alleged trial court
errors, see McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687, 38 L. Ed. 867, 14 S.
Ct 913 (1894), the Supreme Court has held that
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[91]

if a State has created appellate courts as "an integral part of the . . .
system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant,"
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. at 18, the procedures used in deciding appeals
must comport with the demands of the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Constitution.

[92]

Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821, 105 S. Ct. 830
(1985)(alteration in original).

[93]

To ensure the defendant's right to a "meaningful appeal," Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. at 358, the Court has held that when the State
affords a criminal defendant an appeal by right, the Fourteenth
Amendment requires, among other things, that counsel be appointed to
represent an indigent defendant, id. at 356-58, that the representation of
counsel be effective, Evitts, 469 U.S. at 396, and that either an indigent
defendant be provided a free transcript or some equivalent method of
reporting the trial proceedings be employed, Draper v. Washington, 372
U.S. 487, 495, 9 L. Ed. 2d 899, 83 S. Ct. 774 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. at 19-20.

[94]

We may add to this list the requirement that the State afford the
defendant a timely appeal, for an appeal that is inordinately delayed is as
much a "meaningless ritual," Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358, as an appeal that
is adjudicated without the benefit of effective counsel or a transcript of
the trial court proceedings. See Burkett I, 826 F.2d at 1221-22; United
States ex rel. Smith v. Twomey, 486 F.2d 736, 739 (7th Cir. 1973), cert,
denied, 416 U.S. 994, 40 L. Ed. 2d 773, 94 S. Ct. 2408 (1974); cf
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21, 82 S. Ct.
917 (1962) ("No general respect for, nor adherence to, the law as a whole
can well be expected without judicial recognition of the paramount need
for prompt, eminently fair and sober criminal law procedures. . . . Delay
in the final judgment of conviction, including its appellate review,
unquestionably erodes the efficacy of law enforcement."); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424U.S. 319, 333, 47L. Ed. 2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976)("The
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'").
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[95]

When determining whether a criminal defendant has been deprived of his
or her right to timely process at the trial level, the Supreme Court has
established a balancing test to be applied on an ad hoc basis. Barker, 407
U.S. at 530. Four factors should be assessed and balanced: "(1) length of
delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his
right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant." Id. (numbers added). The
fourth factor "should be assessed in the light of the interests of
defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect." Id. at
532. The "Court has identified three such interests: (i) to prevent
oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of
the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be
impaired." Id.

[96]

Although Barker addressed only a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
a speedy trial, the balancing test the Court enunciated provides an
appropriate framework for evaluating whether a defendant's due process
right to a timely direct criminal appeal has been violated. See Rheuark v.
Shaw, 628 F.2d at 303 ("The factors of Barker are preferred [over] the
standard announced in United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 52 L. Ed.
2d 752, 97 S. Ct. 2044 . . . (1977)[concerning pre-indictment delay],
since the reasons for constraining appellate delay are analogous to the
motives underpinning the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy
trial.")(footnote omitted); DeLancy v. Caldwell, 741 F.2d 1246, 1248
(10th Cir. 1984)("We agree with the Fifth Circuit that the right to avoid
unreasonable delay in the appellate process is similar to the right to a
speedy trial."); Burkett II, 951 F.2d at 1445-46 (holding that delay in
adjudicating an appeal, which infringes on due process rights, is
effectively no different than delay in imposing a sentence, which
infringes on Sixth Amendment speedy trial right).

[97]

We can apply the first three factors of the Barker test to claims of
appellate delay without modification. We must modify the fourth factor
of prejudice to the defendant, however, to reflect the interests sought to
be protected by an appeal "unencumbered by excessive delay." Rheuark
v. Shaw, 628 F.2d at 303 n.8.

[98]

The Fifth Circuit has identified the following interests that should be
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considered when assessing prejudice arising from appellate delay: "(1)
prevention of oppressive incarceration pending appeal; (2) minimization
of anxiety and concern of those convicted awaiting the outcome of their
appeals; and (3) limitation of the possibility that a convicted person's
grounds for appeal, and his or her defenses in case of reversal and retrial,
might be impaired." Id. In DeLancy, 741 F.2d at 1248, we adopted the
Fifth Circuit's modification of the Barker prejudice factor for purposes of
appellate delay. We also heeded the Supreme Court's admonition that the
four factors of the balancing test are related and should be considered
together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. Barker, 407
U.S. at 533; DeLancy, 741 F.2d at 1248.
[99]

Nevertheless, as we discuss below, we view the first factor—length of
delay—as a threshold that a petitioner must meet before the court need
consider the other factors. Furthermore, we agree with the Ninth Circuit
that, ordinarily, a petitioner must make some showing on the fourth
factor—prejudice—to establish a due process violation. United States v.
Tucker, 8 F.3d 673, 676 (9th Cir. 1993)(en banc).

[100]

Therefore, in determining whether delay in adjudicating a petitioner's
direct criminal appeal violated the petitioner's due process rights, we
must balance the following factors:

[101]

a. the length of the delay;

[102]

b. the reason for the delay and whether that reason is justified;

[103]

c. whether the petitioner asserted his right to a timely appeal; and

[104]

d. whether the delay prejudiced the petitioner by

[105]

i. causing the petitioner to suffer oppressive incarceration pending
appeal; or
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[106]

ii. causing the petitioner to suffer constitutionally cognizable anxiety and
concern awaiting the outcome of his or her appeal; or

[107]

iii. impairing the petitioner's grounds for appeal or his or her defenses in
the event of a reversal and retrial.

[108]

We will address each of these factors in turn.

[109]

a. The length of the delay .

[110]

The first factor in the balancing test is the length of the appellate delay.
"Only passage of an inordinate amount of time triggers due process
concerns." Hill v. Reynolds, 942 F.2d at 1497 (emphasis added).
Therefore, if a petitioner cannot establish at least some degree of
inordinate delay, the court need not inquire into the other factors. Cf
Doggett v. United States, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2690-91
(1992)(holding that because no speedy trial violation occurs if the
government prosecutes a defendant "with customary promptness," "to
trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval
between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary
from 'presumptively prejudicial' delay").

[Ill]

We cannot set an inflexible length of time that will constitute inordinate
delay in every case. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 521 ("We cannot definitely
say how long is too long in a system where Justice is supposed to be
swift but deliberate."); Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d at 531 ("There is no
talismanic number of years or months, after which due process is
automatically violated."). Nonetheless, it seems appropriate to Judge
appellate delay by the same two-year presumptive standard that we used
earlier to excuse exhaustion. See supra (slip op.) at pp. 30-31. Therefore,
a two-year delay in finally adjudicating a direct criminal appeal
ordinarily will give rise to a presumption of inordinate delay that will
satisfy this first factor in the balancing test.

[112]

Creating a presumption that a two-year delay in adjudicating an appeal is
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inordinate comports with the district court's ruling that "a two-year
period, from the notice of appeal or order permitting same, be established
as the time period for resolution of a direct criminal appeal in Oklahoma
beyond which any delay will be presumed to be unconstitutional, . . .
absent a showing of good and sufficient cause or special circumstances."
R., Doc. 255 at 8 (footnote omitted).*™ Respondents do not challenge
the district court's two-year presumptive period. Although petitioners
argue for a shorter period, the only basis for their argument is that in
1991, the Tenth Circuit's median time for deciding direct criminal
appeals was 11.7 months. See Appellant's Principal Br. (No.93-5123) at
57; Appellant's Principal Br. (No.93-5209) at 18-19. We are not
sufficiently persuaded by this single statistic to conclude that the district
court erred in establishing a two-year presumptive period. See United
States v. Pratt, 645 F.2d at 91 (declining to hold nine-month appellate
delay unconstitutional in absence of exacerbating factors); United States
ex rel. Harris v. Reed, 608 F. Supp. 1369, 1376 (N.D. Ill 1985)(holding
that a seven-and-one-half-month delay in adjudicating a motion for postconviction relief was not so egregious as to violate petitioner's due
process rights); Doescher v. Estelle, 454 F. Supp. 943, 952 (N.D. Tex.
1978)(determining as a matter of law that a one-year delay in processing
petitioner's appeal was not unjustified), appeal dismissed , 597 F.2d 281
(5th Cir. 1979)(table).

[113]

The district court concluded that two years to adjudicate an appeal in
Oklahoma is both customary and feasible."^11 Furthermore, a two-year
delay is within the time frame that other courts have found to raise due
process concerns. For example, in United States ex rel. Hankins, 582 F.
Supp. at 184-85, the court held that the pendency of an appeal for two
years with no decision by the state appellate court, coupled with a ninemonth delay by the trial court in ruling on post-trial motions, gave rise to
a prima facie due process violation. See also Dozie v. Cady, 430 F.2d at
638 (holding that seventeen-month delay in filing opening brief
warranted inquiry into possible due process violation); Burkett II, 951
F.2d at 1445-46 (holding that eighteen-month delay between sentencing
and decision on appeal gave rise to due process violation); United States
v. Antoine, 906 F.2d 1379, 1382-83 (9th Cir.)(holding that three-year
delay in adjudicating federal appeal was "substantial" and remanding for
further findings regarding prejudice), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 963, 112 L.
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Ed. 2d 407, 111 S. Ct. 398 (1990); Snyder v. Kelly, 769 F. Supp. 108,
111 (W.D.N. Y. 1991)(holding that three years is "an excessive amount of
time to await the resolution of an appeal"), aff d 972 F.2d 1328 (2d Cir.
1992)(table); cf Jones v. Crouse, 360 F.2d at 158 (holding that delay of
more than eighteen months in processing appeal of collateral attack
warranted inquiry into possible due process violation).**""
[114]

The passage of two years creates only a presumption of inordinate delay
on appeal. The particular circumstances of a case may warrant a finding
that the passage of less than two years constitutes inordinate delay or that
the passage of more than two years does not. For example, although the
length of the sentence cannot be a controlling factor in light of the time
requirements inherent in processing an appeal, a case in which a very
short sentence was imposed may warrant more expedited treatment. See
Wheeler v. Kelly, 639 F. Supp. 1374, 1379 (E.D.N. Y. 1986)(holding that
"the length of the sentence is a factor in determining whether postconviction delay is excessive"), affd, 811 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1987). On
the other hand, a particularly complex case may warrant a more lengthy
appellate process. Cf. Geames v. Henderson, 725 F. Supp. 681, 685
(E.D.N. Y. 1989)(holding that delay of three-and-one-half years was
excessive because issues on appeal were "no more complex than in most
criminal appeals").

[115]

Because it is a balancing test that we employ, however, delay
substantially beyond two years, at least in a case that does not warrant a
lengthier appellate process, will reduce the burden of proof on the other
three factors necessary to establish a due process violation. See Doggett,
112 S. Ct. at 2693 (holding that the more protracted the delay, the more
prejudice may be presumed from the delay).

[116]

b. The reason for the delay

[117]

The second part of the balancing test is the reason for the delay. In Harris
I, we laid to rest any argument that delays by the Public Defender in
filing briefs could be attributed to petitioners on the ground that the
Public Defender requested the continuances on petitioners' behalf. 938
F.2d at 1065. The record indicated that "the delay in preparing
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petitioner's brief on appeal [was] caused by the inability of [the Public
Defender] to address petitioner's case in a timely fashion." Id. Because
this delay was "forced upon an unwilling petitioner by reason of his
indigency," we held it should not be attributed to the petitioner. Id. The
parties do not dispute that the delays in adjudicating petitioners' direct
criminal appeals are attributable to the State of Oklahoma and not to
petitioners.-^ See R., Doc. 29 at 9 (Attorney General); Addendum to
Br. of OIDS Defs. at 17 (Public Defender); R., Doc. 27, Ex. 3(c),
Attachment 1 (Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals); see also Hankins
v. Fulcomer, 941 F.2d at 252 (holding that court had numerous
opportunities to rule on pending matters and its delay in doing so was not
attributable to petitioner); Wojtczak v. Fulcomer, 800 F.2d at 356
(holding that delay in adjudicating motion for post-conviction relief was
not attributable to petitioner, but to "disinterest on the part of court
appointed counsel and to a failure on the part of the court to require them
to provide minimally effective representation").
[118]

The State has offered no constitutionally sufficient justification for the
delays, such as that the cases are unusually complex or that they involve
the death penalty. The only reasons offered by the State were the lack of
funding and, possibly, the mismanagement of resources by the Public
Defender. See R., Doc. 29 at 9; Addendum to Br. of OIDS Defs. at 17;
R., Doc. 27, Ex.3(c), Attachment 1.
Neither of these reasons
constitutes an acceptable excuse for delay. See United States ex rel.
Smith, 486 F.2d at 739 ("The rights announced in Griffin v. Illinois and
Douglas v. California cannot be allowed to become meaningless through
understaffmg of the state offices responsible for assuring those
rights.")(citations omitted); Snyder, 769 F. Supp. at 111 (holding that the
"brobdingnagian case load of assigned counsel" is not an acceptable
reason for delay); Rheuark v. Shaw, 477 F. Supp. 897, 912 n. 17 (N.D.
Tex. 1979)("The constitutional requirements of due process on appeal
may not be abridged by failing to fund substitute court reporters."), aff d
in part, rev'd in part, 628 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 450 U.S.
931 (1981); cf Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825, 52 L. Ed. 2d 72, 97
S. Ct. 1491 (1977) ("The cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot
justify its total denial."); Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 54n.8 (2d Cir.
1977)("Inadequate resources no longer can excuse the denial of
constitutional rights.").
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[119]

c. Petitioner's assertion of his or her right to a timely appeal

[120]

The third factor we must balance in determining whether a due process
violation has occurred is the petitioner's assertion of his or her right to a
timely appeal. The Supreme Court rejected in Barker "the rule that a
defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial forever waives his right."
407 U.S. at 528. Instead, the Court held that whether and how strongly a
defendant asserts his or her right to a speedy trial should be balanced
with the other factors. Id. at 528-29.

[121]

We will not require petitioners to have made an affirmative assertion of
their right to a timely appeal in state court for this factor to weigh in their
favor. Under the circumstances, the filing of these federal habeas
petitions constitutes a sufficient assertion of petitioners' respective rights
to a timely appeal. See Snyder, 769 F. Supp. at 111.

[122]

Unlike a criminal defendant who stands accused and may not wish to
have any trial, much less a speedy one, e.g., Barker, 407 U.S. at 535, a
criminal defendant who has already been convicted usually wants a
speedy appeal and has little or no incentive to delay the outcome. Cody v.
Henderson, 936 F.2d at 719; cf Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 520 ("The^
prisoner's principal interest, of course, is in obtaining speedy federal
relief on his claims."). Therefore, we presume every petitioner desired a
timely appeal.

[123]

Furthermore, petitioners were hampered by the fact that they had to speak
through their counsel in the state court appellate process and, in most
instances, it was that very counsel who was responsible for the delay.
Under these circumstances, we cannot fairly expect petitioners to have
raised the issue of delay in state court. See Gaines v. Manson, 194 Conn.
510, 481 A.2d 1084, 1093 (Conn. 1984)("The petitioners have been
handicapped in asserting rights through their counsel when it is the
counsel itself that has been the source of the challenged delays.").

[124]

Moreover, because the Public Defender had a policy of briefing cases on
a "first in, first out" basis and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
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was unwilling to expedite the briefing of one Public Defender's case over
another, see Manous v. State, 797 P. 2d at 1005-06, even if petitioners had
complained vigorously about delays in prosecuting their appeals, those
complaints probably would have been unavailing. See Games, 481 A. 2d
at 1093. Therefore, absent evidence that a petitioner affirmatively sought
or caused delay in the adjudication of his or her appeal, this third factor
should weigh in favor of finding a due process violation.
[125]

d. Prejudice to the petitioner as a result of delay

[126]

The fourth factor we must consider when determining whether a
petitioner's due process rights have been violated is whether the
petitioner has suffered any prejudice due to delay in adjudicating his or
her appeal. As we stated earlier, prejudice may result from any of the
following: (i) oppressive incarceration pending appeal; or (li)
constitutionally cognizable anxiety awaiting resolution of the appeal; or
(iii) impairment of a defendant's grounds for appeal or a defendant's
defenses in the event of a retrial. DeLancy, 741 F.2d at 1248; Rheuark v.
Shaw,628F.2dat303n.8.

[127]

We have not previously had occasion to discuss the meaning of prejudice
in the context of appellate delay. We take this opportunity to do so,
beginning with the last and most serious form of prejudice: impairment
of the grounds for appeal or the grounds for defense in the event of a
retrial.

[128]

The most serious [form of prejudice] is the last, because the inability of a
defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire
system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is
obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall
accurately events of the distant past.

[129]

Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.

[130]

Impairment of one's grounds for defense in the event of a retrial is "the
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most difficult form of. . . prejudice to prove because time's erosion of
exculpatory evidence and testimony 'can rarely be shown.'" Doggett, 112
S. Ct. at 2692-93 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). The Supreme Court
has recognized that "excessive delay presumptively compromises the
reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that
matter, identify," id. at 2693, and the likelihood of injury "increases with
the length of the delay," id. To support such a finding of prejudice,
unjustified delay "unaccompanied by particularized trial prejudice must
have lasted longer than [unjustified delay] demonstrably causing such
prejudice." Id. at 2694.
[131]

That delay has impaired a petitioner's ability to mount a defense on retrial
is irrelevant, however, if a petitioner has no credible grounds for reversal
and retrial. See Tucker, 8 F.3d at 676. Therefore, in addition to
establishing that excessive delay has impaired his or her defense on
retrial, a petitioner also must assert a colorable state or federal claim that
would warrant reversal of his or her conviction.-11-- See id. But see Harris
v. Kuhlman, 601 F. Supp. 987, 994 (E.D.N. Y. 1985)(fmding that sevenyear delay might impair petitioner's defense if he were retried, even
though review of petitioner's claims suggested "very little chance of
reversal"). Thus, if a petitioner's conviction has been affirmed by the time
the petitioner's claims are heard in the federal habeas proceeding, the
petitioner will not be able to show prejudice on retrial because the state
appellate court has finally decided there will be no retrial.

[132]

Likewise, because the only prejudice with which we are concerned is that
which arises from excessive delay, for a petitioner to make a
particularized showing of prejudice, the prejudicial event, such as the
death of a key witness, must have occurred, or have been exacerbated,
during the period of delay that is found to be excessive. Therefore, in
most cases, particularized prejudice that occurs during the first two years
that an appeal is pending will not support a due process violation because
the prejudice would have occurred even in the absence of any excessive
delay in adjudicating the appeal.

[133]

We turn then to the second type of prejudice: constitutionally cognizable
anxiety awaiting resolution of the appeal. Once again, we are concerned
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only with anxiety arising out of excessive delay. Therefore, that a
petitioner is anxious about the outcome of the appeal from the day the
notice of appeal is filed is of no consequence; the anxiety must relate to
the period of time that the appeal was excessively delayed.
[134]

The courts appear split on the showing of anxiety that a petitioner must
make. The Ninth Circuit, for example, requires a showing of "particular
anxiety" distinguishable from that "of any other prisoner awaiting the
outcome of an appeal." Antoine, 906 F.2d at 1383; see also Tucker, 8
F.3d at 676; Coe, 922 F.2d at 532. In Burkett II, the Third Circuit
concluded that the petitioner had established prejudice in part because he
was able "to detail anxiety related to the processing of his case postconviction." 951 F.2d at 1447. The Second Circuit, on the other hand, has
affirmed findings of prejudice based solely on the district court's
assumption that the delay of four or more years worried the petitioner,
who awaited hopefully the outcome of the appeal. Yourdon v. Kelly, 969
F.2d 1042 (2d Cir. 1992)(table), affg, 769 F. Supp. 112, 115 (W.D~N.Y.
1991); Snyder v. Kelly, 972 F.2d 1328 (2d Cir. 1992)(table), affg 769 F.
Supp. 108, 111 (W.D.N. Y. 1991). We think the better approach is to
require the petitioner to make some particularized and substantial
showing of anxiety and concern, absent a delay so excessive as to trigger
the Doggett presumption of prejudice.

[135]

A petitioner has no reason to be anxious or concerned about the time it
takes to adjudicate an appeal that is without merit. Therefore, to establish
prejudice resulting from anxiety, a petitioner must once again assert a
colorable state or federal claim that would warrant reversal of the
petitioner's conviction or reduction of sentence to an amount of time less
than that taken to adjudicate the appeal. —n~"

[136]

The third form of prejudice a petitioner may suffer is oppressive
incarceration pending appeal. In many respects this form of prejudice
merely duplicates the prejudice of anxiety discussed above. In both cases,
the petitioner must make some showing that his or her incarceration is
wrongful. In addition, the petitioner must make a particularized showing
that the incarceration is oppressive beyond that experienced by others
awaiting the outcome of their appeals. That is, the petitioner must show
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some oppressiveness unique to his or her situation that is directly
attributable to the excessive delay in adjudicating the petitioner's appeal.
[137]

While we recognize that a habeas petitioner has a right to assert a
properly exhausted habeas claim even if incarcerated under another,
unchallenged sentence, Sciberras v. United States, 404 F.2d 247, 249
(10th Cir. 1968)(2255); Rhodus v. Patterson, 404 F. 2d 890, 891 (10th
Cir. 1968)(2254), incarceration under an unchallenged sentence
substantially negates a claim of prejudice arising from incarceration
under the challenged sentence. Because the quality of a petitioner's
incarceration may be affected by the very multiplicity of his or her
convictions or the seriousness of the offense that is being challenged,
however, a petitioner's incarceration under another, unchallenged
sentence may not always negate the claim of prejudice altogether.

[138]

Recognizing that proving any of the three forms of prejudice is difficult,
we will not require a level of proof that would necessitate a full blown
trial simply to determine whether a petitioner suffered actual prejudice as
a result of excessive appellate delay. Instead, the petitioner need make
only a colorable and particularized showing of prejudice. As we stated
earlier, however, regardless of the form the prejudice takes, it must arise
during the period of appellate delay that the court finds to be excessive if
it is to factor into the Barker balancing test.

[139]

The district court determined that it could not evaluate petitioners' due
process claims without examining each petitioner's case individually. We
agree. While one or more of the factors in the balancing test may weigh
the same for every petitioner, not all the factors will. Prejudice, in
particular, will vary with the individual. Because the district court has not
yet conducted the individual inquiries necessary to resolve petitioners'
due process claims, the record is not sufficiently developed for us to
review those claims at this time. We therefore remand the action for the
district court to conduct the necessary inquiry and make an appropriate
i r

*fnl8

record tor review.
[140]

2. Appropriate remedies
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[141]

If the district court finds that a petitioner's due process rights have been
violated, it must then address the matter of a remedy. We agree with the
district court's Conclusion that any petitioner whose direct criminal
appeal has now been decided and whose conviction has been affirmed is
not entitled to habeas relief based solely on delay in adjudicating his or
her appeal, unless the petitioner can show actual prejudice to the appeal,
itself, arising from the delay.^ 1 2 See Muwwakkil v. Hoke, 968 F.2d 284,
285 (2d Cir.)(holding that once petitioner's state conviction was affirmed,
he was not entitled to release unless he could show a reasonable
probability that, but for the appellate delay, his appeal would have been
decided differently), cert, denied, 121 L. Ed. 2d 589, 113 S. Ct. 664
(1992).

[142]

Only when appellate delay "prejudiced [the petitioner's] due process
rights so as to make his confinement constitutionally deficient," would
habeas relief based on appellate delay be appropriate for a petitioner
whose conviction has been affirmed. Diaz v. Henderson, 905 F.2d 652,
653(2dCir. 1990).

[143]

An untainted affirmance of a petitioner's state appeal while his habeas
petition is pending makes clear that the petitioner was confined pursuant
to a valid judgment of conviction throughout the period of delay. The
affirmance establishes that if the delay had not occurred and petitioner's
due process right to a timely appeal had been fully satisfied, he wrould
have been subject to exactly the same term of confinement. Because the
due process violation did not result in an illegal confinement, it cannot
justify granting the habeas remedy of unconditional release.

[144]

Cody, 936 F.2d at 720.

[145]

We also agree with the district court that a petitioner whose conviction
the state court has reversed with prejudice to retrial is not entitled to
federal habeas relief. Because the state court has set such a petitioner's
release in motion, federal habeas relief is neither necessary nor available.

[146]

"Absent absolute or qualified immunity or other appropriate defenses," a
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petitioner for whom habeas relief is not available may seek redress from
the responsible parties for any due process violation caused by state
appellate delay through a claim for damages under 42 U.S C 1983.
DeLancy, 741 F.2d at 1248; accord Diaz, 905 F.2d at 654; McLallen v.
Henderson, 492 F.2d 1298, 1299-1300 (8th Cir. 1974); Doescher v
Estelle, 477 F. Supp. 932, 934 (N.D. Tex. 1979), aff d in part, vacated in
part, 616 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1980). Because this appeal concerns only
petitioners' habeas claims, we will not rule on the implications of any
pending 1983 claims.
[147]

A petitioner whose direct criminal appeal has not yet been decided,
however, is entitled to some form of habeas relief if he or she can
establish a due process violation arising from delay in adjudicating his or
her state appeal.— The most appropriate remedy in these circumstances
is to grant a conditional writ, i.e., release the petitioner if the State does
not decide the petitioner's appeal within a specified period.
See Harris
I, 938 F.2d at 1070; Coe, 922 F.2d at 532-33; Brooks v. Jones, 875 F.2d
at 32. The district court should order the State to decide the appeal within
sixty days—or such other time as the district court decides is appropriate
for good cause shown
—or release the petitioner.

[148]

Although a conditional order of release is the preferred procedure, if the
petitioner's underlying substantive claims are federal in nature and, either
because of the clarity of the issues or the particular equities involved, the
district court concludes that the better procedure would be for it to
resolve the federal claims in the absence of exhaustion, the district court
has discretion to adjudicate the merits of those claims.
As we
discussed supra at p. 32, however, because review on the merits by the
district court in many regards replicates the petitioner's direct criminal
appeal, the district court should consider the appropriateness of
appointing counsel for the indigent petitioner, Douglas, 372 U.S. at 35657, and providing the indigent petitioner a free transcript, Griffin, 351
U.S. at 19-20, when reviewing the petitioner's federal claims.

[149]

C. Substantive Claim That Appellate Delay Violates Right To Equal
Protection
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[150]

"Unfairness results . . . if indigents are singled out by the State and
denied meaningful access to the appellate system because of their
poverty." Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611. In Harris I, we noted that
delay by the Public Defender in briefing appeals for indigent clients may
implicate equal protection concerns. 938 F.2d at 1067; see also United
States ex rel. Smith v. Twomey, 486 F.2d at 738; Gaines v. Manson, 481
A. 2d at 1094. Our informal survey of published Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals opinions in Harris I suggested that appeals by criminal
defendants who were represented by retained counsel were decided
considerably faster than appeals by indigent criminal defendants who
were represented by the Public Defender. 938 F.2d at 1070 & n.9.

[151]

In its ruling of September 9, 1993, the district court determined the
parties did not dispute that criminal defendants in Oklahoma who were
represented by private counsel had their appeals decided "in significantly
less time" than criminal defendants who were represented by "public
appointed counsel." R., Doc. 255 at 11. The court, however, postponed
any ruling on petitioners' equal protection claims until it conducts the
individual inquiries necessary to resolve petitioners' due process claims.

[152]

Determination of petitioners' equal protection claims raises a variety of
issues, including the level of scrutiny to be applied. If the State's conduct
creates classifications that "impermissibly interfere[] with the exercise of
a fundamental right or operate[] to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect
class" the classifications are subject to strict scrutiny. Massachusetts Bd.
of Retirement v. Murgia, 427U.S. 307, 312, 49 L. Ed. 2d 520, 96 S. Ct.
2562 (1976)(per curiam)(footnotes omitted). Absent a classification that
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class, however, the State's conduct
need only be "rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Oklahoma
Educ. Ass'n v. Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement Comm'n, 889 F.2d
929, 932 (10th Cir. 1989).*^-

[153]

Whether the right to a direct appeal is a fundamental right depends on
whether it is "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34,
36 L. Ed. 2d 16, 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973). The Supreme Court has held that

Research Scarth, Dent & Whiteley PC

Page 41 of 59

"appeals from state criminal convictions are not 'explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution,'" and has noted that "in dealing with
equal protection challenges to state regulation of the right of appeal in
criminal cases [the Court has] applied the traditional rational-basis test."
Estellev. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 538, 43 L. Ed. 2d 377, 95 S. Ct. 1173
(1975)(per curiam); see also McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. at 687
(holding that the Constitution does not require a state to afford a criminal
defendant a direct appeal).
[154]

While it would appear that the rational basis test applies to petitioners'
equal protection claims, the Ninth Circuit has suggested in dicta that
when the classification is based on wealth, the right to a direct appeal
may be a fundamental right for equal protection purposes. See United
States v. Avendano-Camacho, 786 F.2d 1392, 1394 (9th Cir. 1986); Bell
v. Hongisto, 501 F.2d 346, 353 (9th Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 420 U.S.
962, 43 L. Ed. 2d 439, 95 S. Ct. 1351 (1975). But see Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464, 471, 53 L. Ed. 2d 484, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977)("This Court has
never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes
of equal protection analysis.").

[155]

Because the record on appeal is insufficient for us to review petitioners'
equal protection claims at this time, we need not decide the proper level
of scrutiny to apply to petitioners' claims. Nor need we decide other
thorny issues relating to those claims, such as how unequal the appellate
processing time for indigents and non-indigents must be to constitute an
equal protection violation. See Ross, 417 U.S. at 612 ("The Fourteenth
Amendment does not require absolute equality or precisely equal
advantages, nor does it require the State to equalize economic conditions.
. . . The question is not one of absolutes, but one of degrees.")(internal
quotations and citations omitted); Gaines, 481 A.2d at 1094 (holding that
the difference in processing appeals of indigents and non-indigents of
four years and six months, respectively, "reflects a disparity in
opportunity of access to the appellate forum that is constitutionally
impermissible"); Carter v. Thomas, 527 F.2d 1332, 1333 (5th Cir.
1976)(holding that alleged delays of up to twenty-one months between
the submission of motions to proceed in forma pauperis and the filing of
complaints stated an equal protection claim). The district court must
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address these issues in the first instance on remand.
[156]

We note that the district court may not need to reach the equal protection
claim in some cases. Because the habeas remedies available to redress an
equal protection violation based on appellate delay do not differ from the
habeas remedies available to redress a due process violation based on
appellate delay, once the court determines that a due process violation
has occurred that warrants habeas relief, it need not address the other
constitutional issues for purposes of the petitioner's habeas action.
Likewise, as we discussed earlier with regard to the due process claims,
see supra (slip op.) at p. 54, if the State has upheld the petitioner's
conviction on direct appeal, the petitioner is precluded from obtaining
habeas relief based on any equal protection violation resulting from delay
in adjudicating the petitioner's appeal. In any event, because we have
neither the factual record necessary to evaluate petitioners' equal
protection claims, nor the benefit of a reasoned analysis of these claims
by the district court, we decline to address petitioners' equal protection
claims at this time.

[157]

D. Substantive Claim That Appellate Delay Violates Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel

[158]

"A first appeal as of r i g h t . . . is not adjudicated in accord with due
process of law if the appellant does not have the effective assistance of an
attorney." Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. at 396. In the appellate context, the
right to effective assistance of counsel requires that counsel "be available
to assist in preparing and submitting a brief to the appellate court and . . .
play the role of active advocate." Id. at 394 (citation omitted).

[159]

In Harris I, we said that, although a criminal defendant technically may
have appointed counsel, "past and future alleged delays may be so great
that at some point his [or her] counsel's delay in filing [an] appellate brief
either has or will render such assistance ineffective." 938 F.2d at 1068.
The courts in the Second Circuit also have acknowledged that delay by
counsel in prosecuting an appeal can give rise to a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel. See Simmons v. Reynolds, 898 F.2d at 868
(holding that counsel's failure to file a brief for five years constituted
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ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of law); Harris v. Kuhlman,
601 F. Supp. at 993 ("By any measure, counsel's failure to perfect the
appeal [for approximately seven years] must be considered ineffective
assistance."); Yourdon v. Kelly, 769 F. Supp. 112, 115 (holding that
delay of nearly four years attributable to counsel was sufficiently long to
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of law); Williams
v. James, 770 F. Supp. 103, 107 (W.D.N. Y. 1991 )(holding that delay of
two and one-half years, even if attributable to counsel, was not sufficient
to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of law).
[160]

To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner
must show both that "counsel's performance was deficient," and that "the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). To establish
the first of these requirements, a petitioner must show that counsel's
performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness"
measured by "prevailing professional norms." Id. at 688. To establish the
prejudice requirement, a petitioner usually has to show "a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. Prejudice will be
presumed, however, if the assistance of counsel is actually or
constructively denied altogether. Id. at 692.

[161]

Many of the petitioners here have had to wait three or more years just to
get their court-appointed counsel to file an appellate brief on their behalf
The district court may well find that delays of this magnitude fall below
the prevailing professional standards for providing effective legal
assistance. The real question, therefore, is whether the petitioners can
prove prejudice as a result of the briefing delay.

[162]

During the time that counsel delays excessively in preparing and
submitting an appellate brief, the petitioner is left in the same position as
someone who has no counsel on appeal at all. See Evitts, 469 U.S. at 396
("[A] party whose counsel is unable to provide effective representation is
in no better position than one who has no counsel at all."). Under these
circumstances, prejudice is presumed. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 92.
So long as the brief remains unfiled, a petitioner's claim for ineffective
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assistance of counsel arising from briefing delay may be redressed
through a habeas claim. The federal court may direct the State to appoint
new counsel to represent the petitioner or otherwise ensure that the
petitioner is provided effective assistance of counsel on appeal, and may
grant a conditional writ, i.e., order that the petitioner be released if the
brief is not filed and the appeal decided within a specified period of time.
[163]

Once counsel files an appellate brief, however, counsel's ineffectiveness
because of delay ends. See Simmons v. Reynolds, 708 F. Supp. 505, 510
(E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd 898 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1990)(noting that although
petitioner was denied effective assistance by counsel who failed to file a
brief for six years, petitioner ultimately received effective assistance from
new counsel, who filed a brief). Thus, ineffective assistance of counsel
arising from delay in filing an appellate brief is unlike other types of
ineffective assistance in that it has a temporal limitation. Furthermore,
unlike ineffectiveness arising from, for example, counsel's failure to
cross-examine a key witness or to raise a crucial argument on appeal,
ineffectiveness arising from delay in filing a brief is unlikely to affect the
actual outcome of the appeal.

[164]

As we said earlier in the context of due process, supra (slip op.) at p. 55,
if a constitutional violation does not affect the integrity of the State's
decision, the petitioner's confinement is not unconstitutional. Granting
the petitioner habeas relief based on counsel's past ineffective assistance,
which has since ended and has not affected the outcome of the appeal,
would go too far. Therefore, if an appellate brief has already been filed
on the petitioner's behalf at the time the federal court addresses the
petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel arising from delay
in filing an appellate brief, the petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief
absent a showing that the briefing delay impaired the petitioner's chances
of prevailing on appeal.- 1 -^ Redress for the past constitutional violation
is available, if at all, only through a 1983 (or other) claim for damages.

[165]

In sum, a future habeas petitioner may be able to obtain habeas relief for
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel's ongoing and
excessive delay in filing a brief in the petitioner's direct criminal appeal.
Such relief appears to be foreclosed for the petitioners here, however, in
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light of the district court's finding that an appellate brief has been filed
with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals on behalf of all but one
petitioner and our assumption that, by now, a brief has been filed on
behalf of this petitioner, as well.
[166]

III. OTHER ISSUES

[167]

A. Recusal of Judge Brett

[168]

Shortly after the three-Judge district court panel was designated to
adjudicate common issues of law and fact in these habeas cases,
petitioners moved Judge Brett, one of the panel members, to disqualify
himself. Petitioners filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 455, in which
they noted that among the named defendants in the actions were the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals and the Judges thereof, including
the Honorable Tom Brett, who was the uncle of United States District
Court Judge Thomas R. Brett. R., Doc. 113. In their brief in support of
the motion, petitioners recited that "allegations have been made in this
case which will require federal Judge Thomas R. Brett to review actions
in which Tom Brett was involved while sitting on the Oklahoma Court o[
Criminal Appeals." Id., Doc. 114 at 3. Petitioners expressed their concern
that "a decision making process involving a familial relationship between
a sitting Judge and a defendant presents at least the appearance of
possible bias." Id.

[169]

Judge Brett declined to recuse himself because "in the habeas field . . .
it's just a matter of reviewing [the] opinions [of the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals]." Tr. 4/6/93 at 101. Judge Brett did agree, however,
that though his uncle had died a few months earlier, he should not be
involved in any damage claims against his uncle personally. Id.

[170]

On appeal, petitioners argue that Judge Brett erred in not recusing
himself on the habeas, as well as the damage, claims. In light of this
error, petitioners request that we set aside any findings or Conclusions by
the three-Judge district court panel that are unfavorable to petitioners.
Though we conclude that Judge Brett erred in failing to disqualify
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himself in light of the allegations at issue in these cases, under the
particular circumstances presented, we decline to set aside any findings
or Conclusions of the three-Judge panel on that basis.
[171 ]

Section 455 provides in pertinent part as follows:

[172]

(a) Any Justice, Judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.

[173]

(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:

[174]

(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to
either of them, or the spouse of such person:

[175]

(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a
party[.]

[176]

28 U.S.C. 455 (emphasis added).

[177]

The general purpose of 455(a) is "to promote public confidence in the
integrity of the judicial process." Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition
Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 858 n.7, 100 L.Ed. 2d 855, 108 S. Ct 2194(1988).
Thus, the section is designed to eliminate "even the appearance of
impropriety whenever possible." Id. at 865. Pursuant to 455(a), "a Judge
has a continuing duty to recuse before, during, or in some circumstances,
after a proceeding, if the Judge concludes that sufficient factual grounds
exist to cause an objective observer reasonably to question the Judge's
impartiality." United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 992 (10th Cir. 1993).
The standard under 455(a) is an objective one, and requires recusal
whenever "a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would
harbor doubts about the Judge's impartiality." Id. at 993 (further citation
omitted). Here, petitioners' habeas and civil rights claims require the
district court not only to review the opinions of the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals, but also to decide whether that court participated in, or
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at least authorized, alleged violations of petitioners' constitutional rights.
Therefore, under 455(a) Judge Brett should have recused himself
[178]

"[Section] 455(b) is stricter than 455(a) and is concerned with situations
that may involve actual bias rather than 455(a)'s concern with the public
perception of the judicial process." Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d
1510, 1527(1 lth Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 490 U.S. 1066, 104 L.Ed. 2d
631, 109 S. Ct. 2066 (1989). It requires recusal if the Judge bears a third
degree relationship, or closer, with a party to the suit. Here, although
Judge Brett's uncle had died by the time Judge Brett was assigned to
these cases, his uncle is, nonetheless, a named party in this action.
Therefore, recusal under 455(b) was required.

[179]

A Conclusion that Judge Brett should have recused himself does not,
however, end our inquiry. "Although 455 defines the circumstances that
mandate disqualification of federal Judges, it neither prescribes nor
prohibits any particular remedy for a violation of that duty. Congress has
wisely delegated to the judiciary the task of fashioning the remedies that
will best serve the purpose of the legislation." Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 862.
Thus, the Supreme Court, noting that "there need not be a draconian
remedy for every violation of 455(a)," has held that a Judge's violation of
455(a) may be harmless error that does not warrant setting aside the
Judge's previous rulings. Id. at 862, 864. Several circuits have extended
the Supreme Court's harmless error analysis to violations of 455(b), see
Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 867 F.2d 1415, 1420-21 (Fed.
Cir.), cert, denied, 490 U.S. 1047, 104 L. Ed. 2d 425, 109 S. Ct. 1956
(1989); Parker, 855 F.2d at 1527-28, and we are persuaded by their
reasoning. Therefore, we will apply a harmless error analysis to Judge
Brett's violations of 455.

[180]

In deciding whether a violation of 455 is harmless error, the Supreme
Court has directed us to consider "the risk of injustice to the parties in the
particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in
other cases, and the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the
judicial process." Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 864.

[181]

We begin our consideration of these factors by noting the following
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pertinent facts. First, the very issue involved in the three hundred cases
before the district court is that of delay in reviewing petitioners' claims.
Although petitioners' claims relate only to delay by the State of
Oklahoma, we are ever mindful of the fact that further delay by the
federal courts will only exacerbate petitioners' injuries. Second, the facts
before the district court were, for the most part, undisputed. Thus, the
district court panel was not called upon to make credibility
determinations or to make findings on disputed facts that would later be
subject to review for clear error only. See Heins v. Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc.
(InreRuti-Sweetwater, Inc.), 836 F.2d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1988). The
panel's legal Conclusions are subject to de novo review, see id., which we
have done. Third, this case presents the very unusual situation that Judge
Brett did not act alone, but rather as one member of a three-Judge panel
that ruled unanimously on the issues presented.
Finally, we note that
Judge Brett's uncle did not act alone, either, but rather as one member of
a five-Judge court.
[182]

Keeping these pertinent facts in mind, we consider the risks that may
attend reviewing the panel's rulings on the merits, rather than vacating
the district court's orders to permit an entirely new proceeding, untainted
by the conflict.
First, reviewing the district court's decisions as they
now stand would not create an injustice to the State; vacating the
decisions and remanding for new proceedings that would be largely
duplicative of those before us, however, would, if anything, increase the
risk of injury to petitioners by delaying even longer any federal
consideration of their constitutional claims. Second, reviewing the
present decisions carries little or no risk of injustice in other cases
because our application of harmless error is unique to the procedural
posture of these cases. See Poloroid Corp., 867 F.2d at 1420. Finally, we
do not think our review of the panel's decisions will undermine the
public's confidence in the judicial process under the circumstances here.
Rather, our determination that a violation has occurred and our order that
Judge Brett should recuse himself from all further proceedings involving
these cases, should instill confidence in the judiciary. See Parker, 855
F.2datl527.

[183]

Therefore, we conclude that the proper remedy for Judge Brett's
violations of 455 is to review the previous rulings of the three-Judge
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district court panel on the merits, but to direct Judge Brett to recuse
himself from all further proceedings relating to these matters on remand,
including any individual hearings that may be necessary. See, e.g., supra
(slip op.) at pp. 53-54.
[184]

B Attorney Fees

[185]

In the district court, counsel for petitioners sought an award of attorney
fees and expenses for work performed through April 30, 1993, and for
monthly payments thereafter, on the ground that petitioners were
prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. 1988. R., Doc. 142. Section 1988
provides in pertinent part that "in any action or proceeding to enforce a
provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this
title, . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
Counsel subsequently sought an award of fees for prosecuting the fee
application, as well. R., Doc. 176.

[186]

The district court denied both motions by order entered June 29, 1993.
Id., Doc. 210. The court determined that the fee application was
premature because the court had bifurcated the 1983 claims from the
habeas claims and had yet to address petitioners' 1983 claims, which
formed the predicate for an award of fees under 1988. Id. at 3, 7. The
court ruled that "any attorneys fees claimed as [a] prevailing party under
the 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims must await another day." Id. at 8.

[187]

The district court subsequently denied counsel's motion to reconsider the
denial of fees.
The court indicated that the award of any fees beyond
those counsel already was receiving pursuant to his appointment under
the Criminal Justice Act was premature, regardless of whether the fees
were sought pursuant to 1988 or pursuant to the language in Hill v.
Reynolds, 942 F.2d at 1498, suggesting that an appropriate remedy for
any constitutional deprivations might include "assessment against the
state of costs and possibly even attorneys' fees." R., Doc. 233 at 2-3. The
court noted that it had yet to enter any remedy of which attorney fees
might be an appropriate part. Id. at 3.
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[188]

"We review [a] district court's award of attorney fees for an abuse of
discretion. Underlying factual findings will only be upset when clearly
erroneous. However, a district court's statutory interpretation or legal
analysis which provides the basis for the fee award is reviewable de
novo." Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Hissom Memorial Ctr., 963 F.2d 1352,
1355 (10th Cir. 1992).

[189]

The district court's rulings did not preclude the possibility that petitioners
and their counsel may be entitled to an award of fees against the State in
the future. Rather, the court ruled only that the present request for fees
was premature. The district court did not err in so ruling.

[190]

Only after the district court conducts the analyses of petitioners' due
process and equal protection claims that we have directed on remand can
it enter appropriate remedies for petitioners' habeas claims. At that time,
as indicated by our directions in Hill, 942 F.2d at 1498, the district court
may consider whether the assessment of fees against the State would be
an appropriate part of any remedy. But see Kennedy v. Shillinger, 971
F.2d 558, 562 (10th Cir.)(reversing an award of fees against the State in a
habeas proceeding on the ground that the State's conduct in that action
did not "justify a sanction of this sort"), cert, denied, 121 L. Ed. 2d 556,
113 S. Ct. 623 (1992). Likewise, when the district court ultimately
addresses petitioners' civil rights claims, it may then consider whether
petitioners are entitled to fees as prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. 1988.
For the time being, we agree with the district court that the application
for attorney fees is premature.

[191]

IV. CONCLUSION

[192]

The orders and judgments of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma are AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED
IN PART, and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

[193]

Disposition
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[ 194]

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED

Opinion Footnotes

[195]

—- The Public Defender is the predecessor in interest to the Oklahoma
Indigent Defense System (OIDS), which came into being in July 1991.
We will refer to both as the Public Defender.

[196]

— • The Public Defender's fiscal year runs from July 1 of the named year
through June 30 of the following calendar year.

[197]

— Judge Lumpkin, the Presiding Judge of the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals, testified that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
decided that granting extensions of time to the Public Defender was
preferable to the alternative of reviewing appeals without the benefit of
briefs on behalf of the appellants. He explained that, under the court's
rules, if a case were submitted with no brief, it would be reviewed for
fundamental error only. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
thought that reviewing cases without the benefit of briefs from the Public
Defender would likely lead to the indigent appellants filing motions for
post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Because
granting a new appeal on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel
would only send the indigent appellant back to the bottom of the pile at
the Public Defender's Office, the court determined that the indigent
appellants would best be served by waiting for the Public Defender to file
its briefs, however tardy. Apparently neither the Public Defender nor the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals considered releasing the indigent
appellants pending resolution of their appeals.

[198]

*ft" The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals attempted to remedy the
problem indirectly by repeatedly asking the legislature to provide more

funds.
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[199]

— The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction over all
criminal appeals in Oklahoma. Every person convicted of a crime in
Oklahoma has an appeal as of right to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals, which is the only appellate court in the state that hears criminal
matters. There is no intermediate court and the Oklahoma Supreme Court
hears only civil matters. Five Judges make up the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals. Decisions are circulated to all five Judges for
signature, and cannot be issued until at least three of the five Judges
concur.

[200]

— The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' fiscal year runs from July
1 of the previous calendar year through June 30 of the year stated. In later
documentation submitted to the district court, the number of pending
cases at the end of FY 1990 was reported to be 1,533.

[201 ]

—- The district court subsequently bifurcated petitioners' habeas and
1983 claims. We review only the habeas claims in this opinion.

[202]

™ The period of 11.7 months was based on the median time, from notice
of appeal to decision, required by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit to adjudicate criminal appeals in 1991. ,

[203]

— When a petitioner has been granted an appeal out of time, the length
of the appellate process should be measured from the entry of that order,
unless, of course, delay in perfecting the appeal in the first instance is
attributable to the State.

[204]

We modify the district court's ruling only in one particular. We use
the two year period only to presume excessive delay, and not to presume
the ultimate issue of unconstitutionality. To reach that ultimate issue, the
other prongs of the Barker test also must be addressed.
^•fr»i -j

[205]

The district court arrived at the two-year period by taking into
account the following time periods permitted for each stage of the appeal
under the Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, plus
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reasonable extensions: three (previously six) months to prepare the
transcript and record, per Rule 2.3A(2), plus one extension not to exceed
sixty days; sixty days to file appellant's brief, per Rule 3.4B, plus one
extension not to exceed sixty days; sixty days to file appellee's brief, per
Rule 3.4C, plus one extension not to exceed sixty days; and the
remainder of the time, consisting of eleven months, to hear and decide
the appeal. R., Doc. 143 at 21-22; id., Doc. 255 at 7-8. The district court
suggested that delay beyond any of these individual interim times might
also create a presumption of inordinate delay that would be subject to
redress through habeas corpus. See id., Doc. 143 at 23-24; id., Doc. 255
at 8-9. While we understand the district court's reluctance to require a
petitioner whose direct criminal appeal has not progressed in a timely
fashion to wait two full years before coming to federal court to seek
redress, we think treating each component of the two-year period as a
separate presumptive period is ill-advised and would open the federal
courts to an unnecessary flood of litigation. Instead, we think the better
practice is to recognize that the two-year presumptive period is neither
absolute nor inflexible. For example, if unique circumstances dictate the
need for a shorter adjudication time, the petitioner may establish that a
delay of less than two years is inordinate under the circumstances.
Similarly, if a substantial amount of time has passed and it appears a
petitioner's direct criminal appeal cannot realistically be completed
within the two-year period because of inordinate delay in the early stages
of the appellate process, the petitioner may seek redress in federal court
before the full two years has elapsed.
[206]

—~ We have searched, with little success, for appellate standards from
other jurisdictions to guide us in our analysis of petitioners' claims of
appellate delay. We note that the Standards Relating to Appellate Delay
Reduction, which were established by the Appellate Delay Reduction
Committee of the Appellate Judges Conference of the American Bar
Association in 1988, provide that all appeals, whether civil or criminal,
should be decided within 280 days from the filing of the notice of appeal.
See Rita M. Novak & Douglas K. Somerlot, American Bar Ass'n, Delay
on Appeal App. F at 187, 214 (1990).
The ABA standards, which are significantly shorter than the two-year
presumption we have created, have been widely criticized as unrealistic,
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e.g., Honorable Carl West Anderson, Are the American Bar Association's
Time Standards Relevant for California Courts of Appeal?, 27 U.S.F.L.
Rev. 301, 307, 351 (1993); Roger Hanson et al., National Center for State
Courts, Time on Appeal: Beyond Conjecture 3 (1993), and no court has
formally adopted them without modification, Anderson, supra at 359.
Only a handful of state courts have adopted appellate time standards, and
the time standards adopted vary widely. For instance, a delay reduction
team in the First Appellate District of the California Court of Appeals has
proposed the following standards: for appeals from criminal cases that
were disposed of before a trial, the court should process fifty percent of
the appeals within 185 days and ninety percent of the appeals within 305
days; and for appeals from criminal cases that were disposed of after a
trial, the court should process fifty percent of the appeals within 305 days
and ninety percent of the appeals within 475 days. Id. at 359, App. H-3.
Justice Anderson's "comprehensive search of state appellate rules"
revealed that the following standards have been formally adopted by state
courts: Florida: "decision within 180 days of oral argument;" Maryland:
"decision within 130 days of appeal for jointly-elected, expedited
appeals;" New Mexico: "decision within 10 months of appeal." Id. at 351
n.191. Wisconsin has adopted an internal operating procedure providing
that "the average time for rendering a decision should not exceed 40
days, and the maximum time for any case, except one of extraordinary
complexity, should not exceed 70 days." Court of Appeals of Wisconsin
Internal Operating Procedure VI(4)(h). Idaho and Virginia have
informally adopted the following appellate standards: Idaho: "written but
unpublished administrative goal to decide appeals within 418 to 508
days;" Virginia: administrative goal of decision within 210-295 days of
appeal, "depending upon whether a transcript must be prepared and/or the
opinion is to be published." Anderson, supra at 351 n.191. There do not
appear to be clear remedies for the appellant if any of these time
standards are not met.

[207]

In her March23, 1992, comments on data submitted by petitioners to
the district court, the Attorney General conceded that
whether the delay and backlog are the result of understaffmg and
underfunding or whether the delay is the result of possible
mismanagement of the internal operations and allocation of resources
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within the [Public Defender] agency, the result is still the same, that the
reason for the delay is attributable to [the Public Defender] and not to the
Petitioner. R., Doc. 29 at 9.
[208]

The State did offer an alternative reason for the delay in adjudicating
petitioner Doyle King's appeal, which was at issue and pending before
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals for almost seven years without
resolution. The State explained that a majority of the members of the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals could not reach agreement on the
Disposition of the case. R., Doc. 143 at 29; Tr. 4/9/93 at 57. While we
appreciate the court's dilemma, its deadlock did not justify the lengthy
delay in adjudicating King's appeal.

[209]

^ ^ In Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d at 303 n. 8, the Fifth Circuit gave the
following example of delay impairing the grounds for appeal. The
passage of time made it more difficult for the court reporter to read and
transcribe the notes of the trial he had taken. As a result, he omitted
defense counsel's oral motion for a mistrial. On appeal, the state court
refused to rule on an issue because the record did not reflect any motion
for mistrial. Id. Although such examples of delay affecting the appeal
may exist, they are rare; a petitioner is more likely to be able to establish
that delay has impaired the grounds for defense in the event of retrial.
Therefore, our Discussion focuses on this latter type of prejudice rather
than impairment of the grounds for the appeal itself

[210]

In determining the issue of prejudice, the federal district court need
only address the colorability of the underlying claim and is not required
to rule on the merits of the underlying claim.

[211]

We recognize that the length of sentence imposed may affect not
only when a petitioner is subject to release, but the quality of a
petitioner's incarceration prior to release. Cf. Burkett II, 951 F.2d at 1443
(acknowledging that prejudice may arise from excessive delay that
affects the quality of a petitioner's incarceration). Therefore, a petitioner
might justifiably suffer anxiety if, for example, he or she had a colorable
claim warranting a reduction in sentence that, though not enough to make
the petitioner eligible for release before the Conclusion of the appeal, was
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sufficient to affect the quality of the petitioner's incarceration by making
the petitioner eligible for a lower level of security or for rehabilitative
programs. See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439, 37 L. Ed. 2d
56, 93 S. Ct. 2260 (1973)(recogmzing that "the prospect of
rehabilitation" may be adversely affected by delay); Burkett II, 951 F.2d
at 1443 (finding merit in petitioner's claim that sentencing delay kept him
in county jail, where he could not avail himself of rehabilitative programs
that would have been available in the state penitentiary).
[212]

*^^ Petitioners contend that the district court's due process rulings are
insufficient in several other respects. Based on language in Harris I, 938
F.2d at 1071, petitioners assert that the district court should have made
findings about how much time the Public Defender can be expected to
require in the future to file appellate briefs, as well as the specific reasons
for the past delay in filing appellate briefs. Neither of these findings was
necessary to the district court's analysis of petitioners' habeas claims,
however, and neither is necessary to our review. The remainder of
petitioners' challenges to the district court's due process rulings merit no
independent Discussion.

[213]

* M ? O f course, if the State has decided the appeal and affirmed, the
State's decision will be conclusive on any state claims. If the federal
claims were properly presented in the state proceeding, however, they
can then be regarded as exhausted, enabling the federal court to consider
them on the merits in the habeas action.

[214]

As of August 13, 1993, 217 criminal appeals by Harris group
petitioners were still pending before the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals.

[215]

If the claims at issue in the direct appeal concern only the length of
the petitioner's sentence, then release will be available only after the
petitioner has served the uncontested portion of his or her sentence.
Furthermore, if the petitioner is serving or has yet to serve another
sentence that has not been challenged, "release" from the conviction and
sentence being challenged will not actually set the petitioner free.
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[216]

For example, if the briefs have not yet been filed, good cause may
exist to give the State more than sixty days to decide the appeal. We note,
however, that the district court found in its order of September 8, 1993:
that a brief had been filed on behalf of all but one of the petitioners in
their respective direct criminal appeals. R., Doc. 255 at 4.

[217]

Of course, it will not be necessary to provide the State a time to cure
if the due process violation is incurable.

[218]

In Harris I, 938 F.2d at 1071, we addressed other remedies that may
be appropriate depending on the particular circumstances of the case.

[219]

- An intermediate level of review exists for "'quasi-suspect'
classifications based on characteristics beyond an individual's control,
such as gender, illegitimacy, and alienage." Oklahoma Edue. Ass'n, 889
F.2d at 932.

[220]

—- Petitioners' claims for ineffective assistance of counsel relate only to
briefing delays and are distinct from their due process claims, which
relate to delays in the entire appellate process. Although the eventual
filing of an appellate brief ends a petitioner's ability to obtain habeas
relief on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim arising from delay in
briefing the appeal, it does not end a petitioner's ability to obtain habeas
relief on a due process claim arising from delay in the entire appellate
process. So long as a petitioner's appeal remains undecided, the petitioner
may still obtain habeas relief for a due process violation even if counsel
has filed a brief on the petitioner's behalf. See supra (slip op.) at pp. 5657.

[221 ]

— z On December 27, 1993, the district court dismissed Judge Brett's
uncle from this habeas action because he is not the custodian of any
petitioner. See Mackey v. Gonzalez, 662 F.2d 712, 713 (11th Cir. 1981).
The district court also dismissed the 1983 claims against Judge Brett's
uncle on the ground that he is absolutely immune from damages liability.
See Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 686 (10th Cir. 1990), cert, denied,
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499 U.S. 976, 113 L.Ed. 2d 719, 111 S. Ct. 1622(1991).
[222]

Further, on remand Judge Brett should recuse himself from all cases
consolidated in this appeal. Thus, he will be removed from the ultimate
Disposition of petitioners' claims.

[223]

In deciding whether to vacate the panel's previous rulings, we cannot
simply pick and choose among the panel's findings and Conclusions, as
petitioners would have us do. Either we will vacate all the rulings, or
none of them.

[224]

*MQ The parties did not designate the motion to reconsider as part of the
record on appeal.

19940126
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Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.

Amendment 14
(Ratified July 9, 1868)
Section 1. All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws..
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a
State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or

GO

other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male
citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection
or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof But
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred
in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the
loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims
shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provision of this article.
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Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the
county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the
use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at
any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial
proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.
No History for Constitution
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 co_02013.ZIP 8,745 Bytes
Sections in this Chapterl Chapters in this Title| All Titles | Legislative Home Page
Last revised- Thursday, November 30, 2000
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78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to
ssue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
nterlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings
)f state agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative
proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of
Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state
engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or
)ther local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those
nvolving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons
who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions
constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or
capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the
lecisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first
legree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but
lot limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parentime, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
udges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review
ind determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original
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appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative
proceedings.
Amended by Chapter 302, 2001 General Session
Amended by Chapter 255, 2001 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 78_03004.ZIP 3,120 Bytes
Sections in this Chapter]Chapters in this Title] All Titles]Legislative Home Page
Last revised: Monday, October 22, 2001
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76-5-104. Consensual altercation.
In any prosecution for criminal homicide under Part 2 of this chapter or assault,
it is no defense to the prosecution that the defendant was a party to any duel, mutual
combat, or other consensual altercation if during the course of the duel, combat, or
altercation any dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 was used or if the
defendant was engaged in an ultimate fighting match as defined in Section 76-9705.
Amended by Chapter 83, 1997 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76 05012.ZIP 1,953 Bytes
Sections in this Chapter!Chapters in this Title| All Titles]Legislative Home Page
Last revised: Thursday, July 12, 2001
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78-35a-107. Statute of limitations for post-conviction relief.
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year
after the cause of action has accrued.
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the
following dates:
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of
conviction, if no appeal is taken;
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the
case, if an appeal is taken;
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme
Court or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is
filed;
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the
decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is
filed; or
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based.
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse a
petitioner's failure to file within the time limitations.
(4) Sections 78-12-35 and 78-12-40 do not extend the limitations period
established in this section.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 235, 1996 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 78 2F008.ZIP 2,567 Bytes
Sections in this Chapter!Chapters in this Title] All Titles]Legislative Home Page
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58-3-11. Rules of construction as to words and phrases. Words and phrases are
to be construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language;
but technical words and phrases, and such others as have acquired a peculiar and
appropriate meaning in law, or are defined by statute, are to be construed according
:o such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.
^o Change Since 1953
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 68 01013.ZIP 3,477 Bytes
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Rule 11. The record on appeal.
(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers and exhibits filed in
the trial court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, the index prepared by the clerk
of the trial court, and the docket sheet, shall constitute the record on appeal in all
cases. A copy of the record certified by the clerk of the trial court to conform to the
original may be substituted for the original as the record on appeal. Only those
papers prescribed under paragraph (d) of this rule shall be transmitted to the
appellate court.
(b) Pagination and indexing of record.
(1) Immediately upon filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial court shall
securely fasten the record in a trial court case file, with collation in the following
order:
(A) the index prepared by the clerk;
(B) the docket sheet;
(C) all original papers in chronological order;
(D) all published depositions in chronological order;
(E) all transcripts prepared for appeal in chronological order; and
(F) a list of all exhibits offered in the proceeding
(2) (A) The clerk shall mark the bottom right corner of ever}' page of the collated
index, docket sheet, and all original papers as well as the cover page only of all
published depositions and the cover page only of each volume of transcripts
constituting the record with a sequential number using one series of numerals for
the entire record.
— (B) If a supplemental record is forwarded to the appellate court, the clerk shall
collate the papers, depositions, and transcripts of the supplemental record in the
same order as the original record and mark the bottom right corner of each page of
the collated original papers as well as the cover page only of all published
depositions and the cover page only of each volume of transcripts constituting the
supplemental record with a sequential number beginning with the number next
LOT)
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following the number of the last page of the original record.
3) The clerk shall prepare a chronological index of the record. The index shall
:ontain a reference to the date on which the paper, deposition or transcript was filed
in the trial court and the starting page of the record on which the paper, deposition
:>r transcript will be found.
'4) Clerks of the trial and appellate courts shall establish rules and procedures for
checking out the record after pagination for use by the parties in preparing briefs for
m appeal or in preparing or briefing a petition for writ of certiorari.
c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in the event
hat more than one appeal is taken, each appellant, shall comply with the provisions
)f paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule and shall take any other action necessary to
enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and transmit the record. A single
ecord shall be transmitted.
d) Papers on appeal.
1) Criminal cases. All of the papers in a criminal case shall be included by the
lerk of the trial court as part of the record on appeal.
2) Civil cases. In all civil cases, the papers to be transmitted shall consist of the
bllowing.
A) Civil cases with short records. In civil cases where all the papers, excluding any
ranscripts, total fewer than 300 pages, all of the papers will be transmitted to the
ippellate court upon completion of the filing of briefs. In such cases, the appellant
hall serve upon the clerk of the trial court, simultaneously with the filing of
ippellant's reply brief, notice of the date on which appellant's reply brief was filed,
f appellant does not intend to file a reply brief, appellant shall notify the clerk of
he trial court of that fact within 30 days of the filing of appellee's brief.
B) All other civil cases. In all other civil cases where the papers, excluding any
ranscripts, are or exceed 300 pages, all parties shall file with the clerk of the trial
ourt, within 10 days after briefing is completed, a joint or separate designation of
iiose papers referred to in their respective briefs. Only those designated papers and
ie following, to the extent applicable, shall be transmitted to the clerk of the
ppellate court by the clerk of the trial court:

(i) the pleadings as defined in Rule 7(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(ii) the pretrial order, if any;
(iii) the final judgment, order, or interlocutory order from which the appeal is taken;
(iv) other orders sought to be reviewed, if any;
(v) any supporting opinion, findings of fact or conclusions of law filed or delivered
by the trial court;
(vi) the motion, response, and accompanying memoranda upon which the court
rendered judgment, if any;
(vii) jury instructions given, if any;
(viii) jury verdicts and interrogatories, if any;
(ix)the notice of appeal.
(3) Agency cases. Where all papers in the agency record total fewer than 300 pages,
the agency shall transmit all papers to the appellate court. Where all papers in the
agency record total 300 or more pages, the parties shall, within 10 days after
briefing is completed, file with the agency a joint or separate designation of those
papers necessary to the appeal. The agency shall transmit those designated papers to
the appellate court. Instead of filing all papers or designated papers, the agency
may, with the approval of the court, file only the chronological index of the record
or of such parts of the record as the parties may designate. All parts of the record
retained by the agency shall be considered part of the record on review for all
purposes.
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice to appellee if
partial transcript is ordered.
(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after filing the notice of
appeal, the appellant shall request from the court executive a transcript of such parts
of the proceedings not already on file as the appellant deems necessary. The request
shall be in writing and shall state that the transcript is needed for purposes of an
appeal. Within the same period, a copy shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court
and the clerk of the appellate court. If the appellant desires a transcript in a

.uie 11

rage 4 or 3

ompressed format, appellant shall include the request for a compressed format
vithin the request for transcript. If no such parts of the proceedings are to be
equested, within the same period the appellant shall file a certificate to that effect
vith the clerk of the trial court and a copy with the clerk of the appellate court.
2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding or conclusion.
f the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported
•y or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a
ranscript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court
lor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the
elevant portions of the transcript.
3) Statement of issues; cross-designation by appellee. Unless the entire transcript is
3 be included, the appellant shall, within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal,
ile a statement of the issues that will be presented on appeal and shall serve on the
ppellee a copy of the request or certificate and a copy of the statement. If the
ppellee deems a transcript of other parts of the proceedings to be necessary, the
ppellee shall, within 10 days after the service of the request or certificate and the
tatement of the appellant, file and serve on the appellant a designation of additional
iarts to be included. Unless within 10 days after service of such designation the
ppellant has requested such parts and has so notified the appellee, the appellee may
vithin the following 10 days either request the parts or move in the trial court for an
rder requiring the appellant to do so.
f) Agreed statement as the record on appeal. In lieu of the record on appeal as
lefined in paragraph (a) of this rule, the parties may prepare and sign a statement of
tie case, snowing how the issues presented by the appeal arose and were decided in
le trial court and setting forth only so many of the facts averred and proved or
ought to be proved as are essential to a decision of the issues presented. If the
tatement conforms to the truth, it, together with such additions as the trial court
lay consider necessary fully to present the issues raised by the appeal, shall be
pproved by the trial court. The clerk of the trial court shall transmit the statement
3 the clerk of the appellate court within the time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The
lerk of the trial court shall transmit the index of the record to the clerk of the
ppellate court upon approval of the statement by the trial court.
g) Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made or when
anscript is unavailable. If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or
ial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, or if the appellant is impecunious
-*T i
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and unable to afford a transcript in a civil case, the appellant may prepare a
statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means, including
recollection. The statement shall be served on the appellee, who may serve
objections or propose amendments within 10 days after service. The statement and
any objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted to the trial court for
settlement and approval and, as settled and approved, shall be included by the clerk
of the trial court in the record on appeal.
(h) Correction or modification of the record. If any difference arises as to whether
the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the difference shall be
submitted to and settled by that court and the record made to conform to the truth. If
anything material to either party is omitted from the record by error or accident or is
misstated, the parties by stipulation, the trial court, or the appellate court, either
before or after the record is transmitted, may direct that the omission or
misstatement be corrected and if necessary that a supplemental record be certified
and transmitted. The moving party, or the court if it is acting on its own initiative,
shall serve on the parties a statement of the proposed changes. Within 10 days after
service, any party may serve objections to the proposed changes. All other
questions as to the form and content of the record shall be presented to the appellate
court.
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1

THE COURT:

And still based upon that, you are

2

telling me that you want to waive your right to be

3

sentenced during that period of time provided by law and

4

have the Court proceed now?

5

MR. FRAUSTO:

6

THE COURT:

Is that right, sir?

Yes.
The record should reflect that the

7

defendant, Mr. Richard Andrew Frausto, appears to this

8

court as he has throughout the entirety of this trial to be

9

in full command of all of his faculties.

He is clearly a

10

reasonable and intelligent individual.

11

testify here in court and have seen him ably deal with this

12

situation.

13

of the statutory time for the imposition of sentence.

14
15
16

I have watched him

I find that that is a full and voluntary waiver

With respect to the imposition of sentence,
Mr. Wright, I will hear you in mitigation.
MR. WRIGHT:

Well, Your Honor, I —

I know that

17

the standard sought is that when a jury finds him guilty,

18

that that's it.

19

Honor, I think that there is substantial evidence in this

20

case that suggests that there was a self-defense.

21

apparently the jury has neglected that, I'm concerned about

22

some of the questions that the jury expressed to us.

23

Questions that we were unable to respond to before the —

24

before the jury came back.

25

is sufficient evidence to indicate that this man was —

That there's no argument.

But, Your

While

And I frankly think that there

71

who
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1

is a man with a family whom he dearly loves —

2

Court, I think, has seen occasions in the statements that

3

were given and his demeanor, that the utmost concern was

4

his family many times during this trial.

5

me, Your Honor, that with the very strong evidence that

6

there was —

7

jury —

8

in fact, a self-defense.

9

ambush, as was so graphically explained during this trial.

And it seems to

even though it may not have impressed the

that there was very strong evidence that this was,
That it was not an intentional

10

Which just is not logical.

11

kind of —

12
13

and the

I think there should be some

of mercy.
I would suggest, Your Honor, at the very most,

that there should be a ninety-day evaluation.

14

THE COURT:

Thank you, Counsel.

15

Mr. Langston, on behalf of the State?

16

MR. LANGSTON:

Your Honor, the jury has spoken.

17

We're talking about a first-degree felony, with a minimum

18

mandatory consecutive time for the firearms enhancement.

19

think a ninety-day evaluation would not really help

20

anyone.

21

right now, and a ninety-day evaluation would simply put

22

that off.

23

wishes.

24

the Court should concede to his requests and sentence him

25

as the Court has indicated it intends to do to a period of

I

He has expressed a desire to be sentenced today

And that would go, I believe, against his

That is not a sentencing.

/J

And we think that he —

1069
1

time in prison for five years to life, with the enhancement

2

of one to five for the firearms enhancement.

3

ask that the Court follow that indication and sentence

4

Mr. Frausto accordingly.

5

THE COURT:

6

Mr. Wright, anything in addition?

7

MR. WRIGHT:

8

everything I can say.

9

THE COURT:

10

And we would

Thank you, Counsel.

No, Your Honor.

I've said

Thank you.

Mr. Frausto, would you stand, please.

11

Mr. Richard Andrew Frausto, it is the sentence of this

12

court that you be committed to the Division of Corrections

13

in the state of Utah to be imprisoned in the Utah State

14

Prison for a period of time not less than five years nor

15

more than your natural life. No fine is imposed.

16

It is the further sentence of this court that

17

the Court, finding the enhancement provisions by use of a

18

firearm in the commission of this offense, that the

19

applicability of 76-3-203(1) is appropriate —

20

sentences you to an additional consecutive one year,

21

consecutive to the initial five years. And the Court,

22

specificaly finding that it is the intention of the

23

legislature of the State of Utah and of the people of the

24

State of Utah having spoken through their legislature that

25

those who use firearms in the commission of crimes shall be

7<c

the Court
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punished accordingly, it is the Court's additional sentence
that additionally to the consecutive one year as provided
for in 76-3-203, that an additional indeterminate term of
five years be imposed again consecutively to the initial
sentence of five to life.
With respect to restitution, the Court shall
order that the defendant pay restitution in an amount
equivalent to the costs of funeral expenses.

And pursuant

to the provisions of the Utah state law with respect to
restitution, the Court specifically orders that that amount
be doubled*

The Court will provide for a hearing once

notice of the funeral costs is submitted to the Court in
order to challenge those costs if the defendant deems that
appropriate*
Anything else, Mr. Langston?
MR. LANGSTON:

I have nothing further.

We will determine those costs and provide it to
defense counsel.

And then he if he wishes a hearing

THE COURT:

—

Within 30 days of today's date,

Counsel.
MR. LANGSTON:
THE COURT:
MR. WRIGHT:
THE COURT:
in recess.

We will do that.

Mr. Wright, anything else?
Nothing, Your Honor.
That's the order.
y_

/

The Court stands

1071
MR* WRIGHT:
matter,

Your Honor, there is one other

I'm wondering if there is some way that

Mr. Frausto could have a visit with his wife before he is
sent up.

He'd like to have a contact visit.

hour or two.

A very short duration.

Maybe just an

But he'd like to have

that before he leaves.
THE COURT:

I'll encourage the sheriff's

department to make that possible, in view of the
precipitative decision on the part of Mr. Frausto to
involve himself in a sentencing this quickly.

However, I

will not order it, because I leave the management of the
jail to the sheriff's department.
could probably accommodate that.

But I think that they
And I'd certainly

encourage them to do so.
MR. LANGSTON:

Your Honor, we will get the

judgment to the Court Monday.

I think we could get it

prepared by then.
THE COURT:

Counsel, I'll not be around.

But

you can contact me by phone and run it out to the house, if
necessary.
MR. LANGSTON:
THE COURT:
the Court —

All right.

Counsel, while we're on the record,

and this is for the purposes of the record

in response to what has been marked as Court's Exhibit
No. 2, and Instruction No. 13-C, the Court has marked an

?s

—

1072
inquiry from the jury as Court's Exhibit No. 2.

That will

go in the file.
The Court also# at the agreement of counsel,
prepared what was going to be given as a supplemental
instruction prior to the time that the jury came back with
a verdict and before we could answer the question in
Exhibit No. 2 —

Court's Exhibit No. 2.

Those will be

placed in the file.
MR. LANGSTON:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Good

evening.
(Whereupon the proceedings in the above-entitled
matter were concluded at 8:59 P.M.)
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1

C E R T I F I C A T E

2

STATE OF UTAH

3

) ss.
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON )

)

4

I, PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR, an Official Court
Reporter in and for the Fifth Judicial District, state of
Utah, do hereby certify:
That the foregoing matter, to wit, STATE OF UTAH
VS. RICHARD ANDREW FRAUSTO, CRIMINAL NO. 921500702, was
taken down by me in shorthand at the time and place therein
named and thereafter reduced to computerized transcription
under my direction.
I further testify that I am not interested in
the event of the action.
WITNESS my hand and seal this 24th day of
February, 1993.

?A«JL G. MOfULLIN, CSR/RPR
,iK

&*•
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PAULG.MCMUUIN

m i m «(BUC- siWFtf ww

RESIDING AT: St. George, Utah
rfr

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 6-17-95
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January 28, 1993

Wayne A. Freestoi*e
David J, Angerhofer
Contract Attorneys
50 West 300 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
Gentlemen:
In reply to your letter of January 25, 199 3, the answer is, I hav
filed a Notice of Appeal and filed the Request for Transcript•
However, I will not be handling the appeal for Mr. Frausto, Becaus
of some statements he made in his latest letter to me concern:m
what issues he thinks should be the basis of an appeal, I believe i
would be inappropriate for me to handle the appeal* Consequently
I'm in the process of arranging for someone else, probably Mr
Michael Miller, to do it for him.

J. MacArthur Wright
JMW/lq

3H Wtl

WAYNE A. FREESTONE
DAVID J. ANGERHOFER
CONTRACT ATTORNEYS
50 West 300 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 322-1503
(801) 363-0844
M E M O R A N D U M
TO:
DATE:
RE:

Richard Frausto USP #17886
February 1. 1993
REQUlSSTEt) LEGAlr'SfetfnrCBS-

Enclosed please find a copy of the letter we received
from MacArthur Wright in response to the letter we wrote him on
vour behalf.
Thank You.
CONTRACT ATTORNEYS

gr

&>3-

Judith M, Billings
Presiding Judge

Leonard H. Russon
Associate Presiding Judge

®tai) Court of appeals

Russell W. Bench

230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Judge

Regnal W. Garff
Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood

Clerks' Office 801 -578*3950
Administration 801-578-3900

Mary T. Noon an
Clerk of the Court

Judge

Fax 801-578-3999

Norman H. Jackson
Judge

F e b r u a r y 1, 1994

Gregory K. Orme
Judge

Richard A. Frausto
Iron County/Utah State Correctional Facility
2136 North Main
Ceda r - e r t y ,- UT~
^nj^-In Re:
S t a t e of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Richard Andrew Frausto,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 930357-CA

Dear Mr. Frausto:
In response to your letter of January 25, 1994, received
January 31, 1994, our records do not indicate an Anders brief
having been filed for your appeal.
Further, our records indicate you are represented by
counsel as Mr. Michael L. Miller has not filed a notice of
withdrawal. The Court will only consider documents on your
behalf if they are filed by your attorney. It is unclear if
counsel is aware of your sending a letter and suggest you
discuss your intentions with your attorney. You must
communicate through him regarding your appeal. ""'
Your above letter has been forwarded to your attorney that
he might respond to you and possibly give you some assistance.
Sincerely,

Janice Hill
Deputy Clerk
cc:

Michael L. Miller
Jan Graham

36
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Utah Court of Appeals

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

APR 2 5 1334

ooOoo
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

ORDER

Case No* 930357-CA
Richard Andrew Frausto,
Defendant and Appellant•

This matter is before the Court upon appellant's pro se
request for appointment of substitute counsel, filed 7 March
1994, and also upon the motion to supplement the record, filed
by Michael L. Miller, counsel for appellant•

Appellee's

objection to the motion to supplement the record was filed 28
March 1994.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the matter is temporarily
remanded to the Fifth Judicial District Court for consideration
of appellant's pro se request for appointment of counsel and
for proceedings pursuant to Rule 11(f) or (g), Utah R. App. P,
It is FURTHER ORDERED that upon disposition, the clerk of the
trial court shall forward a copy of the court's order to the
Utah Court of Appeals•
Dated this

day of April, 1994.

BY THE COURT:

9*.
Gregory Ky^oriBeT^Judge

^r '&*$

/ja&M** P*[*A

SplM-**?***-™
MICHAEL L. MILLER, Bar No. 4633
Attorney for Defendant / Appellant
32 East 100 South, Suite 203
St- George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (801) 628-7525

IV5AR 1 8 1994

•COURT Of APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff / Appelleef

MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD

vs.
RICHARD ANDREW FRAUSTO,

Case No- 930357-CA
District No- 921500702

Defendant / Appellant,
COMES NOW Defendant / Appellant, by and through counsel, and
moves in the above-entitled court to supplement the record on
appeal in this matter, pursuant to Rule 15, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, and upon the following grounds.
1-

Counsel for Appellant was not his trial counsel-

When

Appellant counsel reviewed the transcript and spoke with trial
counsel, it became apparent that the official transcript in this
matter was missing a discussion between the court, and counsel for
both parties-

Counsel is informed and believes that this

discussion concerned one of the jury instructions which the jury
seemed to be having difficulty understanding, Instruction 13-C.
2-

Counsel then asked trial counsel for both parties to

prepare an affidavit of what was discussed during regarding this
instruction, which ultimately led to a Supplemental Instruction

f3C\

being prepared, although never given•
3.

Defendant's trial counsel prepared his affidavit which is

attached hereto as the proposed supplement to the record.

The

State's trial counsel did not prepare an affidavit, but ultimately
read the affidavit of Defendant's counsel•
4.

Counsel next attempted to obtain a stipulation from the

Attorney General's Office as to the supplementation of the record
based upon the affidavit of Defendant's trial counsel. The
Attorney General's office was not willing to agree to the proposed
stipulation, and requested that counsel attempt to obtain the
stipulation from the Washington County Attorney's office, who was
trial counsel for the State• The Washington County Attorney's
office declined to agree to the proposed stipulation, thus making
this Motion the only course Appellant can pursue in order to
insure that the record to be reviewed by this court is as full
and complete as possible•
WHEREFORE Appellant requests that the record on appeal be
supplemented by the Affidavit of trial counsel; or that in the
alternative, this Court order a remand to Fifth District Court for
an evidentiary hearing on the subject matter of said affidavit.
DATED this

fC** day of March, 1994-

Michael L. Miller
Attorney for Appellant

9?
(3$

'

?y># % tony
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the
foregoing, postage prepaid, to:
Jan Graham, Esq.
Attorney General
236 State Capital Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
DATED this

/4*^ day of March, 1994•

Michael L, Miller

40 [}ii<d
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D O C K E T
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535 SOUTH 28 EAST
IVINS
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Page
1
JANUARY 1 4 , 1997

2:09 PM

Reference:921500702

FRAUSTO, RICHARD ANDREW

TUESiirffr

COA Case: 921500702 FS
State Felony
Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE

<Sft&/-*">,

% ^

OTN #: 585758
Bail
large s
Violation Date: 07/28/92
76-5-203
.00
1. MURDER
Sev: Fl
76-10-503
.00
2. POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON
Sev: F3
roceedinqs
JNS
1/11/92 Case filed from Circuit Court bindover.
JNS
ARR
scheduled for 8/19/92 at 9:00 A in room
with JS
ARR
rescheduled to 8/12/92 at 8:58 A in room D with JLS JNS
JBH
** REFER TO HARD COPY - DELETED IN CIRCUIT COURT
JNS
5/12/92 Fel Arraignment
JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES L.
JNS
TAPE: 920414
COUNT:
1050
JNS
ATD: WRIGHT, J MACARTHUR
ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENT
JNS
Deft is present
JNS
CUSTODY: County Sheriff
JNS
Chrg: 76-5-203
Plea: Not Guilty
JNS
Chrg: 76-10-503
Finding: Dismissed
JNS
TO BE SET FOR 3-DAY JURY TRIAL IN 60-90 DAYS; REQUEST FOR
APPOINTMENT OF INVESTIGATOR GRANTED WITH INITIAL CAP OF $2,000 JNS
JNS
FILED: MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT II
JNS
FILED: ORDER OF DISMISSAL ON COUNT II
JNS
FILED: REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATOR
JNS
FILED: AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT ON ARRAIGNMENT
JNS
:/19/92 Judge ID changed from JS to JLS
JNS
Notice of Set'ting"
""~'"""-' "~"',X~* S"1^
TRJ
scheduled for 10/22/92 at 0900 A in room D with JLS JNS
PTC
scheduled for 10/07/92 at 0900 A in room D with JLS JNS
'/03/92 FILED: MOTION TO RELEASE EXHIBIT # 7 - FIREARM
GSS
TLH
1/04/92 FILED: ORDER RELEASING EXHIBIT # 7 - FIREARM
TLH
1/08/92 FILED: MOTION TO REQUIRE BALLISTICS TESTING
TLH
t/09/92 FILED: ORDER REQUIRING BALLISTICS TESTING
TLH
FILED: RECEIPT OF EXHIBIT # 7- FIREARM (DEP PAM HUMPHREYS)
'/06/92 FILED: MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL DATE
TLH
TLH
FILED: MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR INVESTIGATOR
TLH
FILED: NOTICE OF HEARING (10-7-92)
TLH
/'07/92 Continuance
JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES L.
TAPE: 920493
COUNT:
0272
TLH
Deft Present
TLK
ATD: WRIGHT, J MACARTHUR
ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENT
TLH
CUSTODY: County Sheriff
TLH

°<1ti<h rr^u/l

U

DOCKET

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEORGE

Defendant
Reference:921500702
FRAUSTO, RICHARD ANDREW

, J
Page
TUESWRY
JANUARY 14, 199
TUESWft
2:09 P
COA Case: 921500702 FS
State Felony

10/07/92 COURT GRANTS DEF MOTION FOR CONT OF JURY TRIAL AND MOTION FOR
TL
$1000 ADDITIONAL FUNDS. MR LANGSTON CONCURS. JURY TRIAL TO
TL
BE RESCHEDULED FOR LATE NOV OR EARLY DEC
TL
Gjr
10/19/92 TRJ
on 10/22/92 was cancelled
^Q
A**o(3->\
TRJ
on 10/23/92 was cancelled
7 / f^jSr^vJTv
GH
TRJ
on 10/26/92 was cancelled
\)
GK]
FILED: REPORTER'S PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT (08-10-92)
GH]
10/22/92 Notice of Setting
[ 3 day trial ]
JN,
TRJ
scheduled for 12/15/92 at 0900 A in room D with JLS JN,
PTC
scheduled for 12/09/92 at 0900 A in room D with JLS JN,
(JURY TRIAL SET FOR 12/15/92, 12/17/92 & 12/18/92)
JN:
12/07/92 HRG
scheduled for 12/ 7/92 at 2:30 P in room C with JLS JN,
FILED: NOTICE OF HEARING
.
_
GH!
FILED: STIPULATED MOTION FOR COURT REPORTER
GK
FILED: ORDER FOR COURT REPORTER [JLS 12-09-92]
GH1
MINUTE ENTRY
GH!
Hearing:
JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES L.
GH!
TAPE: 920594
COUNT:
1199
GH1
Deft Present
GH1
ATD: WRIGHT, J MACARTHUR
ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENT
GW
12/09/92 MINUTE ENTRY
GK
FILED: SUBPOENA AND RETURN OF SERVICE (7)
GSi
GRANT AREND
GSi
CONNIE FRAUSTO
GSi
DAVID ICE
GSi
DEBBIE HERN
GSi
MELANIE LEE AREND
GSi
TRISH ICE
GSi
KATHY SCHEAR
GSi
Hearing (PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE):
JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES L.
GH!
TAPE: 920596
COUNT:
1576
GH!
Deft Present
GH1
ATD: WRIGHT, J MACARTHUR
ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENT
GH1
CUSTODY: County Sheriff
GH1
12/14/92 TRJ
scheduled for 12/16/92 at 10:00 A in room D with JLS TL3
FILED: ORDER FOR COURT REPORTER
SU
FILED: DEFENDANT'S" REQUESTED "JURY ~INSTRUCTT CITS
~
-- JN!
12/15/92 JURY TRIAL:
JAMES L SHUMATE
TL1
ATP W BRENT LANGSTON
ATD J MACARTHUR WRIGHT
TIJ
12/16/92 CONTINUANCE OF JURY TRIAL
TL!
12/17/92 CONTINUANCE OF JURY TRIAL
TD
12/18/92 FILED: DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
TLi
FILED: SUBPOENA'S AND RETURN OF SERVICE
GSi
JOSHUA MICHAELS
GSi
TROY WILKINSON
GSi
WILLIAM LEE DORNEY
GS£
LEIGHANN REBER
GSi
CONTINUANCE OF JURY TRIAL
TLi
JURY VERDICT: GT LTY AS CHARGED ON INFORMATION
TLi
DEFENDANT WAIVE TIME FOR SENTENCING
TLI
' SENTENCE: 5 YE 3 TO 3SED
LIFE IMPRISONMENT.
TLI
*
77
NO FINE IMPOSED.
J? . t,in\
.J^\
TLI
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Reference:921500702
ifendant
FRAUSTO, RICHARD ANDREW
1/18/92
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COA Case: 921500702 FS
State Felony
TUES%*(y

;f 1 YEAR CONSECUTIVE TO 5 YEARS (WEAPON ENHANCEMENT) + TLH
5 YEARS CONSECUTIVE TO 5 YEARS (WEAPON ENHANCEMENT)
TLH
FOR A TOTAL OF 11 YEARS TO LIFE.
TLH
•" RESTITUTION ORDERED AMOUNT TO BE DOUBLED AFTER DETERM TLH
INATION BY COA
TLH
DEFENDANT COMMITED TO CUSTODY OF SHERIFF FOR TRANSPOR TLH
TO UTAH STATE PRISON
TLH
Chrg: 76-5-203 Find: Guilty - Jury
(*? \
TLH
FILED: SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION
^-/)
&LA£
^V
TLH
FILED: MENU FOR JURORS (COURT EXHIBIT #3)
TLH
i
FILED: COURT EXHIBIT #1
TLH
FILED: COURT EXHIBIT #2
TLH
FILED: JURY -INSTTUCFIONS
TLH.
FILED: JURY VERDICT
TLH
HRG
scheduled for 12/23/92 at 8:00 A in room D with JLS
GHM
MINUTE ENTRY
GHM
Hearing:
JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES L.
GHM
COUNT:
0020
GHM
TAPE: 920588
Deft Present
GHM
ATD: WRIGHT, J MACARTHUR
ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENT
GHM
CUSTODY: Dept of Corrections
GHM
FILED: JUDGMENT, RESTITUTION JUDGMENT, SENTENCE & COMMITMENT
GSS
Entered case disposition of: Closed
GSS
FILED: NOTICE OF APPEAL
GHM
FILED: REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT
GHM
FILED: ORDER TO PROVIDE TRANSCRIPT [JLS 01-21-93]
GHM
FILED: AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
GHM
•AMENDED NOTICE APPEAL FORWARDED TO UTAH SUPREME COURT
GHM
FILED: SUPREME COURT THIS DAY NOTICE OF APPEAL CASE #930034
GHM
FILED: NOTICE OF TRANSFER FROM SUPREME COURT TO UTAH COURT
GHM
OF APPEALS FOR DISPOSITION
GHM
FILED: WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY AND APPEARANCE OF SUBSTITUTE
GSS
COUNSEL (MICHAEL MILLER)
GSS
FILED: REPORTERS TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS (FOUR VOLUMES)
JBH
FILED: REPORTERS HEARING TRANSCRIPT (12-23-92)
JBK
FILE SENT TO SUPREME COURT
JBH
FILED: LETTER FROM SUPREME COURT T5ENT TO COtfRT OF APPEALS)
GSS
FILED: UTAH COURT OF APPEALS CASE # 930357-CA
GHM
FILED: LETTER FROM UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
GHM
Notice of Setting
TLH
HRG
scheduled for 05/25/95 at 0900 A in room D with JLS TLH
*SET FOR HEARING PER JLS
TLH
HRG
rescheduled to 5/25/94 at 9:00 A in room D with JLS SLW
FILED: TRANSPORTATION ORDER [JLS 05-18-94]
GHM
Hearing:
JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES L
VPF
TAPE: 940265
COUNT:
0001
VPF
ATD: Deft pro se
ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENT
VPF
Deft Present and pro se
VPF
REV
scheduled for 6/ 1/94 at 9:00 A in room D with JLS
ONE
FILED: EX PARTE MOTION TO CONTINUE
KLH
FILED: ORDER OF CONTINUANCE(JLS 5/31/94)
KLH
REV
rescheduled to 6/ 8/94 at 9:00 A in room D with JLS JNS

4t*\

1/21/92
:/23/92

/06/93
/20/93
/21/93
/22/93
/26/93
/28/93
/10/93
/08/93
/11/93
/03/93
/16/93
/08/93
/03/94
/09/94
/19/94
/25/94

/31/94
/01/94

ft

fm\ ^3 U^O

>W:
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Defendant
Reference:921500702
FRAUSTO, RICHARD ANDREW
JN
06/06/94 FILED: TRANSPORTATION ORDER (JLS 6-3-94)
HRG IND
scheduled for 6/ 8/94 at 8:54 A in room D with JLS
GH
REV
on 6/ 8/94 was cancelled
GH
GH
06/08/94 MINUTE ENTRY
Hearing (INDIGENCY HEARING):
JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES L » K\ GH
TAPE: 940284
COUNT:
0040
GH
ATD: None Present
ATP: LUDLOW, ERIC „ D*^\
GH
GH
Deft Present
-dff^
CUSTODY: Dept of Corrections
GH
GH
THE ISSUE OF THE PRIOR PUBLIC DEFENDER IS MUTE. MR. LUDLOW
THE WASHINGTON COUNTY ATTORNEY IS ATTEMPTING TO RETAIN COUN- GH;
GH
SEL IN IRON COUNTY TO ASSIST THE DEFENDANT.
GH
THE HEARING IS CONTINUED TO JUNE 1-5, 1994,.
scheduled for 6/15/94 at 8:54 A in room D with JLS
GH;
HRG
06/14/94 HRG
rescheduled to 6/15/94 at 1:29 P in room D with JLS GH
06/15/94 MINUTE ENTRY
GH
JUDGE:
SHUMATE,
JAMES
L
GH
Hearing:
2260
GHi
TAPE: 940293
COUNT:
ATP:
LANGSTON,
W
BRENT
GH
ATD: HOLM, FLOYD W
GHi
Deft Present
GHi
CUSTODY: Dept of Corrections
GHi
MR. FLOYD HOLM IS RETAINED BY WASHINGTON COUNTY TO ASSIST
THE DEFENDANT WITH HIS APPEAL AND HEARINGS. COUNSELS REQUIRE GHi
ADDITIONAL TIME BEFORE PROCEEDING. THE HEARING IS RESCHEDUL- GH
GH
ED FOR JULY 13, 1994 AT 1:30 P.M. ON MOTON TO SUPPLEMENT
THE RECORD.
GHi
06/16/94 HRG
scheduled for 7/13/94 at 1:30 P in room D with JLS
GH
06/22/94 FILED: NOTICE OF ENTRY OF APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL (F HOLM)
SL'
07/11/94 HRG
rescheduled to 7/13/94 at 1:29 P in room D with JLS JN,
07/13/94 Hearing:
JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES L
JN,
TAPE: 940319
COUNT:
0624
JN;
ATD: None Present
ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENT
JN:
Deft not present
JN;
MR LANGSTON INFORMS THE COURT THAT STIPULATION HAS BEEN
JN:
REACHED BETWEEN COUNSEL AS TO MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD;
JN:
COURT INSTRUCTS MR LANGSTON TO SUBMIT WRITTEN STIPULATION WHICH JN:
HAS BEEN SIGNED BY COUNSEL AND DEFENDANT —
--•-•••
JN
10/14/94 FILED: ORDER SUPPLEMENTAL RECORD) (JLS 10/12/94)
MJ]
03/06/95 **CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING SUPPLEMENTAL RECORD TO THE
TIJ
COURT OF APPEALS
TL1
03/09/95 **FILE MAILED TO COURT OF APPEALS ON REQUEST (SUE)**
TL!
09/14/95 FILED: COPY OF LETTER TO FLOYD W HOLM FROM UTAH COURT OF APPEALS CM:
RE: BRIEFING SCHEDULE
CM:
11/28/95 FILED: LETTER FROM DEFENDANT RE: DISMISSAL OF ATTORNEY FLOYD
CM:
HOLM
*PER JLS, FILE
CM:
12/28/95 FILED: LETTER FROM DEFENDANT REQUESTING COPY OF FILE
CM:
01/09/96 *COPY OF DOCKET MAILED TO DEFENDANT
CM!
*COPY OF LETTER MAILED TO UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CM!
01/12/96 FILED: LETTER TO JUDGE SHUMATE FROM DEFENDANT RE: NEW COUNSEL
CM:
FILED: MEMORANDUM DECISION [JLS 1-12-96]
CM!
(COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION ON MOTION - COURT OF APPEALS) CM!
02/06/96 FILED: ORDER FROM UTAH COURT OF APPEALS (MATTER IS TEMPORARILY CM!

fu*\ W

fimf}
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2/06/96

REMANDED TO FIFTH DISTRICT FOR EXPEDITED HEARING RE:
CMS
DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL'S ALLEGED CONFLICT OF INTEREST)
CMS
**COPIES OF THESE DOCUMENTS ARE INCLUDED WITH THE ORDER:
CMS
LETTER FROM RICHARD FRAUSTO TO UTAH COURT OF APPEALS (2/2/96) CMS
CROSS-MOTION FOR REMAND FOR HEARING ON COUNSEL
CMS
rcj\
CMS
MOTION TO SUSPEND BRIEFING SCHEDULE
AA^S?^?)
n
CM3
AFFIDAVIT OF FLOYD W HOLM
- # ^ . Jr2_}
2/07/96 Notice of Setting
'
CPS
HRG
scheduled for 02/21/96 at 1100 A in room D with JLS CPS
J/08/96 FILED: NOTICE OF HEARING (2/21/96)
CMS
J/15/96 RECEIVED: "FAXED" COVER LETTER AND ORDER OF TRANSPORTATION
CMS
FILED: ORDER OF TRANSPORTATION [JLS 2-15-96]
CMS
*FAXED TO FLOYD HOLM ON 2/16/96
CMS
>/21/96 MINUTE ENTRY
GHM
Hearing:
JUDGE: SHUMATE, JAMES L
GHM
TAPE: 960072
COUNT:
11:11
GHM
ATD: HOLM, FLOYD W
ATP: LANGSTON, W BRENT
GHM
Deft Present
GHM
CUSTODY: Dept of Corrections
GHM
DUE TO CONFLICT MR. FLOYD W HOLM IS RELEASED FROM THE CASE & GHM
MR. THOMAS A BLAKELY IS APPOINTED TO REPESENT THE DEFENDANT. GHM
1/22/96 FILED: ORDER [JLS 2-22-96) (FLOYD HOLM RELEASED AS COUNSEL AND CMS
THOMAS BLAKELY APPOINTED)
CMS
:/23/96 FILED: NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL AS COUNSEL (FLOYD W HOLM)
CMS
:/26/96 FILED: CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING (PAGE 5 - SUPPLEMENTAL
CMS
INDEX OF RECORD ON APPEAL AND COPIES OF ALL DOCUMENTS
CMS
LISTED)
CMS
/18/96 Began tracking Appeal
Review on 06/30/96 CMS
./13/96 Appeal
Review date changed to 12/31/96 CMS
/01/96 FILED: ORDER OF DISMISSAL FROM UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CMS
Ended tracking of Appeal
CMS
/14/96 FILED: REMITTITUR AND COPY OF DISMISSAL FROM UTAH COURT OF
CMS
APPEALS
CMS
/I4/97 FILED: LETTER FROM DEFENDANT REQUESTING COPIES
TLH
PER JLS: SEND COPY OF JUDGMEMNT AND COPY OF DOCKET TO DEFENDANT TLH
Citation Amount:
ditional Case Data
Sentence Summary
1. MURDER
Prison: 11
2. POSS DNGR WEAP

98 YR

Plea: Not Guilty
Suspended:
Plea:

Case Disposition
Disposition....: Closed

Find: Guilty - Jury
Find: Dismissed
DATE: 01/06/93

Parties
Atty for Plaintiff
LANGSTON, W BRENT
178 NORTH 200 EAST
ST GEORGE

UT 84770

Work Phone: (801) .634-5723

D O C K E T
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COA Case: 921500702 FS
State Felony
TUE&w^Y

Reference:921500702
Defendant
FRAUSTO, RICHARD ANDREW
Atty for Defendant

.*<\ , W&)

BLAKELY, THOMAS A
P O BOX 2181
205 EAST TABERNACLE
ST GEORGE
UT 847712181
Personal Description
Sex: M
DOB: 06/30/54
Dr. Lie. No.:

Home Phone: (
)
Work Phone: (801) 628-5130

State: UT

Scheduled Hearing Sumwary
HEARING
FUGITIVE HEARING
HEARING
HEARING
HEARING

on
on
on
on
on

Expires:

05/25/94
06/08/94
06/15/94
07/13/94
02/21/96

0900
0854
0129
0129
1100

A
A
P
P
A

End of the docket report for this case.
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room
room
room
room

D
D
D
D
D

with
with
with
with
with
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SUPPLEMENTAL RECORD
State of Utah vs. Richard Andrew Frausto
District Court Case #921500702 FS
Court of Appeals Case #930347-CA
6/3/93
6/16/93
10/8/93
5/3/94
5/19/94
5/25/94
5/31/94
6/1/94
6/6/94
6/8/94
6/15/94
7/13/94
10/14/94

3-6-95

Letter from Supreme Court re: Court of Appeals court
Letter from Court of Appeals re: case number
Letter from Court of Appeals re: extension to file brief
Notice of Hearing (5/25/94)
Transportation Order
Minute Entry - Notice
Ex Parte Motion to Continue
Order of Continuance
Transportation Order
Minute Entry - Notice
Minute Entry - Notice
Minute Entry - Notice
Order Supplementing Record

n

1348
1349
1350
1351-1352
1353
1354-1355
1356
1357
1358
1359
1360
1361
1362-1364

Mailing Certificate

I do hereby certifiy that I mailed, postage prepaid, or sent via United Postal Service,
prepaid, the supplemental pleadings in file State of Utah vs Richard Andrew Frauston, court
case 921500702 FS, court of appeals # 930347-CA, to the Court of Appeals , on this 6th
day of March, 1995.

Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 Esat, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

Tauna Hammer
Deputy Court Clerk
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